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|term_start1 = 15 September 1949 |
|term_start1 = 15 September 1949 |
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|term_end1 = 16 October 1963 |
|term_end1 = 16 October 1963 |
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|predecessor1 = ''Office created'' |
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|predecessor1 = Position created <br> [[Joseph Goebbels]]<br><small>''as Chancellor of Germany''</small><br>[[Lutz von Krosigk]]<br><small>''as Leading Minister of Germany''</small> |
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|successor1 = [[Ludwig Erhard]] |
|successor1 = [[Ludwig Erhard]] |
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|office2 = [[Minister for Foreign Affairs (Germany)|Minister of Foreign Affairs]] |
|office2 = [[Minister for Foreign Affairs (Germany)|Minister of Foreign Affairs]] |
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|term_start2 = 15 March 1951 |
|term_start2 = 15 March 1951 |
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|term_end2 = 6 June 1956 |
|term_end2 = 6 June 1956 |
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|predecessor2 = |
|predecessor2 = ''Office created'' |
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|successor2 = [[Heinrich von Brentano]] |
|successor2 = [[Heinrich von Brentano]] |
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|office3 = [[Christian Democratic Union of Germany|Leader of the Christian Democratic Union]] |
|office3 = [[Christian Democratic Union of Germany|Leader of the Christian Democratic Union]] |
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|term_start3 = 21 October 1950 |
|term_start3 = 21 October 1950 |
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|term_end3 = 23 March 1966 |
|term_end3 = 23 March 1966 |
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|predecessor3 = |
|predecessor3 = ''Office created'' |
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|successor3 = [[Ludwig Erhard]] |
|successor3 = [[Ludwig Erhard]] |
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|office6 = [[List of mayors of Cologne|Mayor of Cologne]] |
|office6 = [[List of mayors of Cologne|Mayor of Cologne]] |
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|term_start8 = 1922 |
|term_start8 = 1922 |
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|term_end8 = 26 April 1933 |
|term_end8 = 26 April 1933 |
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|predecessor8 = |
|predecessor8 = ''Office created'' |
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|successor8 = [[Robert Ley]] |
|successor8 = [[Robert Ley]] |
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|birth_name=Konrad Hermann Joseph Adenauer |
|birth_name=Konrad Hermann Joseph Adenauer |
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===Early life and education=== |
===Early life and education=== |
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Konrad Adenauer was born as the third of five children of Johann Konrad Adenauer (1833–1906) and his wife Helene (née Scharfenberg; 1849–1919) in [[Cologne]], [[Rhine Province|Rhenish Prussia]], on 5 January 1876.<ref name=oryx>{{cite book|title=Government Leaders, Military Rulers, and Political Activists|year=2001|publisher=Oryx Press|location=Westport, CT|page=4|url=http://www.questia.com/read/106890738/government-leaders-military-rulers-and-political|editor=David W. Del Testa|chapter=Adenauer, Konrad}} {{Subscription required|via=Questia}}</ref> His siblings were August (1872–1952), Johannes (1873–1937), Lilli (1879–1950) and Elisabeth, who died shortly after birth in c. 1880. One of the formative influences of Adenauer's youth was the ''[[Kulturkampf]]'', an experience that as related to him by his parents left him with a lifelong dislike for "Prussianism", and led him like many other Catholic Rhinelanders of the 19th century to deeply resent the Rhineland's inclusion in Prussia.<ref>Jenkins, Roy ''Portraits and Miniatures'', London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 p. 81</ref> |
Konrad Adenauer was born as the third of five children of Johann Konrad Adenauer (1833–1906) and his wife Helene (née Scharfenberg; 1849–1919) in [[Cologne]], [[Rhine Province|Rhenish Prussia]], on 5 January 1876.<ref name=oryx>{{cite book|title=Government Leaders, Military Rulers, and Political Activists|year=2001|publisher=Oryx Press|location=Westport, CT|page=4|url=http://www.questia.com/read/106890738/government-leaders-military-rulers-and-political|editor=David W. Del Testa|chapter=Adenauer, Konrad}} {{Subscription required|via=Questia}}</ref> His siblings were August (1872–1952), Johannes (1873–1937), Lilli (1879–1950) and Elisabeth, who died shortly after birth in c. 1880. One of the formative influences of Adenauer's youth was the ''[[Kulturkampf]]'', an experience that as related to him by his parents left him with a lifelong dislike for "Prussianism", and led him like many other Catholic Rhinelanders of the 19th century to deeply resent the Rhineland's inclusion in Prussia.<ref>Jenkins, Roy ''Portraits and Miniatures'', London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 p. 81</ref> |
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In 1894, he completed his [[Abitur]] and started to study law and politics at the universities of [[University of Freiburg|Freiburg]], [[Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich|Munich]] and [[University of Bonn|Bonn]]. He was a member of several [[Roman Catholic]] students' associations under the [[Katholischer Studentenverein Arminia Bonn|K.St.V. Arminia Bonn]] in Bonn. He graduated in 1900<ref name=oryx /> and afterwards worked as a lawyer at the court in Cologne. Adenauer had ill health as a young man |
In 1894, he completed his [[Abitur]] and started to study law and politics at the universities of [[University of Freiburg|Freiburg]], [[Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich|Munich]] and [[University of Bonn|Bonn]]. He was a member of several [[Roman Catholic]] students' associations under the [[Katholischer Studentenverein Arminia Bonn|K.St.V. Arminia Bonn]] in Bonn. He graduated in 1900<ref name=oryx /> and afterwards worked as a lawyer at the court in Cologne. Adenauer had ill health as a young man and was rejected for military service at age 20 because of his lungs. |
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He was greatly interested in the use of medicinal herbs, according to famous French herbalist Maurice Messugue, whom he met and befriended. Adenauer credited his strong health in older age to the use of an infusion of barley water taken at night, but also maize stigma, mallow, sage, and yellow roses, which he used for coughs he was prone to. These were his favourite medicinal plants according to Messugue, though he had extensive knowledge of a wide range of plants. He agreed with MM that plants had to be free of sprays and not grown too artificially. He told Messugue that he owed his good health to "the plants, to nature." |
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Adenauer found relaxation and great enjoyment in the Italian game of [[bocce]] and spent a great deal of his post political career playing this game. His favorite holiday place to do this was in [[Cadenabbia]], Italy, in a rented villa overlooking Lake Como, which has since been acquired as a conference centre by the [[Konrad Adenauer Foundation|Konrad Adenauer Stiftung]], the political foundation established by Adenauer's political party [[Christian Democratic Union (Germany)|Christian Democratic Union (CDU)]]. |
Adenauer found relaxation and great enjoyment in the Italian game of [[bocce]] and spent a great deal of his post political career playing this game. His favorite holiday place to do this was in [[Cadenabbia]], Italy, in a rented villa overlooking Lake Como, which has since been acquired as a conference centre by the [[Konrad Adenauer Foundation|Konrad Adenauer Stiftung]], the political foundation established by Adenauer's political party [[Christian Democratic Union (Germany)|Christian Democratic Union (CDU)]]. |
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[[File:Cologne WWI Notgeld Banknote 10 Pfg 1918 I.jpg|left|thumb|Cöln Notgeld Banknote 10 Pfennig 1918, signed by Mayor Konrad Adenauer, on the reverse the historical town hall of [[Cologne]] (Rathaus).]] |
[[File:Cologne WWI Notgeld Banknote 10 Pfg 1918 I.jpg|left|thumb|Cöln Notgeld Banknote 10 Pfennig 1918, signed by Mayor Konrad Adenauer, on the reverse the historical town hall of [[Cologne]] (Rathaus).]] |
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[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 102-05952, Wilhelmshaven, Stapellauf Kreuzer »Köln«.jpg|thumb|In [[Wilhelmshaven]] in 1928, when a new cruiser was given the name of Adenauer's (centre, with left hand visible) town ''Köln'']] |
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 102-05952, Wilhelmshaven, Stapellauf Kreuzer »Köln«.jpg|thumb|In [[Wilhelmshaven]] in 1928, when a new cruiser was given the name of Adenauer's (centre, with left hand visible) town ''Köln'']] |
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As a devout Catholic, he joined the [[Centre Party (Germany)|Centre Party]] in 1906 and was elected to Cologne's city council in the same year. In 1909, he became Vice-Mayor of Cologne, an industrial metropolis with a population of 635,000 in 1914. Avoiding the extreme political movements that attracted so many of his generation, Adenauer was committed to bourgeois common-sense, diligence, order, Christian morals and values, and was dedicated to rooting out disorder, inefficiency, irrationality and political immorality. |
As a devout Catholic, he joined the [[Centre Party (Germany)|Centre Party]] in 1906 and was elected to Cologne's city council in the same year. In 1909, he became Vice-Mayor of Cologne, an industrial metropolis with a population of 635,000 in 1914. Avoiding the extreme political movements that attracted so many of his generation, Adenauer was committed to bourgeois common-sense, diligence, order, Christian morals and values, and was dedicated to rooting out disorder, inefficiency, irrationality and political immorality.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|p=94}} From 1917 to 1933, he served as Mayor of Cologne and became qua office a member of the [[Prussian House of Lords]]. |
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[[File:Hoerle Zeitgenossen.jpg|thumb|[[Heinrich Hoerle]]: ''Zeitgenossen'' (contemporaries). An expressionist painting with mayor Adenauer (in grey) together with artists and a boxer.]] |
[[File:Hoerle Zeitgenossen.jpg|thumb|[[Heinrich Hoerle]]: ''Zeitgenossen'' (contemporaries). An expressionist painting with mayor Adenauer (in grey) together with artists and a boxer.]] |
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Adenauer headed Cologne during [[World War I]], working closely with the army to maximize the city's role as a rear base of supply and transportation for the Western Front. He paid special attention to the civilian food supply, |
Adenauer headed Cologne during [[World War I]], working closely with the army to maximize the city's role as a rear base of supply and transportation for the Western Front. He paid special attention to the civilian food supply, enabling the residents to avoid the worst of the severe shortages that beset most German cities during 1918–1919.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|pp=97-99}} In the face of the collapse of the old regime and the threat of revolution and widespread disorder in late 1918, Adenauer maintained control in Cologne using his good working relationship with the Social Democrats. In a speech on 1 February 1919 Adenauer called for the dissolution of Prussia, and for the Prussian Rhineland to become a new autonomous ''Land'' (state) in the ''Reich''.<ref name="Epstein pages 536-545">Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536–545 from ''The Review of Politics'', Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 page 539.</ref> Adenauer claimed this was the only way to prevent France from annexing the Rhineland.<ref name="Epstein pages 536-545"/> Both the ''Reich'' and Prussian governments were totally against Adenauer's plans for breaking up Prussia.<ref>Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536–545 from ''The Review of Politics'', Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 pages 539–540.</ref> When the terms of the [[Treaty of Versailles]] were presented to Germany in June 1919, Adenauer again suggested to Berlin his plan for an autonomous Rhineland state and again his plans were rejected by the ''Reich'' government.<ref>Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536–545 from ''The Review of Politics'', Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 pages 540–541.</ref> |
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He was mayor during the postwar British occupation. He established a good working relationship with the British military authorities, using them to neutralize the workers' and soldiers' council that had become an alternative base of power for the city's left wing. |
He was mayor during the postwar British occupation. He established a good working relationship with the British military authorities, using them to neutralize the workers' and soldiers' council that had become an alternative base of power for the city's left wing.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|pp=128-131}} During the [[Weimar Republic]], he was president of the Prussian State Council (Preußischer Staatsrat) from 1921 to 1933, which was the representation of the [[provinces of Prussia]] in its legislation. Since 1906, a major debate within the ''Zentrum'' concerned the question if the ''Zentrum'' should "leave the tower" (i.e. allow Protestants to join to become a multi-faith party) or "stay in the tower" (i.e. continue to be a Catholic only party). Adenauer was one of the leading advocates of "leaving the tower", which led to a dramatic clash between him and Cardinal [[Michael von Faulhaber]] at the 1922 ''Katholikentag'', where the Cardinal publicly admonished Adenauer for wanting to take the ''Zentrum'' "out of the tower".<ref>Mitchell, Maria ''The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany'' Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 20.</ref> |
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In mid-October 1923, the Chancellor [[Gustav Stresemann]] announced that Berlin would cease all financial payments to the Rhineland and that the new [[German Rentenmark|''Rentemark'']], which had replaced the now worthless ''Mark'' would not circulate in the Rhineland.<ref>Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536–545 from ''The Review of Politics'', Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 pages 541–542.</ref> To save the Rhineland economy, Adenauer opened talks with the French High Commissioner [[Paul Tirard]] in late October 1923 for a Rhenish republic in a sort of economic union with France which would achieve Franco-German reconciliation, which Adenauer called a "grand design".<ref name="ReferenceA">Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536–545 from ''The Review of Politics'', Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 page 542.</ref> At the same time, Adenauer clung to the hope that the ''Rentemark'' might still circulate in the Rhineland. Adenauer's plans came to nought when Stresemann, who was resolutely opposed to Adenauer's "grand design", which he viewed as borderline treason, was able to negotiate an end to the crisis on his own.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> |
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Adenauer flirted with [[Rhenish Republic|Rhenish separatism]] (a Rhenish state as part of Germany, but outside [[Free State of Prussia|Prussia]]). Adenauer's relations with France and the Rhinish separatist movement in 1923 was to be the source of considerable controversy both at the time and later in his career with many accusing Adenauer of treason while Adenauer's defenders have argued that he was a loyal German who merely was coping with very difficult conditions caused by the hyper-inflation of 1923 that had destroyed the German economy.<ref>Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536–545 from ''The Review of Politics'', Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 page 536.</ref> In October–November 1923, Adenauer was involved in talks with the French and the ''Reich'' government under what terms might an autonomous Rhineland state be created, arguing that this was the only way to save the economy.<ref>Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536–545 from ''The Review of Politics'', Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 page 541.</ref> This was especially the case when in mid-October 1923, the Chancellor [[Gustav Stresemann]] announced that Berlin would cease all financial payments to the Rhineland and that the new [[German Rentenmark|''Rentemark'']], which had replaced the now worthless ''Mark'' would not circulate in the Rhineland, a policy that would in effect economically sever the Rhineland from the rest of Germany by forcing the Rhinelanders to use the worthless mark while the rest of Germany was using the new ''Rentemark''.<ref>Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536–545 from ''The Review of Politics'', Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 pages 541–542.</ref> On 24–25 October 1923, Adenauer met with Stresemann to discuss the ramifications of the new currency policy with Adenauer arguing that Stresemann had abandoned the Rhineland, and if this continued, then he would have no other choice, but to reach an accommodation with the French to save the Rhineland economy and Stresemann telling Adenauer that in effect that he could not care less about the Rhineland, and that the Rhinelanders have to do whatever necessary to survive.<ref>Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad ''Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'', Oxford: [[Berghahn Books]], 1995 pages 179–182.</ref>{{Clarify|date=April 2014}} From Stresemann's viewpoint, his first priority was to save the German economy, and the Rhineland would to be written off for the moment with the additional caveat that the Rhinelanders would have to engage in talks with the French that could be disallowed if Stresemann disapproved of their direction that they were going.<ref>Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad ''Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'', Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 182.</ref> Adenauer for his part remained loyal to Germany, but at the same time his first priority was in rescuing the Rhineland economy from the effects of the hyper-inflation by working out whatever arrangement necessary with the French to save the Rhineland economy.<ref>Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad ''Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'', Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 183.</ref> |
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In 1926, the ''Zentrum'' suggested that Adenauer become Chancellor, an offer that he was interested in, but in the end he rejected when the [[German People's Party]] insisted that one of the conditions for entering into a coalition under Adenauer's leadership was that [[Gustav Stresemann]] stay on as Foreign Minister.<ref>[[Jenkins, Roy]] ''Portraits and Miniatures'', London: [[Bloomsbury Reader]], 2012 page 88</ref> Adenauer who disliked Stresemann as "too Prussian" rejected that condition, which marked the end of his chance of becoming Chancellor in 1926.<ref>Jenkins, Roy ''Portraits and Miniatures'', London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 pages 81 & 88</ref> |
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Faced with this situation, Adenauer opened talks with the French in late October 1923 for a Rhinish republic, using Cardinal [[Karl Joseph Schulte]] as his middle-men to arrange talks with the French High Commissioner [[Paul Tirard]].<ref name="ReferenceA">Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536–545 from ''The Review of Politics'', Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 page 542.</ref> During his talks with Tirard, Adenauer showed himself to be one of the few German politicians who were sensitive to French concerns about ''sécurité'' ("security" i.e. the French fear if Versailles were to be undone, then that Germany's greater population and larger economy would allow Germany to destroy a France gravely weakened by the war), and argued for a "grand design" which would achieve Franco-German reconciliation.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> Adenauer maintained to Tirard that to sever the Rhineland from Germany as opposed to Prussia would end any possibility of Franco-German reconciliation and that the best way of achieving that reconciliation would was a Rhineland republic which would be in a sort of economic union with France.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> At the same time, Adenauer clung to the hope that the ''Rentemark'' might still circulate in the Rhineland. Adenauer protested furiously against the new currency policy at a Cabinet meeting in Berlin that he was allowed to attend on 13 November 1923, arguing to the ''Reich'' Finance Minister [[Hans Luther]] had abandoned the Rhineland, stating that: "the Rhineland must be worth more than one or two or even three new currencies. But if the ''Reich'' Finance Minister wants to save the new currency, his ulterior motive is to abandon the Rhineland in order to rid of reparations".<ref name="Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad page 184">Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad ''Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'', Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 184.</ref>{{Clarify|date=April 2014}} The meeting ended with Stresemann telling Adenauer again that the ''Rentemark'' would not circulate in the Rhineland, and that the Rhinelanders were on their own for the time being, a policy that encouraged Adenauer to expand upon his talks with Tirard.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad page 184"/> Adenauer's plans came to nought when Stresemann, who was resolutely opposed to Adenauer's "grand design", which he viewed as borderline treason and who seems to have regretted his advice to Adenauer to work out an arrangement with the French when he learned how far he was prepared to go, was able to negotiate an end to the crisis on his own.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> The fear that Adenauer might be able to successfully negotiate his "grand design" with the French, which Stresemann believed would set in motion not only the dissolution of Prussia, but also the ''Reich'' played a major role in motivating Stresemann to reach his own settlement with the French.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> In 1926, the ''Zentrum'' suggested that Adenauer become Chancellor, an offer that he was interested in, but in the end he rejected when the [[German People's Party]] insisted that one of the conditions for entering into a coalition under Adenauer's leadership was that [[Gustav Stresemann]] stay on as Foreign Minister.<ref>[[Jenkins, Roy]] ''Portraits and Miniatures'', London: [[Bloomsbury Reader]], 2012 page 88</ref> Adenauer who disliked Stresemann as "too Prussian" rejected that condition, which marked the end of his chance of becoming Chancellor in 1926.<ref>Jenkins, Roy ''Portraits and Miniatures'', London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 pages 81 & 88</ref> |
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===Years under the Nazi government=== |
===Years under the Nazi government=== |
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[[File:Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-F000656-0038, Rhöndorf, Konrad Adenauer, lesend.jpg|thumb|Adenauer in 1951, reading in his house in Rhöndorf he built in 1937. It is now a museum.]] |
[[File:Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-F000656-0038, Rhöndorf, Konrad Adenauer, lesend.jpg|thumb|Adenauer in 1951, reading in his house in Rhöndorf he built in 1937. It is now a museum.]] |
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Election gains of Nazi Party candidates in municipal, state and national elections in 1930 and 1932 were significant. Adenauer, as mayor of Cologne and president of the Prussian State Council, still believed that improvements in the national economy would make his strategy work: ignore the Nazis and concentrate on the Communist threat. |
Election gains of Nazi Party candidates in municipal, state and national elections in 1930 and 1932 were significant. Adenauer, as mayor of Cologne and president of the Prussian State Council, still believed that improvements in the national economy would make his strategy work: ignore the Nazis and concentrate on the Communist threat. Adenauer thought the Nazis should be part of the Prussian and ''Reich'' governments based on election returns, even when he was already the target of intense personal attacks.<ref>Williams, p. 201.</ref> Political manoeuvrings around the aging President Hindenburg then brought the [[Nazi Germany|Nazis]] to power on 30 January 1933. |
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By early February Adenauer finally realized that all talk and all attempts at compromise with the Nazis were futile. Cologne's city council and the Prussian parliament had been dissolved; on 4 April 1933, he was officially dismissed as mayor and his bank accounts frozen. "He had no money, no home and no job."<ref>Williams, p. 212.</ref> After arranging for the safety of his family, he appealed to the abbot of the Benedictine monastery at [[Maria Laach Abbey|Maria Laach]] for a stay of several months |
