Operation Jihad | |||||||
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Part of First Chechen War | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||
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Aslan Maskhadov Shamil Basayev Ruslan Gelayev | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
August 6: 15,000-20,000 |
August 6: 1,300-2,000 | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
Official losses: 494 killed 182 missing 1,407 wounded | 40+ to 500 killed |
In the August 1996 battle of Grozny Chechen rebels conducted a rapid assault (code-named Operation Jihad) on the Chechnya capital Grozny,[1] leading to the final ceasefire in the First Chechen War.
The Russians had occupied the capital since February 1995, and had garrisoned 10,000 Russian Ministry of the Interior (MVD) troops there. The Chechens managed to either rout or split the Grozny garrison into dozens of small pockets of resistance, and over the next five days to beat back and decimate several Russian Army units that were sent to oust them from the city.[2] The Russian defeat effectively ended the war.
Background
In July 1996, the Russian leadership abandoned the peace process and decided to continue military operations. Between July 9 and July 16 1996, Russian armed forces carried out a series of major operations in the foothills and settlements of mountainous southern Chechnya where the separatists had their bases. On July 20 1996, federal forces launched a large-scale operation in the south of the Chechen Republic.
On August 6 1996, at 5:50 AM local time, Chechen forces raided Grozny in a surprise attack. Russian forces began executing a major operation in the settlement of Alkhan-Yurt, southwest of Grozny, on the federal Rostov-Baku highway by moving 1,500 Interior Ministry troops and pro-Moscow Chechen militiamen of Doku Zavgayev out of Grozny. Ironically, these forces were moving out of the city as their opponents were entering it.
Chechen attack (August 6)
The Chechen units attacking Grozny consisted of 1,300 to 2,000 men (initially, Russian media reported only 250 fighters had entered the city). Within a week, their numbers grew to between 6,000 and 7,000, as a result of an influx of reinforcements and volunteers, and also because some of the Zavgayev's forces changed sides. Russian federal forces consisted of some 15,000 to 20,000 men. The Russians enjoyed superiority in armored vehicles and artillery, and absolute control of airspace.
The Chechen chief of staff, Aslan Maskhadov, employed tactics which proved highly damaging to the Russian forces. Chechen units entered Grozny and infiltrated between the checkpoints and other positions of Russian forces, before attacking their targets. The main attack in Grozny was over in three hours with a total of 47 Chechen fighters killed in action, according to the Chechen commander Tourpal Ali-Kaimov.
Rather than capturing or destroying the individual Russian checkpoints, police stations, command posts and other pockets of resistance, the Chechens simply blocked them, isolating them from each other and cutting off from escape or reinforcement, and demoralized them with a constant mortar and sniper fire. The largest pocket was the administrative complex in the city center, which included the government building, the Interior Ministry and the republican FSB headquarters; a number of Russian government journalists were also holed up inside. In other part of the city, several groups of trapped Russian troops took approximately 500 civilian hostages at the Municipal Hospital No. 9.[3] The pro-Russian Chechen government fled to the military base outside capital.[4]
At the same time, Chechen units also attacked other major towns in the republic, namely Argun and Gudermes. While federal forces managed to hold the commander’s building in Argun, Gudermes was taken without a fight. A number of Chechens deemed to be collaborators were rounded up, detained, and executed. Reliable sources stated that the execution list for one region of Grozny comprised more than 200 names.[5] Said-Magomed Kakiyev was the only survivor of the group of 30 Chechen OMON policemen who were executed by the men of Doku Umarov and Ruslan Gelayev after the defenders of the city mayor's office surrendered on August 6, reportedly on the promise of free passage.
Russian counterattacks (August 7-11)
The Russian Army forces stationed at Khankala Airfield and Grozny Airport initially calculated that their opponents would leave the city of their own accord after the raid, and thus did not hurry to the aid of those under siege in the Interior Ministry. The first attempts to alleviate the situation were not undertaken until the afternoon of August 7, when an armored column was sent to the aid of the besieged Russian positions. However, the day before, the Chechen group led by Akhmed Zakayev had captured a large supply of RPO flamethrowers by seizing the Grozny railway station (some Chechen sources later stated it was merely a Russian propaganda claim). As a result, Russian tanks became much easier targets for the Chechen mobile units, who stopped the Russian advance quickly.
The Russians sent another column in the following day. But, like the New Year’s Eve offensive 19 months before, the Russians lost many tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) to the Chechen ambush tactics. On the fifth day, 900 men of the 276th Regiment tried to take the center of the city, and within two days, 150 were dead and 300 were wounded. Over the course of five days, the counter-attacking Russian forces lost 18 tanks, 69 APCs and armoured fighting vehicles, 23 trucks, and three helicopters. Only on August 11, the sixth day of fighting, did a few tanks succeed in getting through to the city center, bringing limited supplies and evacuating some of the wounded. On the same day, Russian state television ORT journalist Ramzan Khadzhiev was executed by federal soldiers while trying to flee the city.