By early February Adenauer finally realized that all talk and all attempts at compromise with the Nazis were futile. Cologne's city council and the Prussian parliament had been dissolved; on 4 April 1933, he was officially dismissed as mayor and his bank accounts frozen. "He had no money, no home and no job."<ref>Williams, p. 212.</ref> After arranging for the safety of his family, he appealed to the abbot of the Benedictine monastery at [[Maria Laach Abbey|Maria Laach]] for a stay of several months. According to [[Albert Speer]] in his book ''[[Spandau: The Secret Diaries]]'', Hitler expressed admiration for Adenauer, noting his civic projects, the building of a road circling the city as a bypass, and a "green belt" of parks. However, both Hitler and Speer concluded that Adenauer's political views and principles made it impossible for him to play any role in Nazi Germany. |
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Adenauer was imprisoned for two days after the [[Night of the Long Knives]] on 30 June 1934, but already on 10 August 1934, manoeuvring for his pension, he wrote a 10-page letter to [[Hermann Göring]] (the Prussian interior minister) stating among other things that as Mayor he had even violated Prussian laws in order to allow NSDAP events in public buildings and Nazi flags to be flown from city flagpoles, and added that in 1932 he had declared publicly that the Nazis should join the Reich government in a leading role.<ref>Cited by Peter Koch: ''Adenauer.'' Reinbek 1985</ref><ref>Letter to the Prussian Interior Minister of 10 August 1934 (after his firing), available online in: http://www.konrad-adenauer.de/index.php?msg=10045. Additional letter of 18 September 1962 that confirms the content of the 1934 letter, both reproduced in: Delmer, Sefton; Die Deutschen und ich; Hamburg 1963, S.751 (1962 Faksimilie), 752-60 (1934)</ref> Indeed, at the end of 1932, Adenauer had demanded a joint government by his Zentrum party and the Nazis for Prussia.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Ein Hohenzoller oder meinetwegen auch Hitler|first=Rudolf|last=Augstein|date=29 September 1986|work=[[Der Spiegel]]|language=German|url= http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13521797.html}} |
Adenauer was imprisoned for two days after the [[Night of the Long Knives]] on 30 June 1934, but already on 10 August 1934, manoeuvring for his pension, he wrote a 10-page letter to [[Hermann Göring]] (the Prussian interior minister) stating among other things that as Mayor he had even violated Prussian laws in order to allow NSDAP events in public buildings and Nazi flags to be flown from city flagpoles, and added that in 1932 he had declared publicly that the Nazis should join the Reich government in a leading role.<ref>Cited by Peter Koch: ''Adenauer.'' Reinbek 1985</ref><ref>Letter to the Prussian Interior Minister of 10 August 1934 (after his firing), available online in: http://www.konrad-adenauer.de/index.php?msg=10045. Additional letter of 18 September 1962 that confirms the content of the 1934 letter, both reproduced in: Delmer, Sefton; Die Deutschen und ich; Hamburg 1963, S.751 (1962 Faksimilie), 752-60 (1934)</ref> Indeed, at the end of 1932, Adenauer had demanded a joint government by his Zentrum party and the Nazis for Prussia.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Ein Hohenzoller oder meinetwegen auch Hitler|first=Rudolf|last=Augstein|date=29 September 1986|work=[[Der Spiegel]]|language=German|url= http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13521797.html}}</ref> |
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During the next two years, Adenauer changed residences often for fear of reprisals against him, while living on the benevolence of friends. With the help of lawyers in August 1937 he was successful in claiming a pension; he received a cash settlement for his house, which had been taken over by the city of Cologne; his unpaid mortgage, penalties and taxes were waived. With reasonable financial security he managed to live in seclusion for some years. After the [[July 20 Plot|failed assassination attempt on Hitler]] in 1944, he was imprisoned for a second time as an opponent of the regime. He fell ill and credited Eugen Zander, a former municipal worker in Cologne and communist, with saving his life. Zander, then a section [[Kapo (concentration camp)|Kapo]] of a labor camp near Bonn discovered Adenauer's name on a deportation list to the East and managed to get him admitted to a hospital. Adenauer was subsequently rearrested (and so was his wife), but in the absence of any evidence against him was released from prison at [[Brauweiler Abbey|Brauweiler]] in November 1944. |
During the next two years, Adenauer changed residences often for fear of reprisals against him, while living on the benevolence of friends. With the help of lawyers in August 1937 he was successful in claiming a pension; he received a cash settlement for his house, which had been taken over by the city of Cologne; his unpaid mortgage, penalties and taxes were waived. With reasonable financial security he managed to live in seclusion for some years. After the [[July 20 Plot|failed assassination attempt on Hitler]] in 1944, he was imprisoned for a second time as an opponent of the regime. He fell ill and credited Eugen Zander, a former municipal worker in Cologne and communist, with saving his life. Zander, then a section [[Kapo (concentration camp)|Kapo]] of a labor camp near Bonn discovered Adenauer's name on a deportation list to the East and managed to get him admitted to a hospital. Adenauer was subsequently rearrested (and so was his wife), but in the absence of any evidence against him was released from prison at [[Brauweiler Abbey|Brauweiler]] in November 1944. |
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===After World War II and the founding of the CDU=== |
===After World War II and the founding of the CDU=== |
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Shortly after the war ended, the American occupation forces once again installed him as [[Mayor of Cologne]], which had been heavily bombed. After the city was transferred into the British zone of occupation, however, the Director of its military government, General [[Gerald Templer]], dismissed Adenauer for incompetence in December 1945.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|pp=322-323}} The probable reason for this was that Adenauer considered the Germans the equals of the occupying Allies, a view the British did not appreciate, resulting in his sacking.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|pp=321-323}} Adenauer's dismissal by the British contributed much to his subsequent political success and allowed him to pursue a policy of alliance with the West in the 1950s without facing charges of being a "sell-out". |
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Shortly after the war ended, the American occupation forces once again installed him as mayor of Cologne, which had been heavily bombed. After the city was transferred into the British zone of occupation, however, the Director of its military government, General [[Gerald Templer]], dismissed Adenauer for incompetence in December 1945.<ref>Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 322–323</ref> In dismissing Adenauer from his position as mayor the British advised him not to "pursue, either directly or indirectly, any political activity whatsoever".<ref name="Adenauer at 90">{{citation|last= Kellen |first= Konrad |title= Adenauer at 90 | date= January 1966|journal= [[Foreign Affairs]]|volume= 44| issue= 2|page= 275 }}</ref> As mayor, Adenauer had clashed with the British military government a number of times in the summer and fall of 1945, and a speech lamenting the devastation of Cologne by Allied bombing was seen as implicitly anti-British since it was British bombers that had wrought the devastation that Adenauer bemoaned.<ref>Schwarz, Hans Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'', Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995, pages 321–323</ref> Adenauer always believed that the Labour government in Britain had favored their fellow socialists in the SPD in their zone of occupation in Germany, and that he was sacked by the British to improve the SPD's odds.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans Peter 1995, page 323">Schwarz, Hans Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'', Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995, page 323</ref> Adenauer's biographer Hans Peter Schwarz stated that this was unlikely given there is no evidence that the British were favoring the SPD over the CDU in their zone, and that in several cities of the Ruhr the British had installed CDU politicians as mayors.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans Peter 1995, page 323"/> Rather, it is more likely that Adenauer assumed that in 1945 that the Germans held the same position as they had under the Treaty of Versailles, namely defeated, but still more or less equal to the Allies. In May 1945, the Allies had abolished the German state, and as such the Germans were very much the inferiors of the occupying Allies, something that Adenauer did not appreciate, and was the most probable reason for his sacking. In a 1962 television interview, Adenauer commented that his sacking was a blessing in disguise, and that he would never have become Chancellor if he had not been sacked.<ref>Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 320–321</ref> Adenauer's sacking by the British military government gave him a reputation as a man who would stand up to the Allies, and contributed much to his subsequent political success and allowed him to pursue a policy of alliance with the West in the 1950s without facing charges of being a "sell-out". Adenauer never forgave the British for firing him, and in the 1950s–1960s, many British officials believed that Adenauer's unfriendly attitude towards them was due to his resentment of the humiliation of being ordered out of the Lord Mayor's office by British officers.<ref>Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 320</ref> |
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After |
After being dismissed, Adenauer devoted himself to building a new political party, the [[Christian Democratic Union of Germany|Christian Democratic Union]] (CDU), which he hoped would embrace both [[Protestantism|Protestants]] and Roman Catholics in a single party, and thereby achieve his long-standing goal of bringing the ''Zentrum'' "out of the tower". According to Adenauer, a catholic-only party would lead to German politics being dominated by anti-democratic parties yet again.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|pp=335-337}} In January 1946, Adenauer initiated a political meeting of the future CDU in the British zone in his role as doyen (the oldest man in attendance, ''Alterspräsident'') and was informally confirmed as its leader. Adenauer had become a leader almost by default. During the Weimar Republic, Adenauer had often been considered a future Chancellor and after 1945, his claims for leadership were even stronger.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|pp=345-346}} The other surviving ''Zentrum'' leaders were considered unsuitable for the tasks that lay ahead.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|pp=344-346}} |
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Reflecting his background as a Catholic Rhinelander who had long chafed under Prussian rule, Adenauer believed that Prussianism was the root cause of National Socialism, and that only by driving out Prussianism could Germany become a democracy.<ref name="Mitchell, Maria page 96">Mitchell, Maria ''The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany'' Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 96.</ref> In a December 1946 letter, Adenauer wrote that the Prussian state in the early 19th century had become an "almost God-like entity" that valued state power over the rights of individuals.<ref name="Mitchell, Maria page 96"/> Adenauer |
Reflecting his background as a Catholic Rhinelander who had long chafed under Prussian rule, Adenauer believed that Prussianism was the root cause of National Socialism, and that only by driving out Prussianism could Germany become a democracy.<ref name="Mitchell, Maria page 96">Mitchell, Maria ''The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany'' Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 96.</ref> In a December 1946 letter, Adenauer wrote that the Prussian state in the early 19th century had become an "almost God-like entity" that valued state power over the rights of individuals.<ref name="Mitchell, Maria page 96"/> Adenauer's dislike of Prussia even led him to oppose [[Berlin]] as a future capital.<ref>Mitchell, Maria ''The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany'' Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 97.</ref> Adenauer's ''Sonderweg'' view of German history, with National Socialism as a natural outgrowth out of Prussianism, sharply contrasted with the views of the Social Democratic leader [[Kurt Schumacher]], who saw National Socialism as a natural outgrowth of capitalism.{{sfn|Herf|1997|pp=218-219}} These two radically differing views of recent German history led Adenauer and Schumacher in turn to recommend very different solutions for a better future. For Schumacher, to banish National Socialism meant replacing the capitalist system with a Marxist socialist system, whereas, for Adenauer, banishing National Socialism meant purging Prussianism. |
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Adenauer viewed the most important battle in the post-war world as between the forces of Christianity and [[Marxism]], especially Communism."<ref>Mitchell, Maria ''The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany'' Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 132.</ref> In Germany during this period, the term Marxism described both the Communists and the Social Democrats as the latter were officially a Marxist party until the [[Godesberg Program|Bad Godesberg conference]] of 1959 when the SPD repudiated its commitment to achieving a Marxist society. The same anti-Marxist viewpoints led Adenauer to denounce the Social Democrats as the heirs to Prussianism and National Socialism.<ref>Mitchell, Maria ''The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany'' Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 133.</ref> Adenauer's ideology was at odds with many in the CDU, who wished to unite [[socialism]] and [[Christianity]].<ref>Williams, p. 307</ref> Adenauer worked diligently at building up contacts and support in the CDU over the following years, and he sought with varying success to impose his particular ideology on the party. |
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The term ''Sonderweg'' in Germany originally had the positive meaning in that the Prussian-German state was neither of the West or of the East. In Germany, there traditionally had been a sharp distinction between the ''Abendland'' (Evening Land) of the West, which included the United States and all of the European nations except Russia, and "the West", which did not include Germany.<ref name="Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus page 98">Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus ''Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West'', Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006 page 98</ref> In Germany, the term "Western civilization" meant countries like the U.S., Britain and France, whose people were supposedly materialist and soulless; Germany by contrast was on a ''Sonderweg'' (Special Way) because Germany had a special, mystical, spiritually enriching ''Kultur'' (culture) which made it completely superior to and separate from the corrupt "Western civilization".<ref>Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus ''Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West'', Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006 pages 96-98</ref> Starting in 1914, under the influence of the [[Spirit of 1914]], much of the German intelligentsia had published works praising German ''kultur'' often using extremely racist language as superior to the degenerate "Western civilization" with democracy being ridiculed as mere mobocracy.<ref name="Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus pages 97-98">Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus ''Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West'', Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006 pages 97-98</ref> Prussianism with its glorification of war and an authoritarian state was portrayed as the core of the special, mystical, life-improving ''Kultur''; the best form of government according to this viewpoint was an elite of gifted individuals whom should be entrusted with absolute power to govern the nation.<ref name="Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus pages 97-98"/> Thus, Germany was seen as a Western nation in that it was part of the ''Abendland'', but Germany was definitely not seen as part of "Western civilization" or "the West".<ref name="Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus page 98"/> This is also explains how Germany was portrayed in both world wars as supposedly defending the Western ''Abendland'' from the "Asiatic hordes" from Russia while at the same time "Western civilization" was denounced as "Roman-French leveling universalism".<ref name="Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus page 98"/> Adenauer believed that the ''Sonderweg'' had pushed Germany off the right path into a process that led to National Socialism, and it was necessary to end the distinction between the ''Abendland'' and the West".<ref>Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus ''Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West'', Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006 page 125</ref> Significantly, Adenauer often praised "Western civilization" in his speeches, which was a rather brave thing given that for most Germans at the time the term "Western civilization" had a negative meaning.<ref>Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus ''Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West'', Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006 page 68.</ref> Adenauer in his early post-war speeches often spoke of the need to "eliminate Germany's special position" and to restore unity to the ''Abendland'' by making the ''Abendland'' and "the West" one and the same.<ref>Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus ''Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West'', Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006 page 129-130</ref> |
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Adenauer's ''Sonderweg'' view of German history, with National Socialism as a natural outgrowth out of Prussianism, sharply contrasted with the views of the Social Democratic leader [[Kurt Schumacher]], who saw National Socialism as a natural outgrowth of capitalism.<ref>Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory'', Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 pages 218–219</ref> These two radically differing views of recent German history led Adenauer and Schumacher in turn to recommend very different solutions for a better future. For Schumacher, to banish National Socialism meant replacing the capitalist system with a Marxist socialist system, whereas, for Adenauer, banishing National Socialism meant purging Prussianism. In a speech attacking Schumacher's view of the Nazis as a creation of big business, Adenauer stated: <blockquote>"Big capital did not create National Socialism. National Socialism was not its invention. This can be clearly demonstrated. From the beginning, National Socialism was sharply directed against the Jews. However, Jews were important in the circles of big capital. Does anyone believe that these influential Jewish gentlemen would help their deadly enemies, the National Socialists, to attain political power? No, that powerfully underestimates the cleverness and intelligence of these men."<ref>Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory'', Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 page</ref></blockquote> Instead, Adenauer argued contra Schumacher that it was the German military, which had been the "inventor" of National Socialism.<ref>Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory'', Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 page 218</ref> Referring to the obsession of the military with creating a totalitarian ''Wehrstaat'' (Defense State) from the time of the First World War onwards and that Hitler had begun his political career in 1919 as a ''Reichswehr'' political lecturer, Adenauer argued that the military saw the power of the words National and Socialism for many Germans, "and created a new kind of socialism, National Socialism".<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 219">Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory'', Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 page 219</ref> Adenauer thus "sharply condemned" the viewpoint that "socialism meant salvation for the German people" or that capitalism had led to National Socialism.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 219"/> Instead, Germans needed a break with the traditional Prussian militarism, which saw the state as supreme with the duty of all being to serve the state in whatever it was doing.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 219"/> Adenauer commented that the traditional Prussian state worship mixed with materialism and a xenophobic, militaristic ultra-nationalism had created the ideology of "the total state and the mass without a will. It viewed one's own race the master race, one's own people as the master nation, other peoples as inferior, in part worthy of annihilation, and justified the annihilation of the political enemy in one's own race and in one's own people at any price".<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 215">Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory'', Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 page 215</ref> Adenauer called National Socialism as "nothing other than the consequence driven to the point of criminality of the idolization of power and the dismissal-yes, contempt for-the value of the individual person of the materialist worldview".<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 215"/> |
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Despite Adenauer's dislike of Protestantism, he was determined to build a new ''Zentrum'' that would be "out of the tower", and allow Protestants in to form a new political party that would represent all Christians in Germany, not just Catholics. Adenauer took the view that the decision to keep the ''Zentrum'' "in the tower" before 1933 had been a huge mistake, and to revive the ''Zentrum'' within "the tower" again would inevitably lead to German politics being dominated again by the Social Democrats, the Communists or the Nazis.<ref>Schwarz, Hans Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'', Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 335–337</ref> Adenauer argued that only a party that united conservative Catholics and Protestants would stop these possible outcomes.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans Peter page 336">Schwarz, Hans Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'', Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 336</ref> The need for a cross-confessional right-of-the-center party was the more pressing in Adenauer's viewpoint because most of the conservative German Protestants had been National Socialists, and even those who were not were still followers of the ideology of Prussianism.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans Peter page 336"/> As such, what was needed was a party led by Catholic politicians such as himself which would save conservative Protestants from themselves by weaning them away from Prussianism.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans Peter page 336"/> Furthermore, it was understood by Adenauer that only a party that won the vote of the millions who were National Socialists or the ''[[Mitläufer]]'' who went along with the regime would win a majority in post-war elections, and that to bring back ''Zentrum'' "within the tower" would leave right-wing Protestant voters open to the appeal of National Socialism or an ideology like it.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans Peter page 336"/> Adenauer argued that it was better to integrate right-wing Protestant voters into a "responsible Christian party" in order to have a better future without much thought as to whom these voters had supported in the past.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans Peter page 336"/> Adenauer's determination to integrate the right-wing nationalists who supported the Nazis into the CDU and thus into an acceptance of democracy explains much of the apparent paradox between his dislike of National Socialism and his willingness to accept men who had been very active in supporting the National Socialist dictatorship.<ref>Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'', New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages xii–xv.</ref> |
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Adenauer viewed the most important battle in the post-war world as between the forces of Christianity and [[Marxism]], especially Communism, writing in August 1945 that Germany needed a Christian alliance to provide: "strong resistance against the state system and ideology from the East-Russia-and a thoughtful and cultural and with that also a foreign policy alliance with the Western Europe. Only a planned integration of all Christian and democratic forces can protect us from the dangers threatening from the East."<ref>Mitchell, Maria ''The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany'' Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 132.</ref> In Germany during this period, the term Marxism described both the Communists and the Social Democrats as the latter were officially a Marxist party until the [[Godesberg Program|Bad Godesberg conference]] of 1959 when the SPD repudiated its commitment to achieving a Marxist society. In May 1946, Adenauer wrote that "great battle between Christianity and materialistic Marxism" meant all Christians needed to join forces to fight for the "freedom and dignity of the individual".<ref name="Mitchell, Maria page 133">Mitchell, Maria ''The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany'' Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 133.</ref> The same anti-Marxist viewpoints led Adenauer to denounce the Social Democrats as the heirs to Prussianism and National Socialism. In a speech, Adenauer declared: "As a German, I can only with the greatest regret establish that the old Prussian spirit, that ruthless undemocratic aspiration to exclusive power, speaks through the official announcements of the SPD in a way in which it has, up until now, only obsessed Prussian Junkerdom".<ref name="Mitchell, Maria page 133"/> |
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Adenauer worked diligently at building up contacts and support in the CDU over the next years, and he sought with varying success to impose his particular ideology on the party. His was an ideology at odds with many in the CDU, who wished to unite [[socialism]] and [[Christianity]]; Adenauer preferred to stress the dignity of the individual, and he considered both [[communism]] and [[Nazism]] materialist world views that violated human dignity.<ref>Williams, p. 307</ref> |
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Adenauer's leading role in the CDU of the British zone won him a position at the [[Parliamentary Council of 1948]], called into existence by the Western [[Allies of World War II|Allies]] to draft a constitution for the three western zones of Germany. He was the chairman of this constitutional convention and vaulted from this position to being chosen as the first head of government once the new "[[Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany|Basic Law]]" had been promulgated in May 1949. |
Adenauer's leading role in the CDU of the British zone won him a position at the [[Parliamentary Council of 1948]], called into existence by the Western [[Allies of World War II|Allies]] to draft a constitution for the three western zones of Germany. He was the chairman of this constitutional convention and vaulted from this position to being chosen as the first head of government once the new "[[Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany|Basic Law]]" had been promulgated in May 1949. |
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[[File:CDU Wahlkampfplakat - kaspl001.JPG|thumb|Election poster, 1949: "With Adenauer for peace, freedom and unity of Germany, therefore CDU"]] |
[[File:CDU Wahlkampfplakat - kaspl001.JPG|thumb|Election poster, 1949: "With Adenauer for peace, freedom and unity of Germany, therefore CDU"]] |
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[[File:Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-F002449-0027, Bonn, Bundestag, Pariser Verträge, Adenauer.jpg|thumb|Adenauer speaking in the ''Bundestag'', 1955.]] |
[[File:Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-F002449-0027, Bonn, Bundestag, Pariser Verträge, Adenauer.jpg|thumb|Adenauer speaking in the ''Bundestag'', 1955.]] |
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The first election to the [[Bundestag]] of West Germany was [[German federal election, 1949|held on 15 August 1949]], with the Christian Democrats emerging as the strongest party. |
The first election to the [[Bundestag]] of West Germany was [[German federal election, 1949|held on 15 August 1949]], with the Christian Democrats emerging as the strongest party. There were two clashing visions of a future Germany held by Adenauer and his main rival, the Social Democrat [[Kurt Schumacher]]. Adenauer favored integrating the Federal Republic with other Western states, especially France and the United States in order to fight the [[Cold War]], even if the price of this was the continued division of Germany. Schumacher by contrast, though an anti-Communist, wanted to see a united, socialist and neutral Germany. As such, Adenauer was in favor of joining NATO, something that Schumacher was adamantly opposed to. |
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The Free Democrat [[Theodor Heuss]] was elected the first [[President of Germany|President of the Republic]], and Adenauer was elected Chancellor (head of government) on 15 September 1949 with the support of his own CDU, the [[Christian Social Union of Bavaria|Christian Social Union]], the liberal [[Free Democratic Party of Germany|Free Democratic Party]], and the right-wing [[German Party (1947)|German Party]]. It was said that Adenauer was elected Chancellor by the new German parliament by "a majority of one vote - his own".<ref name="Adenauer at 90">{{cite journal |last= Kellen |first= Konrad |title= Adenauer at 90 |url= https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1966-01-01/adenauer-90| date=January 1966|journal=[[Foreign Affairs]]| volume= 44| issue= 2| page= 257| accessdate=6 July 2014}}</ref> At age 73,<ref name="1970s">{{cite book |title= How We Got Here: The 1970s|last= Frum|first= David|authorlink= David Frum|year= 2000|publisher= Basic Books|location= New York, New York|isbn= 0-465-04195-7|page= 8|pages= |url= }}</ref> it was initially thought that he would only be a caretaker Chancellor. However, he would go on to hold this post for 14 years, a period spanning most of the preliminary phase of the [[Cold War]]. During this period, the post-war division of Germany was consolidated with the establishment of two separate German states, the [[West Germany|Federal Republic of Germany]] (West Germany) and the [[German Democratic Republic]] (East Germany). |
The Free Democrat [[Theodor Heuss]] was elected the first [[President of Germany|President of the Republic]], and Adenauer was elected Chancellor (head of government) on 15 September 1949 with the support of his own CDU, the [[Christian Social Union of Bavaria|Christian Social Union]], the liberal [[Free Democratic Party of Germany|Free Democratic Party]], and the right-wing [[German Party (1947)|German Party]]. It was said that Adenauer was elected Chancellor by the new German parliament by "a majority of one vote - his own".<ref name="Adenauer at 90">{{cite journal |last= Kellen |first= Konrad |title= Adenauer at 90 |url= https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1966-01-01/adenauer-90| date=January 1966|journal=[[Foreign Affairs]]| volume= 44| issue= 2| page= 257| accessdate=6 July 2014}}</ref> At age 73,<ref name="1970s">{{cite book |title= How We Got Here: The 1970s|last= Frum|first= David|authorlink= David Frum|year= 2000|publisher= Basic Books|location= New York, New York|isbn= 0-465-04195-7|page= 8|pages= |url= }}</ref> it was initially thought that he would only be a caretaker Chancellor. However, he would go on to hold this post for 14 years, a period spanning most of the preliminary phase of the [[Cold War]]. During this period, the post-war division of Germany was consolidated with the establishment of two separate German states, the [[West Germany|Federal Republic of Germany]] (West Germany) and the [[German Democratic Republic]] (East Germany). |
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In the controversial selection for a "provisional capital" of the [[West Germany|Federal Republic of Germany]], Adenauer championed [[Bonn]] over [[Frankfurt am Main]]. The British had agreed to detach Bonn from their zone of occupation and convert the area to an autonomous region wholly under German sovereignty; the Americans were not prepared to grant the same for Frankfurt.<ref name="Williams, p. 340">Williams, p. 340</ref> |
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As part of his politics of integration, where those who had supported the Nazis were to be integrated into the democratic system, Adenauer's first important speech as Chancellor occurred on 20 September 1949, where he denounced the entire [[denazification]] process pursued by the Allied military governments between 1945–49.<ref>Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past'' New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 page 3.</ref> Adenauer attacked the "much misfortune and mischief" that he argued had been caused by denazification.<ref name="Frei, Norbert page 3">Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'' New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 page 3.</ref> Adenauer stated that those "truly guilty" of crimes during the National Socialist era deserved to be punished, but he argued that denazification was morally and practically wrong as it sought to punish the millions of Germans who supported the Nazi regime, which Adenauer claimed was unjust and unworkable.<ref name="Frei, Norbert page 3"/> Adenauer ended his speech with the remark that it was time for the distinction between "two classes of human beings in Germany", namely the "politically objectionable" because they had supported the Nazi regime and the "politically unobjectionable" because they had opposed the Nazi regime, to "vanish as fast as possible".<ref name="Frei, Norbert page 3"/> Despite his claim that he believed in punishing those guilty of crimes, Adenauer announced in the same speech that he was planning to bring in an amnesty law for the Nazi war criminals and he planned to apply to "the High Commissioners for a corresponding amnesty for punishments imposed by the Allied military courts".<ref name="Frei, Norbert page 3"/> Adenauer's speech caused some controversy outside of Germany because his sole reference to the Holocaust in his entire two hour speech was to the "anti-Semitic endeavors manifest here and there", a statement that many felt trivialized the genocide waged by the National Socialist regime.<ref>Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'' New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 page 4.</ref> |
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As chancellor, Adenauer tended to make most major decisions himself, treating his ministers as mere extensions of his authority. While this tendency decreased under his successors, it established the image of West Germany (and later reunified Germany) as a "chancellor democracy". |
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One of Adenauer's central projects as Chancellor, though rarely described publicly was a redefinition of German conservatism in order to put an end to the ''[[Sonderweg]]'' by anchoring Germany firmly into the West.<ref>Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys'' Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 pages 213–216</ref> A central feature of the original, positive version of ''Sonderweg'' theory put forward by followers of Prussianism in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century was the idea that the Prussian-German national state as the great Central European power neither of the West nor of the East. Instead Germany's "mission" was to offer in the form of [[reactionary modernism]] a superior "[[Third Position]]" between capitalist, liberal Western democracy and Russian autocracy/Soviet communism. Adenauer argued that there were two sorts of German conservatism; the brutal, militarist, statist, authoritarian Prussian conservatism, which Adenauer loathed and another sort which Adenauer associated with the cosmopolitan, cultured and peaceful middle classes of the Rhineland, which Adenauer himself belonged to.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 216">Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys'' Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 page 216</ref> Adenauer argued that Prussianism by glorifying war as the highest achievement in humanity, and by preaching mindless obedience to the state as the highest virtue had made the National Socialist dictatorship possible, and only by ending the Prussian type of conservatism and replacing it with the Rhineland conservatism could the future of German democracy be secured.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 216"/> Adenauer argued in a speech that the purpose of education was not to foster "a readiness to let oneself be controlled and led" as had traditionally been the case, but rather should be to encourage "the will and ability to incorporate oneself as a free individual aware of one's responsibility into the whole".<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 216"/> The American historian [[Jeffrey Herf]] argued that what Adenauer was trying to create was an "anti-authoritarian right" which would defend the rights of the individual against the state in place of the traditional Prussianist right which had defended the state against the rights of the individual.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 216"/> |
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In a speech on 20 September 1949, Adenauer denounced the entire [[denazification]] process pursued by the Allied military governments between, announcing in the same speech that he was planning to bring in an amnesty law for the Nazi war criminals and he planned to apply to "the High Commissioners for a corresponding amnesty for punishments imposed by the Allied military courts".{{sfn|Frei|2002|p=3}} Adenauer argued the continuation of denazification would "foster a growing and extreme nationalism" as the millions who supported the Nazi regime would find themselves excluded from German life forever.{{sfn|Herf|1997|p=217}} |
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To redefine German conservatism by purging Prussianism out of German life required the CDU to win the votes of those who once supported the Nazis in order to lead them away from their former beliefs to an acceptance of democracy.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 217">Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys'' Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 page 217</ref> Thus, Adenauer frequently made it clear that the rank and file of those who supported the NSDAP were more than welcome in the CDU provided that they were willing to accept democracy.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 217"/> Adenauer made it clear those who been part of the leadership cadre of the NSDAP together those who continued to believe in National Socialism were not welcome in the CDU, but for those Nazis or ''Mitläufer'' "who did not oppress others, who did not enrich themselves and broke no laws should be left in peace", a frequent remark that always drew applause from German audiences when Adenauer made it.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 217"/> For this reason, Adenauer was opposed to denazification arguing that it would "foster a growing and extreme nationalism" as the millions who supported the Nazi regime would find themselves excluded from German life forever.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 217"/> For Adenauer, the key word governing all his policies was '''integration'''.<ref>Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys'' Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 page 220</ref> In foreign policy, integration meant integrating Germany firmly into the Western institutions and alliances to end the ''Sonderweg'', which Adenauer argued had caused two world wars while in domestic policy integration meant persuading those who supported the Nazis into supporting democracy.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 220">Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys'' Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 page 220</ref> What Adenauer wanted in foreign policy was to lock the Federal Republic so firmly into Western institutions such as NATO and the [[European Coal and Steel Community]] that it would be impossible for a future German leader to act against the West, and German foreign policy initiatives could only come in conjunction with the other Western powers.<ref>Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys'' Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 page 268</ref> The policies of Western integration were thus meant to end the ''Sonderweg'' forever by integrating and embedding Germany so firmly into the West that it would be impossible for Germany to go to war with the Western nations as had happened in 1914 and again in 1939.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey pages 220 & 268">Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys'' Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 pages 220 & 268–269</ref> Also, to integrate Germany into Western institutions would require Germany to be an acceptable alliance partner for the Western states, which of course mean following the democratic norms of the West. Adenauer believed that as long Germany was not locked into the West, then the ''Sonderweg'' would continue in one form or another and inevitably another war would occur.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey pages 220 & 268"/> This is a major reason why Adenauer objected so strongly to Schumacher's idea of a neutral Germany in the Cold War as opening the door to another world war.<ref>Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys'' Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 pages 268–269</ref> In domestic policy, Adenauer claimed that treating Nazis like "second class persons" would only ensure the continuation of National Socialism while a strategy of integration of Nazis would ensure the success of democracy.<ref>Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys'' Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 page 223</ref> As part of strategy of integration, Adenauer always took a nationalist line on everything, always stressing his great pride in being German and sometimes went out of his way to annoy his Western allies in various petty ways just to prove that he was not the "Chancellor of the Allies" in order to win over nationalist voters to the CDU.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 501">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 501</ref> Adenauer wanted to win people over to his sort of nationalism which emphasized values such as justice and freedom as things that all Germans should cherish.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 501"/> |
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The Adenauer government refused to accept the [[Oder–Neisse line]] as Germany's eastern frontier.<ref>Duffy, Christopher ''Red Storm on the Reich'', Routledge: London, 1991 page 302</ref> This refusal was in large part motivated by his desire to win the votes of expellees and right-wing nationalists to the CDU, which is why he supported ''Heimatrecht'', i.e. the right of expellees to return to their former homes.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|p=638}} It was also intended to be a deal-breaker if negotiations ever began to reunite Germany on terms that Adenauer considered unfavorable such as the neutralization of Germany as Adenauer knew well that the Soviets would never revise the Oder-Neisse line.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|p=638}} Privately, Adenauer considered Germany's eastern provinces to be lost forever.{{sfn|Ahonen|1998|p=48}} |
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A major part of his strategy of integration led Adenauer to make paradoxical and contradictory arguments about German history.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 218">Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys'' Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 page 218</ref> On one hand, Adenauer argued that the Prussian-German state and its values had led straight to National Socialism while on the other hand in his attempt to win votes for the CDU, Adenauer portrayed the Nazi regime as a gang of few criminals entirely unrepresentative of German society, who somehow managed to dupe millions of good Germans into following them.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 218"/> For electoral purposes, Adenauer liked to promote the idea of the National Socialist regime as a small criminal gang with the vast majority of their supporters being people who Hitler had tricked into following him, and who done nothing wrong under the Third Reich.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 224">Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys'' Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 page 224</ref> In marked contrast to the [[German collective guilt|collective guilt]] theories popular in some quarters in the Allied countries where all Germans were considered equally guilty of National Socialist crimes, Adenauer went to the other extreme of collective exoneration where all living Germans were equally innocent of National Socialist crimes with his thesis that all of the Nazi crimes were the work of a small clique of men who were conveniently all dead.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey pages 223-224">Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys'' Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 pages 223–224</ref> Such a version of the past not only absolved almost all Germans of any responsibility for what had happened in the years 1933–45, but also allowed the story of the Third Reich to be presented as first and foremost as a story of German victimization at the hands of both their own regime and at the Allies rather than a story of Germans victimizing others.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 224"/> Adenauer's repeated statements that Hitler had deceived and tricked people into following him suggested that the Nazis themselves were in a certain sense victims of Hitler.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 224"/> For this reason, Adenauer insisted that a memorial day could be set aside for the victims of National Socialism as long as one included all of the Germans killed by Allied bombing or fighting in the Wehrmacht or the Waffen SS as being equally victims of National Socialism as those who died in the concentration camps or killed in the death camps.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 224"/> Adenauer's proposed memorial day was vetoed by the Allied High Commissioners as an act of unacceptable moral equivalence, who stated that those Germans killed in the Wehrmacht/Waffen SS fighting for the Nazi regime were victims of National Socialism, but were not victims of National Socialism in the same way as those were killed in the death camps were.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 224"/> For Adenauer a painful confrontation with the Nazi past was out of the question as it would cause feelings of shame and disgust amongst the Germans, which he believed would cause a nationalist backlash, and what was needed was a version of the past that would inspire pride in being German.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey pages 223-224"/> Herf wrote that for Adenauer neither memory nor justice mattered much in the pursuit of integration, and all that he cared about was that he achieve his aims.<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 220"/> |
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At the [[Petersberg Agreement]] in November 1949 he achieved some of the first concessions granted by the Allies, such as a decrease in the number of factories to be dismantled, but in particular his agreement to join the [[International Authority for the Ruhr]] led to heavy criticism. In the following debate in parliament Adenauer stated: |
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:<blockquote>''The Allies have told me that dismantling would be stopped only if I satisfy the Allied desire for security, does the Socialist Party want dismantling to go on to the bitter end?''<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,805208,00.html A Good European] ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' 5 December 1949</ref> |
:<blockquote>''The Allies have told me that dismantling would be stopped only if I satisfy the Allied desire for security, does the Socialist Party want dismantling to go on to the bitter end?''<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,805208,00.html A Good European] ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' 5 December 1949</ref>{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|p=450}}</blockquote> |
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The opposition leader [[Kurt Schumacher]] responded by labeling Adenauer "Chancellor of the Allies", accusing Adenauer of putting good relations with the West for the sake of the Cold War ahead of German national interests. |
The opposition leader [[Kurt Schumacher]] responded by labeling Adenauer "Chancellor of the Allies", accusing Adenauer of putting good relations with the West for the sake of the Cold War ahead of German national interests. |
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After a year of negotiations, the [[Treaty of Paris (1951)|Treaty of Paris]] was signed on 18 April 1951 establishing the [[European Coal and Steel Community]]. The treaty was unpopular in Germany where it was seen as a French attempt to take over German industry.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|p=608}} The treaty conditions were favorable to the French, but for Adenauer, the only thing that mattered was European integration.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|p=612}} Adenauer was keen to see Britain join the European Coal and Steel Community as he believed the more free-market British would counterbalance the influence of the more [[Dirigisme|''dirigiste'']] French, and to achieve that purpose he visited London in November 1951 to meet with Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]].{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|pp=612-613}} Churchill said Britain would not join the European Coal and Steel Community because doing so would mean sacrificing relations with the U.S and Commonwealth.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|p=613}} |