Truce (August 11-14)
On August 10, retired Army's Lieutenant General Alexander Lebed was named the Russian President’s plenipotentiary to Chechnya. Convinced that military victory was impossible with the means at his disposal, he decided to enter into negotiations with the separatists.
On the night of August 11 1996 Lebed opened negotiations with Aslan Maskhadov and compelled the Russian commander Konstantin Pulikovsky to join them. The Minister of Defense, Igor Rodionov, had been appointed with Lebed’s personal recommendation, which enabled the latter to control the military. The Interior Minister, Anatoly Kulikov, with the reputation of being a hawk, was neutralized by Lebed who accused him of abandoning Grozny. He also convinced Russian President Boris Yeltsin of the correctness of his course, in part due to the extremely difficult situation of the federal forces.
Ceasefire (August 14-19)
Since August 14, the Chechen forces had almost completely controlled Grozny. The Russian command declined to take back the city and concentrated on retaining their bases at Khankala and Severny airport. In the city, there remained some centers of resistance with around 2,000 servicemen still blocked in their positions. But with shortages of ammunition, medicine, food and water, they were doomed to destruction, either by enemy fire or by friendly air or artillery strikes. Argun and Gudermes were in the separatists’ hands, and the Chechen force was also increasing its activities around Urus-Martan and Vedeno.
Under these circumstances, Lebed succeeded in obtaining a ceasefire in Grozny beginning August 14, and on August 17 1996 General Pulikovsky signed an order terminating all military activity in the republic.
Renewed fighting and the ultimatum (August 19-20)
The hawks’ last attempt to torpedo the peace process occurred on August 19. On that day, General Pulikovsky issued an ultimatum to the rebels to leave Grozny within 48 hours - in the event of non-compliance, attacks would be launched from all directions and with all available means. The threat resulted in mass panic among the civilian population, estimated by the human rights organization Memorial at between 50,000 to 70,000.
Air and artillery strikes commenced in the early hours of August 20, before the end of the deadline, condemning the remaining federal forces in the city as well as the civilians. In the chaotic scenes as "the Russian bombs and shells destroyed entire apartment blocks and at least one hospital, and hit residential suburbs with wild inaccuracy" (Human Rights Watch), terrified refugees tried to save themselves from the announced threat of the carpet bombing.[6] Many of them were reported killed when their columns were hit by the artillery fire.[7]
End to the war (August 20-30)
General Lebed, however, managed to avert further bloodshed. After returning to Chechnya on August 20, he ordered a cease fire and returned to talks with the rebel leaders. On August 30, 1996, Lebed and Maskhadov signed the Khasav-Yurt Accord, marking the end of the First Chechen War.
Aftermath
The Khasav-Yurt Accord paved the way for the signing of two further agreements between Russia and Chechnya. In mid-November 1996, Yeltsin and Maskhadov signed an agreement on economic relations and reparations to Chechens who had been "affected" by the 1994-96 war and in May 12 1997 Maskhadov and Boris Yeltsin signed a formal treaty in Moscow "on peace and the principles of Russian-Chechen relations."[8]
The incursion into Dagestan in the summer of 1999, however, led to a breach of these treaties and the start of the Second Chechen War.
See also
References
- ^ Violence erupts again in Chechnya CNN, 6 August 1996
- ^ Russia's Forces Unreconstructed
- ^ Occupation of Municipal Hospital No. 9
- ^ Rebel attack on Grozny intensifies CNN, August 7, 1996
- ^ The Violation of Human Rights and Norms of Humanitarian Law in the Course of the Armed Conflict in the Chechen Republic
- ^ Lebed Seeks to Avert Slaughter Of Civilians in Chechen Conflict Los Angeles Times, August 22, 1996
- ^ Lebed calls off assault on Grozny The Telegraph, 22 August 1996
- ^ YELTSIN, MASKHADOV SIGN PEACE AGREEMENT.
- Hot August in Grozny by Oleg Lukin for Prague Watchdog
- The Battle(s) of Grozny by Ib Faurby, Royal Danish Defence College in co-operation with Märta-Lisa Magnusson, University of Southern Denmark.
- View From the Wolves' Den - The Chechens and Urban Operations: The Recapture of Grozny by David P. Dilegge
- Oliker, Olga (2001) Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat MR 1289, Rand, Santa Monica, CA, ISBN 0-8330-2998-3 Chapter 2: "Grozny I: 1994-1995" pp. 30-32
- Evangelista, Matthew (2002) The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., ISBN 0815724985
- Youngs, Tim The Conflict in Chechnya Research Paper 00/14, 7 February 2000, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, London, UK