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Right from the beginning of his Chancellorship, Adenauer refused to accept the [[Oder–Neisse line]] as Germany's eastern frontier, and made it quite clear if Germany ever reunified, the Federal Republic would lay claim to all of the land that had belonged to Germany as of 31 December 1937 that now belonged to Poland and the Soviet Union.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans Peter page 638">Schwarz, Hans Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'', Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 638.</ref> In pursuit of this, the Adenauer government went to the Constitutional Court to receive a ruling that declared that legally speaking the frontiers of the Federal Republic were those of the German ''Reich'' as of 31 December 1937, that the [[Potsdam Declaration]] of 1945 which announced that the Oder-Neisse line was Germany's "provisional" eastern border was invalid, and that as such the Federal Republic considered all of the land east of the Oder-Neisse line that had belonged to Germany in 1937 to be "illegally" occupied by Poland and the Soviet Union.<ref>Duffy, Christopher ''Red Storm on the Reich'', Routledge: London, 1991 page 302</ref> The American historian [[Gerhard Weinberg]] has pointed out that the frontiers of 1937 that Adenauer laid claim to were the same frontiers established by the [[Treaty of Versailles]]-which the entire interwar German leadership had claimed to be totally unacceptable for twenty years from 1919 to 1939-which perhaps indicated that Versailles was nowhere near as harsh as claimed, especially when compared with the far greater territorial losses imposed by the Oder-Neisse line.<ref>Weinberg, Gerhard ''Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 page 11.</ref> Adenauer's refusal to accept the Oder-Neisse line was in large part motivated by domestic politics, namely his desire to win the votes of the right-wing nationalists who once voted for the Nazis to the CDU.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans Peter page 638"/> The various groups that represented the Germans who fled or were expelled from Eastern Europe formed a powerful lobby in the Federal Republic in the 1950s that no politician was willing to anger as 16% of the electorate in 1950 were people who fled or were expelled after the war.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 pages 41–42.</ref> As a result, the CDU, the CSU, the FDP and the SPD all issued statements opposing the Oder-Neisse line and supporting ''Heimatrecht'' ("right to one's homeland", i.e. that the expelles be allowed to return to their former homes).<ref name="Ahonen pages 31-63">Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 42.</ref> Adenauer never formally laid claim to the [[Sudetenland]], which had become part of Germany in 1938 as that would make his foreign policy seem too much like Hitler's for the comfort of his Western allies, but he argued in public for the right of the Sudeten Germans expelled in 1945–46 for ''Heimatrecht'' together with the related demand made by the Sudeten expellee leaders that a referendum be held in which the Sudeten expellees would vote to decide if the Sudetenland would be returned to Germany or stay part of Czechoslovakia.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 44.</ref> In this way, Adenauer came close to laying claim to the Sudetenland without actually doing so. Adenauer greatly feared the power of the expellee lobby, and told his cabinet in 1950 that he was afraid of "unbearable economic and political unrest" if the government did not champion all of the demands of the expellee lobby.<ref name="Ahonen pages 31-63"/> In addition, Adenauer's rejection of the Oder-Neisse line was intended to be a deal-breaker if negotiations ever began to reunite Germany on terms that Adenauer considered unfavorable such as the neutralization of Germany as Adenauer knew well that the Soviets would never consider revising the Oder-Neisse line.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans Peter page 638"/> Finally Adenauer's biographer, the German historian Hans Peter Schwarz has argued that Adenauer may have genuinely believed that Germany had the right to retake the land lost east of the Oder and Neisse rivers, despite all of the image problems this created for him in the United States and western Europe.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans Peter page 638"/> By contrast, the Finnish historian Pertti Ahonen—citing numerous private statements made by Adenauer that Germany's eastern provinces were lost forever and expressing contempt for the expellee leaders as delusional in believing that they were actually going to return one day to their former homes—has argued that Adenauer had no interest in really challenging the Oder-Neisse line.<ref name="Ahonen pages 31-63">Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 48.</ref> Ahonen wrote that Adenauer "saw his life's work in anchoring the Federal Republic irrevocably to the anti-Communist West and no burning interest in East European problems—or even German reunification."<ref name="Ahonen pages 31-63">Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 48.</ref> Adenauer's stance on the Oder-Neisse line was to create major image problems for him in the Western countries in the 1950s, where many regarded his revanchist views on where Germany's eastern borders ought to be with considerable distaste, and only the fact that East Germany was between the Federal Republic and Poland prevented this from becoming a major issue in relations with the West.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans Peter page 638"/> |
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From the beginning of his Chancellorship, Adenauer had been pressing for German rearmament. After the outbreak of the [[Korean War]] on 25 June 1950, the U.S. and Britain agreed that West Germany had to be rearmed to strengthen the defenses of Western Europe against a possible Soviet invasion. Further contributing to the crisis atmosphere of 1950 was the bellicose rhetoric of the East German leader [[Walter Ulbricht]], who proclaimed the reunification of Germany under communist rule to be imminent.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 124">Gaddis, John Lewis ''We Now Know'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 124.</ref>{{sfn|Large|1996|p=66}} To soothe French fears of German rearmament, the French Premier [[René Pleven]] suggested the so-called [[Pleven plan]] in October 1950 under which the Federal Republic would have its military forces function as part of the armed wing of the multinational [[European Defense Community]] (EDC).<ref>Gaddis, John Lewis ''We Now Know'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 125.</ref> Adenauer deeply disliked the "Pleven plan", but was forced to support it when it became clear that this plan was the only way the French would agree to German rearmament.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol.1|1995|pp=592-594}} |
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On 8 May 1950 Adenauer received a letter from the French foreign minister [[Robert Schuman]] suggesting that a "High Authority" with supranational authority controlling the coal and steel industries of France and West Germany as the best way to promote economic growth and end the [[French–German enmity|Franco-German enmity]].<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter pages 503-504">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 503–504</ref> Schumann had written the letter at the instigation of the French diplomat [[Jean Monnet]] who had conceived of what came to be known as the "Schuman plan".<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter pages 503-504"/> Adenauer immediately accepted Schuman's proposal.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 504</ref> Monnet did not know Adenauer personally, but he was able to overcome objections to the "Schuman plan" from within the Quai d'Orsay by arguing that based on their dealings with Adenauer in 1923 that here was a German leader with whom the French could trust. On 23 May 1950, Adenauer met with Monnet for the first time, who later recalled that the Chancellor "... was not a confident man, but one curious about what I had to say and who found it difficult to free himself of a certain mistrust. Apparently he could not believe that we really offering him equal rights, and the years of difficult negotiations and wounded pride still marked his attitude".<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 511</ref> The Franco-German talks began in Paris on 20 June 1950, which marked the first that the Federal Republic had appeared as an equal on the international stage.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 515</ref> As the Franco-German talks proceeded, other European nations decided to join the proposed coal and steel community. |
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In 1950, a major controversy broke out when it emerged that Adenauer's State Secretary [[Hans Globke]] had played a major role in drafting anti-semitic laws in Nazi Germany.<ref>Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 pages 37–40.</ref> Adenauer kept Globke on as State Secretary as part of his strategy of integration.{{sfn|Herf|1997|pp=289-290}} Starting in August 1950, Adenauer began to pressure the Western Allies to free all of the war criminals in their custody, especially those from the [[Wehrmacht]], whose continued imprisonment made West German rearmament impossible, Adenaeur claimed.<ref>Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 101 & 149.</ref> Adenauer had been opposed to the Nuremberg trial in 1945–46 and after becoming Chancellor he demanded the release of the so-called "Spandau Seven" as the seven war criminals convicted at [[Nuremberg Trials|Nuremberg]] and imprisoned at [[Spandau Prison|Spandau prison]] were known.<ref>Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 page 149.</ref><ref>Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 100–102.</ref> |
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Right from the moment that Adenauer assumed the Chancellorship, he been pressing for German rearmament, but the prospect of Germany being rearmed less than five years after the end of World War II encountered massive resistance from public opinion and key decision-makers in the U.S., U.K and especially France. When presented with a memo in early June 1950 from the Pentagon calling for West German rearmament, U.S. air force bases in Spain and including Taiwan within the U.S. "defensive perimeter", President [[Harry S. Truman]] wrote on the margin about the first two proposals: "Decidedly militaristic. Both as wrong as can be".<ref>Gaddis, John Lewis ''We Now Know'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 124.</ref> After the outbreak of the [[Korean War]] on 25 June 1950, the U.S. and Britain agreed that West Germany had to be rearmed to strengthen the defenses of Western Europe against a possible Soviet invasion. It was widely believed at the time that [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]] had ordered the North Korean invasion of South Korea in order to draw away American forces from Europe as part of a "general plan", so that the Red Army could overrun Western Europe.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 531">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 531</ref> The first Soviet nuclear test of August 1949 had greatly weakened European confidence in the American nuclear deterrent, and many Europeans believed that the Americans would never use their atomic bombs against the Soviet Union lest they provoke a Soviet retaliatory nuclear strike.<ref name="Large, David Clay page 43">Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 page 43.</ref> The Imperial General Staff of the British Army in a report in July 1950 warned that the Korean War was only the first step towards the Soviet conquest of the world and that there was a "real danger" of a Soviet invasion later that year while the French High Commissioner [[André François-Poncet]] was convinced that a Soviet invasion would happen for certain sometime in the summer of 1950.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 531"/> The Imperial General Staff also warned Whitehall that given that the United States was involved in Korea while France was involved in Vietnam that it would be Britain that would serve as the primary defender of the Federal Republic in the event of a Soviet invasion.<ref name="Large, David Clay page 43"/> These fears of a Soviet invasion in 1950 were especially strong because of the imbalance between Anglo-French-American forces in West Germany and Soviet forces in East Germany with most military experts predicating in the spring of 1950 before the Korean War had started that the Red Army could easily overrun most of West Germany within days and that the [[Rhine]] would be the first line of defense.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 526">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 526</ref> Field Marshal [[Bernard Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein|Bernard Montgomery]], serving as a senior advisor with NATO reported to London in 1950 that "it was utterly futile to pretend that we delay the Russians east of the Rhine for longer than a period of two or three days".<ref name="Large, David Clay page 43"/> In 1950, there were two and half American divisions, two British divisions and "a few" French divisions of dubious quality (the best French troops have been sent to fight in Vietnam) stationed in West Germany, which was widely considered to be no match for Soviet forces comprising 172 divisions based in East Germany.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 536">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 536</ref> Soviet military planning in the early 1950s called for in the event of war for the Red Army to begin at once a combined arms offensive that was to see the Red Army reach the [[English Channel]] within two-three days of war breaking out.<ref name="Gobarev pages 1-29">Gobarev, Victor "Soviet Military Planning and Activities During the East German Uprising of 1953" pages 1–29 from ''The Journal of Slavic Military Studies'', Volume 10, Issue #4, December 1997 page 15.</ref> The Russian historian Victor Gobarev wrote that the plans for Red Army tanks to reach the English Channel within two-three days of war beginning were "utterly realistic".<ref name="Gobarev pages 1-29"/> It was generally accepted that a Soviet invasion of West Germany would see a repeat of the same [[Soviet war crimes|widespread atrocities against German civilians]] that the Red Army had committed during operations in Germany in 1944–45.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 526"/> It is estimated that during the Soviet advance into Germany in 1945 that Red Army soldiers raped about two million German women and girls.<ref>Gaddis, John Lewis ''We Now Know'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, page 286</ref> As the terror, especially the mass gang rapes waged by Soviet troops in 1944–45 had scarred the German national psyche, most Germans had an obsessive fear of the Red Army, and it estimated that at the onset of a Soviet invasion, at least 8–10 million German civilians would flee west to France and the Low Countries, hindering the movement of NATO forces coming to the front and causing a total breakdown in German society.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 526–527</ref> Adenauer used the crisis atmosphere produced by the Korean War to argue that the Federal Republic needed a military, something that he had already believed in, but now saw a chance to achieve.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 516</ref> |
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By 1951 laws were passed by the [[Bundestag]] ending denazification. Denazification was viewed by the United States as counterproductive and ineffective, and its demise was not opposed.<ref>The Nazi-ferreting questionnaire cited 136 mandatory reasons for exclusion from employment and created red-tape nightmares for both the hapless and the guilty; see ''The New York Times'', 22 February 2003, p. A7.</ref> Adenauer's intention was to switch government policy to reparations and compensation for the victims of NS rule (''[[Wiedergutmachung]]'').<ref>Steinweis, Alan E., Rogers, Daniel E. ''The Impact of Nazism: New Perspectives on the Third Reich and Its Legacy.'' Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2003, p. 235</ref><ref name=Art/> Officials were allowed to retake jobs in civil service, with the exception of people assigned to Group I (Major Offenders) and II (Offenders) during the denazification review process.<ref name=Art>Art, David, ''The politics of the Nazi past in Germany and Austria'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 53–55</ref><ref>[http://www.bgbl.de/Xaver/media.xav?SID=anonymous3113862832518&tocf=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl_tocFrame&tf=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl_mainFrame&qmf=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl_mainFrame&hlf=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl_mainFrame&bk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&name=bgbl/Bundesgesetzblatt%20Teil%20I/1951/Nr.%2022%20vom%2013.05.1951/bgbl151s0307.pdf ''Gesetz zur Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse der unter Artikel 131 des Grundgesetzes fallenden Personen'' – 11 May 1951 (Bundesgesetzblatt I 22/1951, p. 307 ff.)]</ref> Adenauer pressured his rehabilitated ex-Nazis by threatening that stepping out of line could trigger the reopening of individual de-Nazification prosecutions. The construction of a "competent Federal Government effectively from a standing start was one of the greatest of Adenauer's formidable achievements".<ref name="Williams, p. 391">Williams, p. 391</ref> |
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The less than impressive performance of the American forces in Korea in the summer of 1950 as the Americans were pushed back by the North Koreans down the Korean peninsula to the [[Battle of Pusan Perimeter|Pusan Perimeter]] greatly helped advocates of German rearmament.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 536"/><ref name="Large, David Clay pages 66-67">Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 pages 66–67.</ref> In western Europe, the argument was made that if the Americans could not defeat [[North Korea]], then how could they be expected to fare against the mighty Red Army, which had vanquished the Wehrmacht in 1945? Accordingly, in his talks with [[Jean Monnet]] and [[André François-Poncet]] in the summer of 1950, Adenauer stressed that the Europeans had to look after their own defense rather depending upon the Americans, who could not even defeat North Korea, and that German rearmament was essential if the Europeans were to have any hope of stopping a Soviet invasion.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 536"/><ref name="Large, David Clay pages 66-67"/> Further contributing to the crisis atmosphere of 1950 was a speech by the East German leader [[Walter Ulbricht]] in [[Halle (Saale)|Halle]] in July 1950 where Ulbricht praised the North Korean leader [[Kim Il-sung]] as an example to be followed in his efforts to "liberate" South Korea and declared: "If the Americans in their imperialist arrogance believe the Germans have less national consciousness than the Koreans, then they have fundamentally deceived themselves".<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 124">Gaddis, John Lewis ''We Now Know'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 124.</ref> Ulbricht's suggestion that he might like to follow the example of "Comrade Kim" and invade West Germany because the Germans like the Koreans supposedly all longed to live in unity under Communism served to greatly alarm everyone in the West and increase fears of World War III being imminent.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 124"/> The U.S High Commissioner [[John J. McCloy]] wrote in a memo to President Truman on 18 July 1950 in the aftermath of Ulbricht's speech: "If no means are held out for the Germans to fight in an emergency, my view is that we should probably lose Germany politically as well as militarily without hope of regain. We should also lose, incidentally, a reserve of manpower which may become of great value in event of a real war and could certainly be used by the Soviets against us".<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 124"/> Even before the Korean War, Adenauer had warned the Allies that Ulbricht was not just a Communist, but also a German nationalist who found the partition of his country just as painful as almost all Germans did, and who would invade West Germany at the first chance to reunify Germany.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic 1876–1952'', Oxford: Berghan Books, 1995 pages 523–526</ref> On 3 August 1950, Ulbricht gave another speech in which he warned that the days of American "puppet governments" like those alleged to be ruling [[South Korea]] and [[West Germany]] were numbered, and it was now "high time to liquidate the nest of warmongers' in Bonn, just as was happening in Korea".<ref name="Large, David Clay page 66">Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 page 66.</ref> Ulbricht further added that he looked forward to the day when Adenauer and his cabinet would be tried before a "People's Court" in Berlin, and warned Adenauer and his government should escape to South America while there was still time.<ref name="Large, David Clay page 66"/> |
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In October 1950, Adenauer received the so-called "Himmerod Memorandum" drafted by four former Wehrmacht generals at the [[Himmerod Abbey]] that linked freedom for German war criminals as the price of German rearmament, along with public statements from the Allies that the Wehrmacht committed no war crimes in World War II.{{sfn|Large|1996|pp=97-98}} The Allies were willing to do whatever necessary to get the much-needed German rearmament underway and in January 1951 General [[Dwight Eisenhower]], commander of NATO forces, issued a statement which declared the great majority of the Wehrmacht had acted honorably.<ref>Bickford, Andrew ''Fallen Elites: The Military Other in Post–Unification Germany'', Stanford: 2011 pages 116–117</ref> |
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What was needed was a viable democratic German Army, free of the militarism and outlook of its wartime predecessor. The idea was that it would be essential for the defense of Germany and indeed all of Western Europe. On 11 August 1950, the former British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] gave a widely publicised speech in [[Strasbourg]] in which he warned that given the crisis in Korea that World War III could break out at any moment, and what was needed was a European Army, which would include troops from the Federal Republic under Allied command, which marked the first time that a politician from the one of the Allied nations had publicly urged German rearmament, albeit under strict Allied control.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 537">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 537</ref> Churchill's speech, coming as it did from a man who could not being accused of being soft on Germany, broke the taboo on German rearmament, and talks began on allowing it.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 537"/> On 17 August 1950, Adenauer gave an interview with the ''[[New York Times]]'', in which he claimed to have secret intelligence showing that the Soviet Union would invade later that year, and that only a "demonstration of Western power and preparedness could forestall Soviet aggression".<ref name="Large, David Clay page 70">Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 page 70.</ref> Adenauer went on to say the German people had little faith in American power given the recent defeats in Korea and were terrified of the "obviously aggressive intentions" of the paramilitary East German ''[[Volkspolizei]]'' (People's Police).<ref name="Large, David Clay page 70"/> Adenauer stated that solution was "a strong German defense force" capable of stopping "any possible aggression by the Soviet Zone People's Police in the Korean manner" together with the immediate dispatch of four first-rate American combat divisions to West Germany.<ref name="Large, David Clay page 70"/> By September 1950 the turn in the fortunes of the UN forces in Korea following the successful American landings at [[Battle of Inchon|Inchon]] had restored European confidence in American military power, which accordingly meant the French, who had strong fears of German rearmament, started to post objections in talks over German rearmament.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 589–590</ref> To break the impasse, the French Premier [[René Pleven]] then took up Churchill's idea of a European Army and suggested the [[Pleven plan]] in October 1950 under which the Federal Republic would never be allowed a military, but instead have its military forces function as part of the armed wing of the multinational [[European Defense Community]] (EDC).<ref>Gaddis, John Lewis ''We Now Know'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 125.</ref> The idea for the EDC military came from [[Jean Monnet]], who argued within the Quai d'Orsay that the West needed German rearmament, but at the same time that the Germans, even under Adenauer, could not be trusted with their own military forces, so hence the compromise of the EDC military.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 592</ref> Adenauer deeply disliked the "Pleven plan", and at first wanted to reject it, arguing that West Germany should have its own military, but changed his mind when it became clear that the French would only agree to German rearmament in the form of the "Pleven plan".<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 592–594</ref> Adenauer was able to overcome grave French objections and created the non-nuclear "Bundeswehr" based on democratic principles and practices that met the Allies' criteria.<ref>{{cite journal |first=Leo J. |last=Daugherty |title='Tip of the Spear': The Formation and Expansion of the Bundeswehr, 1949–1963 |journal=Journal of Slavic Military Studies |year=2011 |volume=24 |issue=1 |pages=147–177 |doi=10.1080/13518046.2010.549052 }}</ref> |
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On 2 January 1951, Adenauer met with the American High Commissioner, [[John J. McCloy]], to argue that executing the [[Landsberg Prison|Landsberg prisoners]] would ruin forever any effort at having the Federal Republic play its role in the Cold War.{{sfn|Frei|2002|p=157}} In response to Adenauer's demands and pressure from the German public, McCloy on 31 January 1951 reduced the death sentences of most of the 102 men at Landsberg, hanging only 7 of the prisoners while the rest of the condemned to death were spared.{{sfn|Frei|2002|pp=164-165}} |
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In 1950, a major controversy broke out when it emerged that Adenauer's State Secretary [[Hans Globke]], who been a high ranking civil servant under the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich had a dubious past under the latter.<ref>Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 pages 37–40.</ref> Globke had played a major role in drafting anti-Semitic laws in Nazi Germany and was praised on 25 April 1938 by the ''Reich'' Interior Minister Dr. [[Wilhelm Frick]] as "the most capable and efficient official in my ministry" when it came to drafting anti-Semitic laws.<ref>Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 page 39.</ref> On 12 July 1950 [[Adolf Arndt]], a SPD member of the ''Bundestag'' brought up Globke's career in Nazi Germany and accused him of having "committed mass murder with the help of legal paragraphs" on the floor of the ''Bundestag''.<ref>Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 page 40.</ref> In his reply, Adenauer stated he was saw nothing wrong with Globke's past that warranted his dismissal. Adenauer kept Globke on as State Secretary as part of his strategy of integration, namely to show the millions who had supported Hitler that if a man like Globke, despite everything he had done under the Third Reich, could go on to a good career in the Federal Republic, serving as Adenauer's right-hand man, then so could they.<ref>Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys'' Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 page 289-290</ref> Starting in August 1950, Adenauer began to pressure the Western Allies to free all of the war criminals in their custody, especially those from the [[Wehrmacht]], whose continued imprisonment Adenauer claimed made West German rearmament impossible as he maintained that Germans would not fight for the West against the Soviet Union as long as the Western nations imprisoned German officers for war crimes.<ref>Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 101 & 149.</ref> Besides for the Wehrmacht war criminals, Adenauer also wanted the release of the so-called "Spandau Seven" as the seven war criminals convicted at [[Nuremberg Trials|Nuremberg]] imprisoned at [[Spandau Prison|Spandau prison]] were known.<ref>Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 page 149.</ref> The "Spandau Seven" were [[Albert Speer]], Admiral [[Karl Dönitz]], Baron [[Konstantin von Neurath]], [[Rudolf Hess]], [[Walther Funk]], Admiral [[Erich Raeder]] and [[Baldur von Schirach]]. Adenauer had been opposed to the Nuremberg trial in 1945–46, and demanded right from the moment that he became Chancellor in 1949 that the Western Allies do everything in their power to free the "Spandau Seven" as a sign of friendship with Germany and claimed that this was essential to allow Germans to fight against the Soviets in case World War III should break out.<ref>Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 100–102.</ref> In response, during a lengthy correspondence over 1950–51, the three Allied High Commissioners informed Adenauer that conditions at Spandau were not inhumane as he claimed and that "the prisoners sentenced by the International Military Tribunal, serve their terms ... in accordance with the principles adhered to in all democratic countries".<ref>Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 105–106.</ref> |
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Contemporary critics accused Adenauer of cementing the division of Germany, sacrificing reunification and the recovery of territories lost in the westward shift of [[Poland]] and the [[Soviet Union]] with his determination to secure the Federal Republic to the West. Adenauer's German policy was based upon ''Politik der Stärke'' (Policy of Strength), and upon the so-called "magnet theory", in which a prosperous, democratic West Germany integrated with the West would act as a "magnet" that would eventually bring down the East German regime.{{sfn|Large|1996|p=70}} |
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During the early years of his chancellorship and with a broad consensus within the West German establishment in favor of amnesty and integration, Adenauer pressed for the ending of denazification efforts. The denazification process was viewed by the United States as counterproductive and ineffective, and its demise was not opposed.<ref>The Nazi-ferreting questionnaire cited 136 mandatory reasons for exclusion from employment and created red-tape nightmares for both the hapless and the guilty; see ''The New York Times'', 22 February 2003, p. A7.</ref> Adenauer's intention was to switch government policy to reparations and compensation for the victims of NS rule (''[[Wiedergutmachung]]'').<ref>Steinweis, Alan E., Rogers, Daniel E. ''The Impact of Nazism: New Perspectives on the Third Reich and Its Legacy.'' Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2003, p. 235</ref><ref name=Art/> In October 1950, Adenauer received the so-called "Himmerod Memorandum" drafted by four former Wehrmacht generals at the [[Himmerod Abbey]] that linked freedom for German war criminals as the price of German rearmament, or as the memo phrased it, German sacrifices in the defense of Western Europe could be expected "only when freedom and equality were returned to the German people".<ref name="Large, David Clay page 97">Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 page 97</ref> The leader of the committee was General [[Hermann Foertsch]], who was a close protégé of the fanatically Nazi General [[Walther von Reichenau]] and in the 1930s had been one of the officers in charge of National Socialist indoctrination of the German Army.<ref>Wette, Wolfram ''The Wehrmacht'', Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006 page 236.</ref> The Himmerod memo declared that the "psychological preconditions" for German rearmament would be public statements from the Allies that the Wehrmacht committed no war crimes in World War II and freedom for all "alleged war criminals" as the memo called those Germans convicted of war crimes, starting with the "Spandau Seven" convicted at Nuremberg.<ref>Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 page 98</ref> On 16 November 1950, Adenauer met with the three Allied High Commissioners for Germany, namely [[John J. McCloy]], [[André François-Poncet]] and Sir [[Ivone Kirkpatrick]], where he demanded that the Allies stop all war crimes trials, end the extradition of war crimes suspects to eastern Europe and free all of the men already imprisoned or facing execution for war crimes, which he maintained was the basic ''quid pro quo'' for German rearmament and alliance with the West against the Soviet Union.<ref>Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'' New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages 153–154.</ref> Adenauer was especially insistent that McCloy pardon all of the war criminals sentenced to death by American military courts at the [[Landsberg Prison|Landsberg prison]], arguing to McCloy that for most Germans the Landsberg prisoners were heroes and if the Americans were to hang those men, it would be impossible for West Germany to play its part if World War III were to break out with the Soviet Union.<ref>Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'' New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages 154–155.</ref> The entry of [[China]] into the Korean War in November 1950 had drastically raised the stakes in [[Korea]], and there were widespread fears in the West that World War III could break out at any moment, thus making it imperative that German rearmament get under way as soon as possible.<ref name="Large, David Clay pages 95-96">Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 pages 95–96</ref> Many at the time believed with Chinese and American soldiers fighting and killing one another in Korea that it was only a matter of time before this escalated into World War III. The British historian Colonel Michael Hickey wrote about the mood in late 1950 that: "The Joint Chiefs in Washington were still convinced that the Soviets were at the back of it all, employing the Chinese and North Koreans as their surrogates while plotting all-out war in other theatres; the world, they believed, was tottering on the brink of general war".<ref>Hickey, Michael ''The Korean War The West Confronts Communism'', New York: Overlook Press, 2001 page 115.</ref> Though the Truman administration had decided to fight a limited war in Korea, it was not clear in November 1950 if that would be the case, and it was widely believed at the time that there was a real possibility of the Chinese intervention marking the beginning of a wider conflict.<ref name="Large, David Clay pages 95-96"/> As a result, many in the West feared the outbreak of all out Sino-American war, which would require a truly massive deployment of American forces to the Far East, and thus would leave Britain and France shouldering the main burden if the Soviet Union should invade West Germany.<ref name="Large, David Clay page 97"/> Given this context, the Allies believed that they needed German rearmament as soon as possible, and were more or less willing to pay Adenauer's price of freeing Nazi war criminals to get German rearmament under way. In January 1951, Adenauer's pressure for a statement clearing the Wehrmacht of war crimes and to restore "honor" to the Wehrmacht borne fruit when General [[Dwight Eisenhower]], at that time the commander of NATO forces issued a statement which declared: "There was a real difference between the regular German soldier and officer and Hitler and his criminal group...For my part, I do not believe that the German soldier as such lost his honor. The fact that certain individuals committed what were dishonorable and despicable acts reflects on the individuals concerned and not on the great majority of German officers and soldiers".<ref>Bickford, Andrew ''Fallen Elites: The Military Other in Post–Unification Germany'', Stanford: 2011 pages 116–117</ref> The American historian Andrew Bickford wrote that Eisenhower's statement was historically worthless given the extent of [[Wehrmacht war crimes]] together with the Wehrmacht's massive cooperation with the ''[[Einsatzgruppen]]'' in murdering 2.2 million Soviet Jews, but was a "political necessity" given that Adenauer absolutely refused to cooperate with starting West German rearmament until a statement was made to restore "honor" to the Wehrmacht.<ref name="Bickford, Andrew page 117">Bickford, Andrew ''Fallen Elites: The Military Other in Post–Unification Germany'', Stanford: 2011 page 117</ref> Further assistance to Adenauer's campaign to free Nazi war criminals came from General [[Matthew Ridgeway]], who wrote a public letter urging the Allied high commissioners "to pardon all German officers convicted of war crimes on the Eastern Front" under the grounds that he had issued orders in Korea "of a kind for which German generals are now sitting in prison".<ref>Smelser, Ronald & Davies, Edward ''The Myth of the Eastern Front'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 page 75</ref> Ridgeway's letter taken at face value with its statement that there was no difference between how Germany fought the war against the Soviet Union and the United States in Korea would indicate that American forces were committing war crimes on a truly massive scale in Korea, but it is not clear how much, if anything Ridgeway knew of the "war of extermination" that Germany waged against the Soviet Union. Regardless, Adenauer used Ridgeway's letter to pressure the U.S government to free all of the Wehrmacht and SS officers convicted of war crimes on the Eastern Front. Following the advice that he had received in the Himmerod memo about best to proceed with West German rearmament, Adenauer sought to foster a "generally positive" image of the Wehrmacht in the early 1950s, who were portrayed as not engaging in a genocidal war of conquest that ultimately ended in total disaster for Germany, but rather as heroic "defenders of the homeland" from the Red Army.<ref name="Bickford, Andrew page 117"/> |
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In 1952, the [[Stalin Note]], as it became known, "caught everybody in the West by surprise".<ref>Williams, p. 376</ref> It offered to unify the two German entities into a single, neutral state with its own, non-aligned national army to effect superpower disengagement from [[Central Europe]]. Adenauer and his cabinet were unanimous in their rejection of the Stalin overture; they shared the Western Allies' suspicion about the genuineness of that offer and supported the Allies in their cautious replies. In this, they were supported by leader of the opposition [[Kurt Schumacher]] (a very rare occurrence), and recent (21st century) findings of historical research.{{citation needed|date=July 2013}} Adenauer's flat rejection was, however, still out of step with public opinion; he then realized his mistake and he started to ask questions. Critics denounced him for having missed an opportunity for [[German reunification]]. The Soviets sent a second note, courteous in tone. Adenauer by then understood that "all opportunity for initiative had passed out of his hands,"<ref>Williams, p. 378</ref> and the matter was put to rest by the Allies. Given the realities of the [[Cold War]], German reunification and recovery of [[Former eastern territories of Germany#Potsdam Conference|lost territories in the east]] were not realistic goals as both of Stalin's notes specified the retention of the existing "Potsdam"-decreed boundaries of Germany. |
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The German historian Norbert Frei wrote that under the pressure of total war during World War II, the Nazi regime had come close to creating the ''[[Volksgemeinschaft]]'' ("People's Community") of its propaganda as a powerful sense of national solidarity and togetherness emerged during the war identical to the same feelings that had produced the ''[[Burgfriedenspolitik]]'' of World War I.<ref>Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'' New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages xiv–xv.</ref> The ''Burgfriedenspolitik'' literally meant "peace within a castle under siege politics", i.e. the idea that in wartime all Germans should forget their political differences and patriotically rally around their government. Furthermore, Frei noted that for most Germans war-time ways of thinking persisted well into the 1950s.<ref>Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'' New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages xiv–xv.</ref> As a result, the vast majority of Germans in the late 1940s and 1950s were opposed to the idea of punishing anyone for what they had done under the Nazi regime, which they had strongly identified with during the war, as war crimes trials tended to reflect badly on the Nazi regime and hence those who supported it.<ref>Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'' New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages xiv–xv.</ref> In the immediate years after 1945, most Germans felt little or no guilt over the Nazi era and Herf wrote that "His [Adenauer's] constituency was preoccupied with its own problems, more than the hell the Wehrmacht had inflicted on Europe, especially Eastern Europe".<ref name="Herf, Jeffrey page 224"/> The German historian Wolfram Wette wrote in 2002 that in the 1950s "...the vast majority of the population retained the nationalistic attitudes inculcated in them earlier. Not only did they not accept the verdict that war crimes had been committed, but also they expressed solidarity with those who had been convicted, protected them and demanded their release, preferably in the form of a general amnesty".<ref>Wette, Wolfram ''The Wehrmacht'', Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006 page 239.</ref> In the 1950s, there was what Wette called a "broad consensus across party lines" that it was "time to close the chapter" on the Nazi past, and to forget all of the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in the National Socialist era.<ref>Wette, Wolfram ''The Wehrmacht'', Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006 page 240.</ref> Only starting in the 1960s–1970s when new generations of Germans came of age did a significant number of Germans begin to feel guilt over the Nazi past, and start to question what Wette called "cherished legends" about the Nazi era such as the claim that the Wehrmacht had "clean hands" during the war.<ref>Wette, Wolfram ''The Wehrmacht'', Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006 pages 277–278.</ref> |
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Adenauer recognized the obligation of the German government to compensate [[Israel]], as the main representative of the [[Jews|Jewish people]], for [[The Holocaust]]. Germany started negotiations with Israel for restitution of lost property and the payment of damages to victims of Nazi persecution. In the ''[[Reparations Agreement between Israel and West Germany|Luxemburger Abkommen]]'', Germany agreed to pay compensation to Israel. Jewish claims were bundled in the [[Claims Conference|Jewish Claims Conference]], which represented the Jewish victims of Nazi Germany. Germany then initially paid about 3 billion [[Deutsche Mark|Mark]] to Israel and about 450 million to the Claims Conference, although payments continued after that, as new claims were made.<ref name=bpb>[http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/JNSEQM,0,0,Wiedergutmachung.html Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung – Wiedergutmachung]</ref> In the face of severe opposition both from the public and from his own cabinet, Adenauer was only able to get the reparations agreement ratified by the ''Bundestag'' with the support of the SPD.<ref name="Moeller, Robert pages 26-27">Moeller, Robert ''War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany'', Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001 pages 26-27.</ref> Israeli public opinion was divided over accepting the money, but ultimately the fledgling state under [[David Ben-Gurion]] agreed to take it, opposed by more radical groups like [[Irgun]], who were against such treaties. Those treaties were cited as a main reason for the assassination attempt by the radical Jewish groups against Adenauer.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jun/15/germany.lukeharding |title=Menachem Begin 'plotted to kill German chancellor' |first=Luke |last=Harding |newspaper=Guardian |date=15 June 2006 |location=London}}</ref> |
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On 2 January 1951, Adenauer met with McCloy to argue that the status of the Landsberg prisoners was not so much a legal question as a political one, and that to execute the Landsberg prisoners would ruin forever any effort at having the Federal Republic play its role in the Cold War.<ref>Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'' New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 page 157.</ref> To prove Adenauer's point about popular support for the condemned of Landsberg, in the last half of 1950 and the first half of 1951, thousands of Germans took part in demonstrations outside of Landsberg prison to demand pardons for all of the war criminals while the German media coverage was overwhelmingly on the side of the condemned, who depicted as the innocent victims of American "lynch law".<ref>Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'' New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages 156–159.</ref> Though the protestors at Landsberg claimed to be only motivated by opposition to the death penalty and to not have any pro-Nazi or anti-Semitic feelings, their actions belied their words. When a group of Jewish protestors, many of them Holocaust survivors arrived at Landsberg demanding the execution of the 102 war criminals on 7 January 1951, the German protestors demanding amnesty began to chant the Nazi era slogan "''Juden raus! Juden raus!''" ("Jews out! Jews out!") and then proceed to beat up the Jewish protestors.<ref>Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'' New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 page 158.</ref> In response to this pressure, McCloy on 31 January 1951 reduced the death sentences of most of 102 men at Landsberg, confirming only 7 of the death sentences while the rest of the condemned to death were spared, and in some cases like the industrialist [[Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach]] pardoned.<ref>Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'' New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages 164–165.</ref> Though the pardoning of Krupp was very popular in Germany, it attracted considerable criticism in the United States, Britain and France with many charging that Krupp, who had sentenced to death by an American military court for using slave labour in his factories during World War II, had only been freed by McCloy to appease German public opinion.<ref>Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'' New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages 165–166.</ref> The seven death sentences confirmed by McCloy were the so-called "worst of the worst" at Landsberg, namely [[Oswald Pohl]], [[Paul Blobel]], [[Otto Ohlendorf]], [[Werner Braune]], [[Eric Naumann]], Georg Schallermair and Hans Schmidt.<ref>Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'' New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 page 165.</ref> Neither Adenauer nor German public opinion was satisfied by McCloy's decision, and as a result, throughout the first half of 1951 the Federal Republic continued to lobby McCloy to pardon the seven condemned men while the huge demonstrations for amnesty continued at Landsberg.<ref>Frei, Norbert ''Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'' New York: Columbia University Press, 2002 pages 168–169.</ref> McCloy saw his ruling on 31 January 1951 that spared most of the Landsberg prisoners as a compromise intended to be acceptable to both American and German public opinion, and was greatly annoyed at Adenauer's attempts to save the "Landsberg Seven" from being hanged, which McCloy regarded as an act of bad faith.<ref>Herf, Jeffrey ''Divided Memory'' : Harvard University Press, 1997 page 295.</ref> Despite Adenauer's best efforts to save them together with massive pressure from German public opinion, on 7 June 1951 the Americans hanged Pohl, Blobel, Ohlendorf, Braune, Naumann, Schallermair and Schmidt. |
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On 27 March 1952, a package addressed to Chancellor Adenauer exploded in the [[Munich]] Police Headquarters, killing one Bavarian police officer. Investigations revealed the mastermind behind the assassination attempt was [[Menachem Begin]], who would later become the Prime Minister of [[Israel]].<ref>[http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/0,1518,421441,00.html Interview with H. Sietz, investigator (German)]</ref> Begin had been the former commander of [[Irgun]] and at that time headed [[Herut]] and was a member of the [[Knesset]]. His goal was to put pressure on the German government and prevent the signing of the [[Reparations Agreement between Israel and West Germany]], which he vehemently opposed.<ref>[http://www.br-online.de/kultur-szene/capricci/report/thema030706_1.html Background history of assassination attempt (German)]</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/germany/article/0,,1797768,00.html |title=Menachem Begin 'plotted to kill German chancellor' |publisher=The Guardian |date=15 June 2006 |location=London |first=Luke |last=Harding}}</ref> The West German government kept all proof under seal in order to prevent [[antisemitism|antisemitic]] responses from the German public. |
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On 18 April 1951, the [[Treaty of Paris (1951)|Treaty of Paris]] was signed establishing the [[European Coal and Steel Community]], which was the predecessor to the [[European Economic Community]] established in 1957.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 608">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 608</ref> The treaty was not popular with most Germans with Schumacher denouncing it from the left as part of a plot by French capitalists to exploit German workers and to extend the [[Occupation statute]] while from the right the treaty was seen as an attempt by [[Jean Monnet]] to take over German industry for the benefit of France.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 608"/> This was especially the case because the talks with the French, Adenauer had given in to Monnet's demand that the French and Germans have equal voting rights in the coal and steel community instead of the German demand that voting rights be based on coal and steel production (which had favored the Germans).<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 609</ref> Monnet told Adenauer that French public opinion would not like the German plan for voting rights, and it would be hard to get the treaty ratified by the National Assembly if the treaty conceded to the German plan for voting rights. For Adenauer, what was truly important was the proposed coal and steel community come to life, and he did not care if the particular terms were more favorable to the French than to the Germans.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 612">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 612</ref> Adenauer told his cabinet when facing objections to the coal and steel community treaty that "The people must be given a new ideology, it can only be an European one".<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 612"/> Despite his dislike of the British, Adenauer was very keen to see Britain join the European Coal and Steel Community as he believed the more free-market British would counterbalance the influence of the more [[Dirigisme|''dirigiste'']] French, and to achieve that purpose he visited London in November 1951 to meet with Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]].<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 612–613</ref> However, Churchill informed Adenauer that Britain was part of three circles, namely the "special relationship" with the United States, the Commonwealth and Europe and could never sacrifice one of the circles for another.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 613">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 613</ref> Churchill went on to say that to join the European Coal and Steel Community would sacrificing the circles with the U.S and Commonwealth for the European circle, and that was something that he would not do.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 613"/> |
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Adenauer made a historic speech to the [[Bundestag]] in September 1951 in which he recognized the obligation of the German government to compensate [[Israel]], as the main representative of the [[Jews|Jewish people]], for [[The Holocaust]]. This started a process that led to the Bundestag approving a pact between Israel and Germany in 1953 outlining the reparations Germany would pay to Israel. As a result, Germany started negotiations with Israel for restitution of lost property and the payment of damages to victims of the Nazi persecutions. The British historian [[Tony Judt]] wrote about ''Wiedergutmachung'' and reparations to Israel:<blockquote>"In making this agreement Konrad Adenauer ran some domestic political risk: in December 1951, just 5 percent of West Germans surveyed admitted feeling ‘guilty’ towards Jews. A further 29 percent acknowledged that Germany owed some restitution to the Jewish people. The rest were divided between those (some two-fifths of respondents) who thought that only people ‘who really committed something’ were responsible and should pay, and those (21 percent) who thought ‘that the Jews themselves were partly responsible for what happened to them during the Third Reich.’ When the restitution agreement was debated in the Bundestag on March 18th 1953, the Communists voted against, the Free Democrats abstained and both the Christian Social Union and Adenauer’s own CDU were divided, with many voting against any ''Wiedergutmachung'' (reparations).<ref>[[Tony Judt]]: ''Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945'', New York 2005, p. 271</ref></blockquote> In the ''[[Reparations Agreement between Israel and West Germany|Luxemburger Abkommen]]'', Germany agreed to pay compensation to Israel. Jewish claims were bundled in the [[Claims Conference|Jewish Claims Conference]], which represented the Jewish victims of Nazi Germany. Germany then initially paid about 3 billion [[Deutsche Mark|Mark]] to Israel and about 450 million to the Claims Conference, although payments continued after that, as new claims were made.<ref name=bpb>[http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/JNSEQM,0,0,Wiedergutmachung.html Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung – Wiedergutmachung]</ref> In December 1951, a public opinion poll showed that only 11% of West Germans approved of paying reparations to Israel while 88% were opposed.<ref>Moeller, Robert ''War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany'', Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001 page 26.</ref> Within the cabinet, Adenauer faced much opposition from his CSU Finance Minister [[Fritz Schäffer]] and his Free Democrat Justice Minister [[Thomas Dehler]].<ref name="Moeller, Robert page 27">Moeller, Robert ''War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany'', Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001 page 27.</ref> Adenauer was only able to get the reparations agreement ratified by the ''Bundestag'' with the support of the SPD.<ref name="Moeller, Robert page 27"/> Israel was divided in accepting the money. The agreement was condemned by some Israelis as simply an expedient whereby Germany would buy off Jewish survivors to regain credibility on the international stage, and Adenauer was criticised for being too lenient towards politically compromised individuals whose past treatment of Jews was at best questionable.<ref>''The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History'', Spencer Tucker, Priscilla Mary Roberts, p. 33, 2008</ref> Many believed that the purpose behind the reparations to Israel was to bribe into silence the state most likely to object to Adenauer's policy of integrating Nazis into democracy.<ref>Taylor, Frederick ''Exorcising Hitler'', London: Bloomsbury Press, 2011 page 368.</ref> But ultimately the fledgling state under [[David Ben-Gurion]] agreed to take it, opposed by more radical groups like [[Irgun]], who were against such treaties. Those treaties were cited as a main reason for the assassination attempt by the radical Jewish groups against Adenauer.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jun/15/germany.lukeharding |title=Menachem Begin 'plotted to kill German chancellor' |first=Luke |last=Harding |newspaper=Guardian |date=15 June 2006 |location=London}}</ref> |
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By 1951 laws were passed by the [[Bundestag]] ending denazification. Officials were allowed to retake jobs in civil service, with the exception of people assigned to Group I (Major Offenders) and II (Offenders) during the denazification review process.<ref name=Art>Art, David, ''The politics of the Nazi past in Germany and Austria'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 53–55</ref><ref>[http://www.bgbl.de/Xaver/media.xav?SID=anonymous3113862832518&tocf=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl_tocFrame&tf=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl_mainFrame&qmf=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl_mainFrame&hlf=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl_mainFrame&bk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&name=bgbl/Bundesgesetzblatt%20Teil%20I/1951/Nr.%2022%20vom%2013.05.1951/bgbl151s0307.pdf ''Gesetz zur Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse der unter Artikel 131 des Grundgesetzes fallenden Personen'' – 11 May 1951 (Bundesgesetzblatt I 22/1951, p. 307 ff.)]</ref> |
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The amnesty legislation had benefited 792,176 people, among them: |
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*3,000 functionaries of the SA, the SS, and the Nazi Party who participated in deporting victims to prisons and camps |
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*20,000 other Nazi perpetrators sentenced for "deeds against life" (presumably murder); |
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*30,000 sentenced for causing bodily injury |
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*5,200 charged with "crimes and misdemeanors in office."<ref name="TNR">[http://www.tnr.com/article/amnesty-and-amnesia Jeffrey Herf in ''The New Republic'', 10 March 2003; book review of Frei, Norbert, ''Amnesty and Amnesia, Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration'']</ref> |
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Moreover, Adenauer promoted and protected several high-profile ex-Nazis and Wehrmacht criminals in his administration, the newly created Bundeswehr, the justice system, and local public administrations, despite his declarations that former Nazis would be tolerated only if they have been passive party members.<ref name="Williams, p. 390">Williams, p.390</ref><ref>[[Steven Ozment|Ozment, Steven]]. ''A Mighty Fortress. A New History of the German People''. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. 2004, p.291</ref> In a ''Bundestag'' debate on 23 October 1952, Adenauer admitted that 66% of the diplomats of the ''[[Auswärtiges Amt]]'' had belonged to the NSDAP, but justified their employment as "I could not build up a Foreign Office without relying upon such skilled men".<ref>Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 page 48.</ref> Among the most publicly denounced former Nazis promoted by Adenauer were [[Hans Globke]], who rose to become one of his closest aides, and the former Nazi general [[Reinhard Gehlen]], whom Adenauer made head of the new [[Bundesnachrichtendienst|West German Secret Service]]. Globke, in particular, had misused his public official powers to harass Jews already before the Nazis took power and during the war he helped organize the deportation of 20,000 Jews from Greece to extermination camps in Poland.<ref>{{Internetquelle|url=http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000271221/0000271221_0001.gif| titel="E EICHMANN TRIAL"| zugriff=18 April 2010| hrsg= [[Central Intelligence Agency]]| datum=6 April 1961}}</ref><ref>{{Internetquelle|url=http://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/madoc/volltexte/2003/77/pdf/Dissertation.pdf| titel="Dr. Max Merten – ein Militärbeamter der deutschen Wehrmacht im Spannungsfeld zwischen Legende und Wahrheit"|autor = Wolfgang Breyer| zugriff=18 April 2010| hrsg= Inauguraldissertation, [[Universität Mannheim]]| datum=2003}}</ref> |
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However, most German conservatives had collaborated enthusiastically with the Nazis so that many historians have argued that "it would have been folly to deprive the fledgling republic of the services of [these civil servants and professionals] for that reason alone."<ref name="Williams, p. 391">Williams, p. 391</ref> Officially Adenauer pressured his rehabilitated ex-Nazis by threatening that stepping out of line could trigger the reopening of individual de-Nazification prosecutions. The construction of a "competent Federal Government effectively from a standing start was one of the greatest of Adenauer's formidable achievements".<ref name="Williams, p. 391"/> This can hardly be said of Gehlen's "services" which were repeatedly accused of misinforming and misleading NATO partners and were full of former Nazi mass murderers.<ref>{{cite news |title=The CIA and Nazi War Criminals|editor-first=Tamara|editor-last=Feinstein|date=4 February 2005|work=[[National Security Archive]]|series=Electronic Briefing|issue=Book no. 146|url= http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB146/index.htm}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Die Geheimdienstlegende: Reinhard Gehlen und der BND|work=[[3sat]]|language=German|url= http://www.3sat.de/page/?source=/ard/thementage/165494/index.html}}</ref> In February 1952, Adenauer met with [[Otto Kranzbühler]], the lawyer for Admiral Dönitz who was now also acting as the lawyer for [[Albert Speer]] to discuss ways to win freedom for the "Spandau Seven".<ref name="ReferenceB">Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'' Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 189.</ref> Adenauer told Kranzbühler, who highly committed to winning freedom for his clients that for he done everything possible on behalf on the Spandau Seven by lobbying the Allied High Commissioners, and at present he focusing his efforts only on behalf of Baron von Neurath, whom Adenauer especially wanted to see freed.<ref name="ReferenceB"/> Adenauer further informed Kranzbühler that his main concern at present was winning freedom for the men imprisoned by the Americans at Landsberg and by the British at Werl prison, and he did not wish to antagonize the Anglo-Americans by bringing up the subject of the Spandau Seven, and as such Kranzbühler should refrain from bringing up the subject of his two clients at Spandau.<ref name="ReferenceB"/> Spandau prison was jointly run by the British, the French, the Americans, and the Soviets, and any change in the status of the prisoners would require permission from all four governments. The Allied High Commissioners were always highly annoyed by Adenauer's demands that they should pressure the Soviet government to agree to free the war criminals of Spandau as any effort to free the Spandau Seven always enraged the Soviets and allowed the Soviet propaganda to paint the Allies as trying to undo the work of Nuremberg. |
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Contemporary critics accused Adenauer of cementing the division of Germany, sacrificing reunification and the recovery of territories lost in the westward shift of [[Poland]] and the [[Soviet Union]] with his determination to secure the Federal Republic to the West. "In his view, he said with the greatest emphasis, full integration into Western Europe was a precondition of the reunification of Germany."<ref>Williams, p. 375</ref> During the [[Cold War]], the United States was "aiming for a West German armed force, after their [U.S.] costly experience in the Korean War".<ref>Williams, p. 373</ref> and Adenauer linked this rearmament concept to West German sovereignty and entry into NATO. Adenauer's German policy was based upon ''Politik der Stärke'' (Policy of Strength), and upon the so-called "magnet theory", in which a prosperous, democratic West Germany integrated with the West would act as a "magnet" that would eventually bring down the East German regime.<ref>Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front'' Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 page 70.</ref> In 1952, the [[Stalin Note]], as it became known, "caught everybody in the West by surprise".<ref>Williams, p. 376</ref> It offered to unify the two German entities into a single, neutral state with its own, non-aligned national army to effect superpower disengagement from [[Central Europe]]. Adenauer and his cabinet were unanimous in their rejection of the Stalin overture; they shared the Western Allies' suspicion about the genuineness of that offer and supported the Allies in their cautious replies. In this, they were supported by leader of the opposition [[Kurt Schumacher]] (a very rare occurrence), and recent (21st century) findings of historical research.{{citation needed|date=July 2013}} |
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Adenauer's flat rejection was, however, still out of step with public opinion; he then realized his mistake and he started to ask questions. Critics denounced him for having missed an opportunity for [[German reunification]]. The Soviets sent a second note, courteous in tone. Adenauer by then understood that "all opportunity for initiative had passed out of his hands,"<ref>Williams, p. 378</ref> and the matter was put to rest by the Allies. Given the realities of the [[Cold War]], German reunification and recovery of [[Former eastern territories of Germany#Potsdam Conference|lost territories in the east]] were not realistic goals as both of Stalin's notes specified the retention of the existing "Potsdam"-decreed boundaries of Germany. |
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As chancellor, Adenauer tended to make most major decisions himself, treating his ministers as mere extensions of his authority. While this tendency decreased under his successors, it established the image of West Germany (and later reunified Germany) as a "chancellor democracy". |
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On 27 March 1952, a package addressed to Chancellor Adenauer exploded in the [[Munich]] Police Headquarters, killing one Bavarian police officer. Two boys who had been paid to send this package by mail had brought it to the attention of the police. Investigations led to people closely related to the [[Herut]] Party and the former [[Irgun]] armed organization. The West German government kept all proof under seal in order to prevent [[antisemitism|antisemitic]] responses from the German public. Five Israeli suspects identified by French and German investigators were allowed to return to Israel. One of the participants, [[Eliezer Sudit]], later revealed that the alleged mastermind behind this assassination attempt was [[Menachem Begin]], who would later become the Prime Minister of [[Israel]].<ref>[http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/0,1518,421441,00.html Interview with H. Sietz, investigator (German)]</ref> Begin had been the former commander of Irgun and at that time headed Herut and was a member of the [[Knesset]]. His goal was to put pressure on the German government and prevent the signing of the [[Reparations Agreement between Israel and West Germany]], which he vehemently opposed.<ref>[http://www.br-online.de/kultur-szene/capricci/report/thema030706_1.html Background history of assassination attempt (German)]</ref> [[David Ben-Gurion]], the Labour Prime Minister of Israel, appreciated Adenauer's response in playing down the affair and not pursuing it further, as it would have burdened the already-delicate relationship between the two new states. |
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In June 2006 a slightly different version of this story appeared in one of Germany's leading newspapers, [[Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung]], quoted by ''[[The Guardian]]''. Begin had offered to sell his gold watch as the conspirators ran out of money. The bomb was hidden in an encyclopaedia and it killed a bomb-disposal expert, injuring two others. Adenauer was targeted because of the Reparations Agreement between Israel and West Germany, signed at that time, which was violently opposed by Begin. Sudit, the story's source, explained that the "intent was not to hit Adenauer but to rouse the international media. It was clear to all of us there was no chance the package would reach Adenauer". The five conspirators were arrested by the French police, in [[Paris]]. They "were [former] members of the ... Irgun" (the organisation had been disbanded in 1948, 4 years earlier).<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/germany/article/0,,1797768,00.html |title=Menachem Begin 'plotted to kill German chancellor' |publisher=The Guardian |date=15 June 2006 |location=London |first=Luke |last=Harding}}</ref> |
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===Second government=== |
===Second government=== |
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When a [[Uprising of 1953 in East Germany|rebellion in East Germany]] was harshly suppressed by the Red Army in June 1953, Adenauer took |
When a [[Uprising of 1953 in East Germany|rebellion in East Germany]] was harshly suppressed by the Red Army in June 1953, Adenauer took political advantage of the situation and was handily re-elected to a second term as Chancellor.<ref>Williams, p. 406</ref> The CDU/CSU came up one seat short of an outright majority. Adenauer could have governed alone without the support of other parties, but retained the support of nearly all of the parties in the Bundestag that were to the right of the SPD. For all of his efforts as West Germany's leader, Adenauer was named ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine's [[Time Magazine Person of the Year|Man of the Year]] in 1953. In 1954, he received the [[Karlspreis]] (English: Charlemagne Award), an Award by the German city of [[Aachen]] to people who contributed to the European idea, European cooperation and European peace. |
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The [[German Restitution Laws]] (''Bundesentschädigungsgesetz'') were passed in 1953 that allowed some victims of Nazi prosecution to claim restitution.<ref>[http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/beg/index.html ''Bundesgesetz zur Entschädigung für Opfer der nationalsozialistischen Verfolgung'']</ref> Under the 1953 restitution law, those who had suffered for "racial, religious or political reasons" could collect compensation, which were defined in such a way as to sharply limit the number of people entitled to collect compensation.<ref>Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542–572 from ''The Journal Of Modern History'', Volume 65, 1993 pages 564.</ref> |
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The [[German Restitution Laws]] (''Bundesentschädigungsgesetz'') were passed in 1953 that allowed some victims of Nazi prosecution to claim restitution.<ref>[http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/beg/index.html ''Bundesgesetz zur Entschädigung für Opfer der nationalsozialistischen Verfolgung'']</ref> Under the 1953 restitution law, those who had suffered for "racial, religious or political reasons" could collect compensation, which were defined in such a way as to sharply limit the number of people entitled to collect compensation.<ref>Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542–572 from ''The Journal Of Modern History'', Volume 65, 1993 pages 564.</ref> A study done in 1953 showed that of the 42,000 people who been held at the [[Buchenwald concentration camp]], only 700 were entitled to compensation under the 1953 law.<ref name="Ludtke pages 542-572">Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542–572 from ''The Journal Of Modern History'', Volume 65, 1993 page 564.</ref> The German historian [[Alf Lüdtke]] wrote that Adenauer's Finance Minister [[Fritz Schäffer]] "tried to save every last penny" when it came to compensating Nazi victims.<ref name="Ludtke pages 542">Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542–572 from ''The Journal Of Modern History'', Volume 65, 1993 page 569.</ref> To be eligible for collecting individual compensation for suffering, one had to prove that one was part of the "realm of German language and culture", a requirement that excluded millions of people from Eastern Europe who were taken to Germany to work as slave laborers during the war as most of the survivors did not know German or at least enough German to be considered part of "realm of German language and culture".<ref>Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542–572 from ''The Journal Of Modern History'', Volume 65, 1993 pages 567.</ref> In the same way, to be eligible for individual compensation required the individual seeking compensation for suffering under the Nazi regime to live in the Federal Republic, a requirement that excluded almost all of the non-German victims of the Nazis, who for the most part did not wish to move to Germany, the "land of their tormentors".<ref>Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542–572 from ''The Journal Of Modern History'', Volume 65, 1993 pages 565.</ref> Communist concentration camp survivors were excluded from compensation under the grounds that in 1933 the [[Communist Party of Germany|KPD]] had been seeking "violent domination" by working for a Communist revolution.<ref name="Ludtke pages 542-572"/> In 1956, the law was amended to allow Communist concentration camp survivors to collect compensation if they could prove that they were not associated with Communist causes after 1945, but as almost all the surviving Communists belonged to the [[Union of Persecutees of the Nazi Regime]] (VNN), which had been banned in August 1951 by the Hamburg and Hesse governments as a Communist front organisation, the new law did not help many of the KPD survivors.<ref name="Ludtke pages 542-572"/> In 1956, the federal government banned the VNN as a Communist front organization.<ref name="Ludtke pages 542-572"/> The same law excluded homosexuals, the [[Romani people|Romani]] and the [[Sinti]], ''Asoziale'' ("Asocials"-people considered by the National Socialist state to be anti-social, a broad category comprising anyone from petty criminals to people who just were merely eccentric and non-conformist), and homeless people for their suffering in the concentration camps under the grounds that all these people were "criminals".<ref>Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542–572 from ''The Journal Of Modern History'', Volume 65, 1993 pages 564– 565.</ref> Lüdtke wrote that the decision to deny that the Romani and the Sinti had been victims of National Socialist racism and to exclude the Roma and Sinti from compensation under the grounds that they were all "criminals" reflected the same anti-Gypsy racism that made them the target of persecution and genocide in the first place during the National Socialist era.<ref>Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542–572 from ''The Journal Of Modern History'', Volume 65, 1993 pages 565 & 568–569.</ref> It was not until 1990 that Germany finally started to pay compensation to the survivors of the ''[[Porajmos]]'' ("the devouring") as the genocide against the Romani was known, by which time most of the ''Porajmos'' survivors were dead, thereby saving the German people millions of deutschmarks that would otherwise had gone out in compensation payments to those who suffered in the ''Porajmos''.<ref>Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542–572 from ''The Journal Of Modern History'', Volume 65, 1993 page 570.</ref> The decision to deny compensation to gay survivors of the concentration camps was not surprising given that the 1935 version of [[Paragraph 175]] was not repealed until 1969.<ref name="Burleigh, Michael page 183">Burleigh, Michael & Wippermann, Wolfgang ''The Racial State: Germany 1933–1945'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 page 183.</ref> As a result, German homosexuals—in many cases survivors of the concentration camps—between 1949 and 1969 continued to be convicted under the same law that had been used to convict them between 1935 and 1945, though in the period 1949–69 they were sent to prison rather than concentration camps.<ref name="Burleigh, Michael page 183"/> Aside from that, other global treaties for compensation were made with other western European states in the following decades, to compensate for the Nazi crimes.<ref name=bpb/> |
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In the spring of 1954, opposition to the [[Pleven plan]] grew within the French [[National Assembly (France)|National Assembly]].{{sfn|Large|1996|p=209}} The British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] told Adenauer that Britain would ensure that German rearmament would happen, regardless if the National Assembly ratified the EDC treaty or not.{{sfn|Large|1996|p=211}} In August 1954, the [[Pleven plan]] died when an alliance of conservatives and Communists in the National Assembly joined forces to reject the EDC treaty under the grounds that German rearmament in any form and shape was an unacceptable danger to France.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 134">Gaddis, John Lewis ''We Now Know'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 134.</ref> |
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The Social Democrat member of the ''Bundestag'' [[Adolf Arndt]] frequently charged that the entire Restitution Laws had less to do with any genuine desire to compensate the victims of National Socialism and were instead just an empty, hollow, cynical exercise in public relations where the Federal Republic would pay off just enough in compensation to appease public opinion abroad while at the same time the Restitution Laws were applied in such a mean-spirited, hair-splitting, and petty manner that strongly suggested that saving the German taxpayer money was the main concern.<ref name="Ludtke pages 542"/> Arndt used as a typical case of how the Restitution laws were worked in practice, namely the case of a Gentile German woman married to a Jewish man, who despite considerable pressure from the Nazi regime refused to divorce her husband, who was then deported and gassed at Auschwitz in 1942.<ref name="Ludtke pages 542"/> In 1954, the widow was refused her request for compensation given the fact that the German state murdered her husband under the grounds that "she personally had not suffered Nazi violence, and that it would have been possible to divorce her husband", and therefore by refusing to divorce her husband it was by her own "free will" that she suffered the pain of her husband being gassed at Auschwitz.<ref name="Ludtke pages 542"/> Arndt commented that "in no other matters did the administration and the courts treat people in such a narrow and mean way, and that nowhere else were hair- and word-splitting employed so intensely. This is the result of the foul climate of creeping anti-Semitism".<ref name="Ludtke pages 542"/> Lüdtke wrote that critics of Restitution Laws like [[Adolf Arndt]], Hans Reif, [[Franz Böhm]] and Otto-Heinrich Greve were a decided minority in the 1950s without influence, and that most people at the time supported the "restrictive and mean practices" of the Adenauer government when it come to compensation for the victims of National Socialism.<ref name="Ludtke pages 542"/> |
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British Foreign Secretary [[Anthony Eden]] used the failure of the EDC to advocate for independent German rearmament and German NATO membership.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 134"/> Thanks in part to Adenauer's success in rebuilding Germany's image, the British proposal met with considerable approval.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 134"/> In the ensuing [[London and Paris Conferences|London conference]], Eden assisted Adenauer by promising the French that Britain would always maintain at least four divisions in the [[British Army of the Rhine]] as long as there was a Soviet threat, with the the strengthened British forces also aimed implicitly against any German revanchism.{{sfn|Large|1996|p=217}} Adenauer then promised that Germany would never seek to have nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as heavy warships, strategic bombers, long-range artillery, and guided missiles, though these promises were non-binding.{{sfn|Large|1996|p=217}} The French had been assuaged that German rearmament would be no threat to France. Additionally, Adenauer promised that the German military would be under the operational control of NATO general staff, though ultimate control would rest with the German government; and that above all he would never violate the strictly defensive NATO charter and invade East Germany to achieve German reunification.{{sfn|Large|1996|p=220}} |
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In the spring of 1954, the future of the [[Pleven plan]] that envisioned the Federal Republic having its military forces function as part of the EDC appeared increasingly dubious as opposition to it grew within the French [[National Assembly (France)|National Assembly]].<ref name="Large, David Clay page 209">Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 page 209.</ref> The French foreign minister [[Georges Bidault]] had to deny rumors that he made a secret deal during a meeting with the Soviet foreign minister [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] that the French would abandon the Pleven plan in exchange for Soviet help in ending the war in [[Vietnam]], saying at a press conference: "I did not put the EDC in a hole in order to get a smile from Mr. Molotov...You don't trade Adenauer for [[Ho Chi Minh]]".<ref name="Large, David Clay page 209"/> The French defeat at the [[Battle of Dien Bien Phu]] in May 1954 highlighted just how difficult it was for France to fight a colonial war, which led to fears in France that if France were to fight another major war to hang onto to its colonies that it would impossible to deal with Germany should Adenauer in the future be replaced with a more nationalistic German leader.<ref name="Large, David Clay page 209"/> At the same time, the refusal of the United States to intervene in Vietnam despite the looming French defeat at Dien Bien Phu undermined French confidence in the United States, which led to many in France arguing that it was better to kill the Pleven plan rather risk a return to German militarism without U.S. protection.<ref name="Large, David Clay page 209"/> Furthermore, the ending of France's war in Indochina meant that all of the French troops there would be recalled to France, which many of the French to conclude that they no longer needed German help if the Soviet Union should invade. Adenauer himself feared that the new French Premier, the partly Jewish [[Pierre Mendès France]] was a Germanophobe who would do anything to block German rearmament.<ref name="Large, David Clay page 209"/> Despite Adenauer's fears, Mendès France was in fact clearly in favor of the Pleven Plan, but as he stressed repeatedly in his meetings with West German, British and American diplomats, French public opinion was not, which was why he insisted on amending the EDC treaty to further weaken Bonn's control of the German contingent to the EDC force.<ref name="Large, David Clay page 209"/> One journalist wrote in the spring of 1954 that the Pleven Plan "had divided French opinion as had no other question since the war".<ref name="Large, David Clay page 209"/> Neither Adenauer nor Britain and the U.S were much interested in Mendès France's proposed changes to the Pleven Plan, and told him that France could either accept the plan as it was or reject it.<ref name="Large, David Clay page 211">Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 page 211.</ref> On 19 August 1954, the British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] told the U.S. Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]] that: "I am distressed at Adenauer's position. I feel we owe him almost a debt of honor after all the risks he has run and patience he has shown".<ref name="Large, David Clay page 211"/> Churchill followed up his meeting with Dulles by sending Adenauer a telegram promising that Britain would ensure that German rearmament would happen, regardless if the National Assembly ratified the EDC treaty or not.<ref name="Large, David Clay page 211"/> In August 1954, the [[Pleven plan]] died when an alliance of conservatives and Communists in the National Assembly joined forces to reject the EDC treaty under the grounds that German rearmament in any form and shape was an unacceptable danger to France.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 134">Gaddis, John Lewis ''We Now Know'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 134.</ref> |
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In May 1955, Germany joined NATO and in November a German military, the ''Bundeswehr'', was founded.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 134"/> Though Adenauer made use of a number of Wehrmacht generals and admirals in the ''Bundeswehr'', he saw the ''Bundeswehr'' as a new force with no links to the past, and wanted it to be kept under civilian control at all times<ref>Fritz Erler, ‘Politik und nicht Prestige,’ in Erler and Jaeger, Sicherheit und Rustung, 1962, p.82-3, cited in Julian Lider, ''Origins and Development of West German Military Thought'', Vol. I, 1949–1966, Gower Publishing Company Ltd, Aldershot/Brookfield VT, 1986, p.125</ref> To achieve these aims, Adenauer gave a great deal of power to the military reformer [[Wolf Graf von Baudissin]].{{sfn|Large|1996|pp=177-178}} |
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Following the failure of the Pleven Plan, the British Foreign Secretary Sir [[Anthony Eden]] used the rejection of the EDC treaty by the National Assembly to suggest that the Federal Republic be allowed its own military forces and be allowed to join NATO.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 134"/> Adenauer himself, despite all his efforts in championing the EDC, was secretly pleased by the failure of the Pleven plan, as it opened the possibility of the Federal Republic having its own military, and for the Federal Republic to join NATO as he always wanted all the long.<ref name="Large, David Clay page 214">Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 page 214.</ref> Adenauer told [[Walter Hallstein]] that: "What the people there in Paris said is not entirely stupid. I've been looking over the treaty you negotiated. Well, in fact it's so not good as you have maintained."<ref name="Large, David Clay page 214"/> By this time, Adenauer had used the four years between the introduction of the Pleven Plan in 1950 and its rejection in 1954 to build up considerable good-will in Washington, London and Paris so that the idea of German rearmament, which had seemed so shocking and appalling in 1950, seemed less so in 1954, and as a result the Eden plan met with considerable approval.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 134"/> Furthermore, Adenauer suggested in his meetings with Eden, Dulles and Mendès France that German public opinion was gravely offended by the French rejection of the EDC treaty, and that if nothing was done to ensure German rearmament soon, then the appeal of neo-Nazi groups would increase.<ref>Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 page 216.</ref> Dulles for his part made it clear that American public opinion was growing annoyed at the sense that the Europeans were not doing their share of defending western Europe, and that unless the Europeans came up with a new plan to replace the Pleven Plan, the United States would eventually lose interest in defending western Europe.<ref>Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 pages 216–217.</ref> To replace the Pleven plan, the British government opened a conference in London on 28 September 1954.<ref>Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 page 217.</ref> Eden assisted Adenauer by promising the French at a conference in London that Britain would always maintain at least four divisions in the [[British Army of the Rhine]] as long as there was a Soviet threat, leading Adenauer to remark: "We all impressed with the obligation that this declaration placed upon us".<ref name="Large, David Clay page 217">Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 page 217.</ref> Eden's promise of strengthened British Army of the Rhine was just as much aimed implicitly against a revived German militarism as it was aimed explicitly against Soviet Union. The French Ambassador to the Court of St. James, [[René Massigli]] wept tears of joy at Eden's speech, saying that the French had waiting for this for 50 years, ever since the ''[[Entente cordiale]]'' of 1904.<ref name="Large, David Clay page 217">Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 page 217.</ref> Adenauer then followed up Eden's speech by promising in a speech of his own that the Federal Republic would never seek to have nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as heavy warships, strategic bombers, long-range artillery, and guided missiles, albeit under certain conditions.<ref name="Large, David Clay page 217"/> After his speech, Dulles asked Adenauer: "Herr Chancellor, are we to understand you have made this declaration-like all such international declarations-only [[Clausula rebus sic stantibus|''rebus sic stantibus'']] [under present conditions]".<ref name="Large, David Clay page 217"/> Adenauer answered Dulles by saying: "You have interpreted my declaration correctly."<ref>Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 page 218.</ref> Adenauer's caveats were not widely not noted at the time of his speech, and the visibly moved Belgian foreign minister [[Paul-Henri Spaak]] proclaimed to Adenauer's aide Count von Kielmansegg in the aftermath of his declaration renouncing various types of weapons: "Tell your chancellor, he is a greater European than I."<ref name="Large, David Clay page 217"/> The speeches of Eden and Adenauer did much to assuage Mendès France that German rearmament would not be a threat to French security and that Britain by making the "continental commitment" (a long-term goal of the French going back to the early years of the 20th century) by promising to maintain a large force in Germany would serve to check any effort at German revanchism in Western Europe. Additionally, Adenauer promised at the London conference that if the Federal Republic was allowed a military, it would be under the operational control of NATO general staff, though ultimate control would rest with the German government; that he would never launch a military action that was not in accordance with the strictly defensive NATO charter; and above all he would never invade East Germany to achieve German reunification.<ref>Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 page 220.</ref> |
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In November 1954, Adenauer's lobbying efforts on behalf of the "Spandau Seven" finally borne fruit with the release of [[Konstantin von Neurath]].<ref>Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 129–131.</ref> Adenauer congratulated Neurath on his release.<ref>Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 130–131.</ref> President Heuss went even further, telling Neurath of his "martyrdom" at Nuremberg, and strongly implied that Neurath had been framed by the Allies.<ref name="Goda, Norman page 131">Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 page 131.</ref> The statements welcoming Neurath's release by Heuss and Adenauer sparked controversy all over the world.<ref name="Goda, Norman page 131"/> At the same time, Adenauer's efforts to win freedom for Admiral [[Karl Dönitz]] ran into staunch opposition from the British Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, [[Ivone Kirkpatrick]], who argued Dönitz would be an active danger to German democracy.<ref>Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 149–151.</ref> Adenauer then traded with Kirkpatrick no early release for Admiral Dönitz with an early release for Admiral [[Erich Raeder]] on medical grounds.<ref>Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 152–155.</ref> |
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In May 1955, the Federal Republic was allowed to have its own military in the form of the ''Bundeswehr'' and allowed to join NATO.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 134"/> Though Adenauer made use of a number of Wehrmacht generals and admirals in the ''Bundeswehr'', he did not want the ''Bundeswehr'' to be a revived Wehrmacht as he deeply disliked Prussian militarism, and instead saw the ''Bundeswehr'' as a new force with no links to the past.<ref name="Large, David Clay pages 177-178">Large, David Clay ''Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era'', Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996 pages 177–178.</ref> Unlike the ''[[Reichswehr]]'', which under the Weimar Republic had functioned as a "state-within-the-state" that played a major role in bringing down the Weimar Republic, Adenauer went to great lengths to ensure the new ''Bundeswehr'' be entirely under civilian control at all times.<ref>Fritz Erler, ‘Politik und nicht Prestige,’ in Erler and Jaeger, Sicherheit und Rustung, 1962, p.82-3, cited in Julian Lider, ''Origins and Development of West German Military Thought'', Vol. I, 1949–1966, Gower Publishing Company Ltd, Aldershot/Brookfield VT, 1986, p.125</ref> To ensure a democratic ''Bundeswehr'', Adenauer gave a great deal of power to the military reformer [[Wolf Graf von Baudissin]].<ref name="Large, David Clay pages 177-178"/> |
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In 1954, Adenauer's lobbying efforts on behalf of the "Spandau Seven" finally borne fruit with the release of Baron [[Konstantin von Neurath]].<ref>Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 129–131.</ref> After Neurath was released, Adenauer sent him a telegram that read: "The news that freedom has been restored to you after long, hard years has sincerely gladdened me. I express to you, your wife and your children the heartiest congratulations couple them with my best wishes for the restoration of your health".<ref>Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 130–131.</ref> President Heuss went even further, sending a telegram that spoke of Neurath's "martyrdom" at Nuremberg, and strongly implied that Neurath had been framed by the Allies.<ref name="Goda, Norman page 131">Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 page 131.</ref> The statements welcoming Neurath's release by Heuss and Adenauer sparked controversy all over the world with one Dutch newspaper writing that the telegrams sent by the President and Chancellor to Neurath were part of a "characterless policy of opportunism" intended to win the support of those Germans who supported the Nazis and argued that a "war criminal receiving clemency" should not be treated like a "hero" as Neurath had been.<ref name="Goda, Norman page 131"/> The British ''[[Daily Mirror]]'' newspaper ran a cartoon in which the ghosts of Hitler, Goebbels and Göring all complained that they had committed suicide too soon, and if only they were still alive in 1954, then Adenauer and Heuss would be celebrating their early release from Spandau as well.<ref name="Goda, Norman page 131"/> At the same time, Adenauer's efforts to win freedom for Admiral [[Karl Dönitz]] ran into staunch opposition from the British Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir [[Ivone Kirkpatrick]], who argued that the charismatic, popular war hero and National Socialist fanatic Dönitz who still was utterly convinced that he was still Germany's president on the account that Hitler had named him to that post in his last will in 1945 could not have the early release that Adenauer was pressing for because Dönitz would be an active danger to German democracy.<ref>Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 149–151.</ref> Adenauer then traded with Kirkpatrick no early release for Admiral Dönitz with an early release for Admiral [[Erich Raeder]], supposedly on medical grounds.<ref>Goda, Norman ''Tales from Spandau'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 152–155.</ref> |
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Adenauer's achievements include the establishment of a stable democracy in West Germany and a lasting reconciliation with [[France]], culminating in the [[Élysée Treaty]]. His political commitment to the Western powers achieved full sovereignty for West Germany, which was formally laid down in the [[General Treaty]], although there remained Allied restrictions concerning the status of a potentially reunited Germany and the state of emergency in West Germany. Adenauer firmly integrated the country with the emerging Euro-Atlantic community ([[NATO]] and the [[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development|Organisation for European Economic Cooperation]]). Adenauer is closely linked to the implementation of an enhanced [[pension]] system, which ensured unparalleled prosperity for retired people. Along with his Minister for Economic Affairs and successor [[Ludwig Erhard]], the West German model of a "[[social market economy]]" (a [[mixed economy]] with [[capitalism]] moderated by elements of [[social welfare]] and [[Catholic social teaching]]) allowed for the boom period known as the ''[[Wirtschaftswunder]]'' ("economic miracle") that produced broad prosperity. The Adenauer era witnessed a dramatic rise in the standard of living of average Germans, with real wages doubling between 1950 and 1963. This rising affluence was accompanied by a 20% fall in working hours during that same period, together with a fall in the unemployment rate from 8% in 1950 to 0.4% in 1965.<ref>''Contemporary World History'' by William J. Duiker</ref> in addition, an advanced welfare state was established.<ref>''The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany'', edited by [[Wolfgang Mommsen]]</ref> |
Adenauer's achievements include the establishment of a stable democracy in West Germany and a lasting reconciliation with [[France]], culminating in the [[Élysée Treaty]]. His political commitment to the Western powers achieved full sovereignty for West Germany, which was formally laid down in the [[General Treaty]], although there remained Allied restrictions concerning the status of a potentially reunited Germany and the state of emergency in West Germany. Adenauer firmly integrated the country with the emerging Euro-Atlantic community ([[NATO]] and the [[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development|Organisation for European Economic Cooperation]]). Adenauer is closely linked to the implementation of an enhanced [[pension]] system, which ensured unparalleled prosperity for retired people. Along with his Minister for Economic Affairs and successor [[Ludwig Erhard]], the West German model of a "[[social market economy]]" (a [[mixed economy]] with [[capitalism]] moderated by elements of [[social welfare]] and [[Catholic social teaching]]) allowed for the boom period known as the ''[[Wirtschaftswunder]]'' ("economic miracle") that produced broad prosperity. The Adenauer era witnessed a dramatic rise in the standard of living of average Germans, with real wages doubling between 1950 and 1963. This rising affluence was accompanied by a 20% fall in working hours during that same period, together with a fall in the unemployment rate from 8% in 1950 to 0.4% in 1965.<ref>''Contemporary World History'' by William J. Duiker</ref> in addition, an advanced welfare state was established.<ref>''The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany'', edited by [[Wolfgang Mommsen]]</ref> |
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[[File:Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-107546, Köln-Bonn, Adenauer, Mutter eines Kriegsgefangenen.jpg|thumb|Adenauer with the mother of a German [[POW]] brought home in 1955 from the [[Soviet Union]], due to Adenauer's visit to Moscow]] |
[[File:Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-107546, Köln-Bonn, Adenauer, Mutter eines Kriegsgefangenen.jpg|thumb|Adenauer with the mother of a German [[POW]] brought home in 1955 from the [[Soviet Union]], due to Adenauer's visit to Moscow]] |
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[[File:Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-F004214-0033, Konrad Adenauer und Ludwig Erhard.jpg|thumb|Konrad Adenauer with minister of economics [[Ludwig Erhard]], 1956. Adenauer acted more leniently towards the trade unions and employers' associations than Erhard.]] |
[[File:Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-F004214-0033, Konrad Adenauer und Ludwig Erhard.jpg|thumb|Konrad Adenauer with minister of economics [[Ludwig Erhard]], 1956. Adenauer acted more leniently towards the trade unions and employers' associations than Erhard.]] |
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In return for the release of the last German prisoners of war in 1955, the Federal Republic opened diplomatic relations with the [[Soviet Union|USSR]], but refused to recognize East Germany and broke off diplomatic relations with countries (e.g., Yugoslavia) that established relations with the East German régime.<ref>Williams, p. 450; this principle became known as the [[Hallstein Doctrine]]</ref> Adenauer was also ready to consider the [[Oder-Neisse line]] as the German border in order to pursue a more flexible policy with Poland but he did not command sufficient domestic support for this, and opposition to the Oder-Neisse line continued, causing considerable disappointment with Adenauer's Western allies.{{sfn|Ahonen|1998|pp=44-46}} |
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In return for the release of the last German prisoners of war in 1955, the Federal Republic opened diplomatic relations with the [[Soviet Union|USSR]], but refused to recognize East Germany and broke off diplomatic relations with countries (e.g., Yugoslavia) that established relations with the East German régime.<ref>Williams, p. 450; this principle became known as the [[Hallstein Doctrine]]</ref> On 1 May 1956, the Foreign Minister [[Heinrich von Brentano]] admitted during a press conference in London that the Federal Republic's stance on the [[Oder-Neisse line]] was "somewhat problematic", and suggested that the Federal Republic should recognize the Oder-Neisse line in exchange for the Soviet Union allowing reunification.<ref name="ReferenceC">Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue #1, January 1998 page 44.</ref> Brentano's remark caused such an uproar with the expellee leaders arguing that he should resign, that Adenauer was forced to disallow his foreign minister, and Brentano only kept his job by claiming that he was misquoted by the British press.<ref name="ReferenceC"/> In private, Brentano was willing to accept the Oder-Neisse line as the price of reunification, and was not misquoted in London as he claimed afterwards.<ref name="ReferenceC"/> Away from the public limelight in a conversation with the Canadian ambassador [[Charles Ritchie (diplomat)|Charles Ritchie]] in June 1956, Brentano called the leaders of the expellee groups "unteachable nationalists" who had learned nothing from World War II, and who did not have the right to control the Federal Republic's policy towards Eastern Europe by vetoing policy changes they disliked.<ref name="ReferenceC"/> Brentano's press conference was meant by Adenauer to be a [[trial balloon]] to see if the Federal Republic could have a more flexible policy towards Eastern Europe.<ref name="ReferenceC"/> The furious protests set off by Brentano's press conference convinced Adenauer that he did not command sufficient domestic support to pursue such a policy, and that the current policy of opposing the Oder-Neisse line would have to continue.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue #1, January 1998 pages 44–45.</ref> This caused considerable disappointment with Adenauer's Western allies, who had been applying strong pressure behind the scenes and would continue to apply such pressure for the rest of the 1950s for Bonn to recognize the Oder-Neisse line.<ref name="Ahonen pages 31">Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue #1, January 1998 page 46.</ref> This pressure become especially acute after the [[Polish October|"Polish October" crisis]] of 1956 brought to power [[Władysław Gomułka]] as Poland's new leader.<ref name="Ahonen pages 31"/> Gomułka was a committed Communist, but also a Polish nationalist who had imprisoned in 1951 for being insufficiently deferential to Moscow, and it was believed possible in Washington that a split could be encouraged between Moscow and Warsaw if only Bonn would recognize the Oder-Neisse line.<ref name="Ahonen pages 31"/> Because the Federal Republic's refusal to recognize the Oder-Neisse line together with the presence of such Nazi-tainted individuals like [[Theodor Oberländer]] in Adenauer's cabinet, Gomułka was obsessed with the fear that one day the Germans would invade Poland again, which would mean a return to the horrors of the German occupation.<ref name="Granville pages 261-290">Granville, Johanna "Reactions to the Events of 1956: New Findings from the Budapest and Warsaw Archives" pages 261–290 from ''Journal of Contemporary History'', Volume 38, Issue #2, April 2003 pages 284–285.</ref> Gomułka feared the Germans more than he disliked the Russians, and thus he argued in both public and in private that it was necessary to keep Soviet troops in Poland to guard against any future German revanchism.<ref name="Granville pages 261-290"/> Gomułka had openly stated at the 8th Plenum of the PZPR on 19 October 1956 that: "Poland needs friendship with the Soviet Union more than the Soviet Union needs friendship with Poland... Without the Soviet Union we cannot maintain our borders with the West".<ref name="ReferenceA">Granville, Johanna "From the Archives of Warsaw and Budapest: A Comparison of the Events of 1956" pages 521-563 from ''East European Politics and Societies'', Volume 16, Issue #2, April 2002 page 541</ref> Because Gomułka's obsession with the Oder-Neisse line and his reputation as a Polish nationalist who spoke of a "Polish road to socialism" independent of Moscow, it was believed possible at the time that Gomułka might follow Tito's example in 1948 if only Adenauer could be persuaded to accept the Oder-Neisse line. One scholar wrote in 1962 that most Poles deeply disliked Communism, but were willing to accept Gomułka's regime as the lesser evil because they believed Gomułka's warnings that if without the Red Army, the Germans would invade again.<ref>Bromke, Adam "Nationalism and Communism in Poland" pages 635–643 from ''Foreign Affairs'', Volume 40, Issue #4, July 1962 pages 638–640</ref> Such was the extent of Polish fears about German revanchism that as late as February 1990 the Polish Prime Minister [[Tadeusz Mazowiecki]] (who was a firm anti-Communist) stated in a speech that Red Army might have to stay in Poland until Germany had promised to firmly recognize the Oder-Neisse line as the final frontier once and for all between Germany and Poland.<ref>{{cite web |
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In 1956, during the [[Suez Crisis]], Adenauer completely supported the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt, arguing to his Cabinet that Nasser was a pro-Soviet force that needed to cut down to size.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol. 2|1997|pp=241-242}} Adenauer was appalled that the Americans had come out against the attack on Egypt alongside the Soviets, which led Adenauer to fear that the United States and Soviet Union would "carve up the world" with no thought for European interests.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol. 2|1997|p=242}} |
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| first = Clay |
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| authorlink = |
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| title = Kohl Performs A Balancing Act On German-Polish Boundary Line |
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| publisher = Daily Press |
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|date= 6 March 1990| url = http://articles.dailypress.com/1990-03-06/news/9003050378_1_neisse-poland-s-border-oder |
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| accessdate = 2014-02-22}}</ref> |
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Right at the height of the Suez crisis, Adenauer visited Paris to meet the French Premier [[Guy Mollet]] in a show of moral support for France.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol. 2|1997|p=243}} The day before Adenauer arrived in Paris, the Soviet Premier [[Nikolai Bulganin]] sent the so-called "Bulganin letters" to the leaders of Britain, France, and Israel threatening nuclear strikes if they did not end the war against Egypt.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol. 2|1997|p=243}} The news of the "Bulganin letters" reached Adenauer mid-way on the train trip to Paris. The threat of a Soviet nuclear strike that could destroy Paris at any moment added considerably to the tension of the summit.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol. 2|1997|p=244}} The Paris summit helped to strengthen the bond between Adenauer and the French, who saw themselves as fellow European powers living in a world dominated by Washington and Moscow.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol. 2|1997|p=245}} |
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In 1956, during the [[Suez Crisis]], Adenauer completely supported the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt, arguing to his Cabinet that Nasser was a pro-Soviet force that needed to cut down to size.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 241–242.</ref> Adenauer went on to tell his Cabinet that the French were justified because of Nasser's support for the FLN in Algeria, but the British were partly to blame because they "inexplicably" shut down their Suez Canal base in 1954.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 242">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 242.</ref> What appalled Adenauer about the Suez crisis was that the United States had come out against the attack on Egypt, when led Adenauer to fear that the United States and Soviet Union would "carve up the world" according to their own interests with no thought for European interests.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 242"/> Adenauer complained to his cabinet about the Americans' "chumminess with the Russians" as he called the United States voting with the Soviet Union at the UN Security Council against Britain and France, and the traditionally Francophile Adenauer drew closer to Paris as a result.<ref>Dietl, Ralph "Suez 1956: An European Intervention?" pp. 259–273 from ''Journal of Contemporary History'', Volume 43, Issue # 2, April 2008, p. 273.</ref> Right at the height of the Suez crisis, Adenauer visited Paris to meet the French Premier [[Guy Mollet]] in a show of moral support for France.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 243">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 243.</ref> The day before Adenauer arrived in Paris, the Soviet Premier [[Nikolai Bulganin]] sent the so-called "Bulganin letters" to the leaders of Britain, France, and Israel threatening nuclear strikes if they did not end the war against Egypt.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 243"/> The news of the "Bulganin letters" reached Adenauer mid-way on the train trip to Paris, and led to several of his aides to urge him to cancel the summit with Mollet rather run the risk of staying in a city that was under the threat of a Soviet nuclear strike. Adenauer instead declared that the summit would go ahead regardless of the danger. One of Adenauer's aides Fritz von Eckardt commented about the opening ceremony in Paris where Mollet and Adenauer stood side by side while the national anthems were played that: <blockquote>"When the Chancellor met members of the French government at the station, the place was full of people, who greeted Adenauer with considerable enthusiasm. A company of the ''Garde civile'' gave the salute. The German national anthem and the ''Marseillaise'' rang out. The Chancellor took the salute like a statue, motionless. I was thinking of the scene at the National Cemetery at Arlington near Washington. Even the most hard-boiled must have been touched by the significance of the moment and its symbolism. In the most serious hour France had experienced since the end of the war, the two government were standing shoulder by shoulder".<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 244">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 244.</ref></blockquote> During the summit in Paris, Mollet commented to Adenauer that a Soviet nuclear strike could destroy Paris at any moment, which added considerably to the tension of the summit and helped to draw the French and Germans closer together as they worked together in a city that they believed could have been vaporised in a moment.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 244"/> Adenauer began the summit by giving Mollet a long list of complaints about the Americans, whom he accused of being unfaithful and inconsistent allies, and said he hoped to forge a Franco-German friendship that would allow the two nations to weather together any sort of crisis.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 243–244.</ref> The Paris summit helped to forge a psychological bond between Adenauer and the French, who saw themselves as fellow European powers living in a world dominated by Washington and Moscow.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 245.</ref> |
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Adenauer was deeply shocked by the Soviet threat of nuclear strikes against Britain and France, and even more by the apparent quiescent American response to the Soviet threat of nuclear annihilation against two of NATO's key members.<ref>Dietl, Ralph "Suez 1956: An European Intervention?" pp. 259–273 from ''Journal of Contemporary History'', Volume 43, Issue # 2, April 2008 p. 273</ref> As a result, Adenauer became more interested in the French idea of a European "Third Force" in the Cold War as an alternative security policy.<ref>Dietl, Ralph "Suez 1956: An European Intervention?" pp. 259–273 from ''Journal of Contemporary History'', Volume 43, Issue # 2, April 2008, pp. 273–274.</ref> This helped to lead to the formation of the [[European Economic Community]] in 1957, which was intended to be the foundation stone of the European "Third Force".<ref>Dietl, Ralph "Suez 1956: An European Intervention?" pp. 259–273 from ''Journal of Contemporary History'', Volume 43, Issue # 2, April 2008, p. 274.</ref> |
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Adenauer reached an agreement for his "nuclear ambitions" with a NATO Military Committee in December 1956 that stipulated West German forces to be "equipped for nuclear warfare".<ref>Williams, p. 442</ref> Concluding that the United States would eventually pull out of Western Europe, Adenauer pursued nuclear cooperation with other countries. The French government then proposed that France, West Germany and Italy jointly develop and produce nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and an agreement was signed in April 1958. With the ascendancy of Charles de Gaulle, the agreement for joint production and control was shelved indefinitely.<ref>Williams, p. 458</ref> President John F. Kennedy, an ardent foe of nuclear proliferation, considered sales of such weapons moot since "in the event of war the United States would, from the outset, be prepared to defend the Federal Republic."<ref>Williams, p. 490</ref> The physicists of the [[Max Planck Society|Max Planck Institute]] for Theoretical Physics at [[Göttingen]] and other renowned universities would have had the scientific capability for in-house development, but the will was absent,<ref name="Williams, p. 444"/> nor was there public support. With Adenauer's fourth-term election in November 1961 and the end of his chancellorship in sight, his "nuclear ambitions" began to taper off. |
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===Third government=== |
===Third government=== |
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[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-27146-0001, Paris, NATO-Vertrag, Unterzeichnung Adenauer.jpg|thumb|Signing the NATO treaty in Paris, 1954 (Adenauer at the left)]] |
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-27146-0001, Paris, NATO-Vertrag, Unterzeichnung Adenauer.jpg|thumb|Signing the NATO treaty in Paris, 1954 (Adenauer at the left)]] |
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1957 saw the reintegration of the [[Saarland]] into West Germany . The election of 1957 essentially dealt with national matters.<ref name="Williams, p. 444">Williams, p. 444</ref> His re-election campaigns centered around the slogan "No Experiments".<ref name="1970s"/> Riding a wave of popularity from the return of the last POWs from Soviet labor camps, as well as an extensive pension reform, Adenauer led the CDU/CSU to the first—and as of 2015, only—outright majority in a free German election.<ref name="Williams, p. 445">Williams, p. 445</ref> In 1957, the Federal Republic signed the [[Treaty of Rome]] and become a founding member of the [[European Economic Community]]. In September 1958, Adenauer first met President [[Charles de Gaulle]] of France, who was to become a close friend and ally in pursuing Franco-German rapprochement. |
1957 saw the reintegration of the [[Saarland]] into West Germany . The election of 1957 essentially dealt with national matters.<ref name="Williams, p. 444">Williams, p. 444</ref> His re-election campaigns centered around the slogan "No Experiments".<ref name="1970s"/> Riding a wave of popularity from the return of the last POWs from Soviet labor camps, as well as an extensive pension reform, Adenauer led the CDU/CSU to the first—and as of 2015, only—outright majority in a free German election.<ref name="Williams, p. 445">Williams, p. 445</ref> In 1957, the Federal Republic signed the [[Treaty of Rome]] and become a founding member of the [[European Economic Community]]. In September 1958, Adenauer first met President [[Charles de Gaulle]] of France, who was to become a close friend and ally in pursuing Franco-German rapprochement.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol. 2|1997|pp=365-366}} |
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In response to the Ulm trials in 1958, Adenauer set up the [[Central Office of the State Justice Administrations for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes]].<ref name="Taylor, Frederick page 373">Taylor, Frederick ''Exorcising Hitler'', London: Bloomsbury Press, 2011 page 373.</ref> |
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In 1958, a scandal emerged when a policeman in [[Ulm]] retired.<ref name="Taylor, Frederick page 373">Taylor, Frederick ''Exorcising Hitler'', London: Bloomsbury Press, 2011 page 373.</ref> The policeman wrote to the Baden-Württemberg government claiming that his pension was not quite right under the grounds that it failed to take account for his time in the ''[[Einsatzgruppen]]'' killing Jews in 1941-42, and that his pension should included his time in the ''Einsatzgruppen''.<ref name="Taylor, Frederick page 373"/> Somebody in the Baden-Württemberg government, offended by the idea of a war criminal getting a pension for murdering people leaked this to the press. The policeman's pension request led to the first prosecution of Nazi war criminals by West German officials.<ref name="Taylor, Frederick page 373"/> The revelation at the Ulm trial that were thousands of former ''Einsatzgruppen'' members living productive, happy, law-abiding lives in post-war Germany cast much doubt on Adenauer's thesis that Nazi war crimes were the work of a small gang of criminals all dead, and led to Adenauer setting up the [[Central Office of the State Justice Administrations for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes]].<ref name="Taylor, Frederick page 373"/> |
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[[File:CDU Wahlkampfplakat - kaspl019.JPG|thumb|The famous election poster of 1957: "No experiments"]] |
[[File:CDU Wahlkampfplakat - kaspl019.JPG|thumb|The famous election poster of 1957: "No experiments"]] |
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On 27 November 1958 another Berlin crisis broke out when Khrushchev submitted an [[ultimatum]] with a six-month expiry date to Washington, London and Paris, where he demanded that the Allies pull all their forces out of West Berlin and agree that West Berlin become a "free city", or else he would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. <ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 140">Gaddis, John Lewis ''We Now Know'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 140.</ref> Adenauer was opposed to any sort of negotiations with the Soviets, arguing if only the West were to hang tough long enough, Khrushchev would back down.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol. 2|1997|p=399}} |
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Throughout the 1950s, the East German leader [[Walter Ulbricht]] had been pressuring the Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]] for an end to [[West Berlin]], maintaining that the German Democratic Republic could not prosper as long as West Berlin existed as an escape valve for unhappy East Germans.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 139">Gaddis, John Lewis ''We Now Know'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 139.</ref> In February 1958, the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany [[Mikhail Pervukhin]] suggested to Khrushchev that "the Berlin question can be resolved independently from resolving the entire German problem, by the gradual political and economic conquest of West Berlin".<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 139"/> On 10 November 1958, Khrushchev gave a bellicose speech warning that he wanted to see the end of West Berlin, which he called a "cancer" in East Germany and then on 27 November another Berlin crisis broke out when Khrushchev submitted [[Ultimatum]] with a six-month expiry date to Washington, London and Paris.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 140">Gaddis, John Lewis ''We Now Know'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 140.</ref> Khrushchev demanded that the Allies pull all their forces out of West Berlin and agree that West Berlin become a "free city", or else he would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 139"/> A Soviet-East German peace treaty would mean at least officially the ending of the Soviet rights in their zone of Germany.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 139"/> Every since 1945, American, British and French forces had enjoyed access rights to West Berlin through East Germany and to do so they had dealt with the Soviet forces.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 139"/> Ending the Soviet rights in East Germany would meant to enjoy their access right to West Berlin the Allies would now have to deal with the East Germans rather the Soviets.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 141">Gaddis, John Lewis ''We Now Know'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 141.</ref> Under the [[Hallstein Doctrine]], Adenauer had a policy of breaking off diplomatic relations with any state except for the Soviet Union that recognized East Germany.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 141"/> Thus, a Soviet-East German peace treaty would mean that the Allies would have to recognize East Germany to use their access rights to West Berlin and have Adenauer break off relations with them or alternatively the Allies would have to give up on their access rights to West Berlin if they did not wish to deal with East Germany.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis pages 140-141">Gaddis, John Lewis ''We Now Know'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 pages 140–141.</ref> The plans for the "Free City of Berlin" were regarded by everyone at the time including most importantly Khrushchev as a mere prelude to the East German annexation of West Berlin, and as a providing a face-saving way for the Allies to pull out of West Berlin before the East Germans marched in.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis pages 140-141"/> Alternatively, if the Allies did recognize East Germany, and Adenauer then enforced the Hallstein Doctrine by breaking diplomatic relations with Washington, Paris and London, then all of Adenauer's work towards integrating the Federal Republic into the West would be undone at one stroke.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis pages 140-141"/> From Khrushchev's viewpoint, either outcome would be equally desirable for the Soviet Union, and he believed that the crisis could only be resolved in his favor because the only way in which the Western powers could continue enjoy their access rights to West Berlin without recognizing East Germany would be war, and Khrushchev did not believe the West would risk World War III for the sake of Berlin.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis pages 140-141"/> At the time that Khrushchev presented his ultimatum in 1958, he was said to have made the remark that "Berlin is the testicles of the West. Every time I want to make the West scream, I squeeze on Berlin".<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 140"/> |
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As the 27 May deadline approached, the crisis was defused by the British Prime Minister [[Harold Macmillan]], who visited [[Moscow]] to meet with Khrushchev.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 141">Gaddis, John Lewis ''We Now Know'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 141.</ref> Macmillan failed to get the resolution of the Berlin crisis he was seeking, but managed to win time by getting Khrushchev to extend the deadline while not committing himself or the other Western powers to concessions.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 141"/> Adenauer believed Macmillan to be a spineless "appeaser", who had made a secret deal with Khrushchev at the expense of the Federal Republic.<ref name="Thorpe, D.R. page 428">Thorpe, D.R. ''Supermac'', London: Chatto & Windus, 2010 page 428</ref>{{sfn|Schwarz Vol. 2|1997|p=396}} Macmillan argued that Adenauer's rigid line on the Berlin crisis was likely to plunge the world into a nuclear holocaust, and that diplomacy was a better solution.<ref>Thorpe, D.R. ''Supermac'', London: Chatto & Windus, 2010 pages 428–429.</ref> By contrast with his poor relations with Macmillan, Adenauer enjoyed excellent relations with General de Gaulle of France, whom Adenauer saw as a "rock", and the only foreign leader whom he could completely trust.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol. 2|1997|pp=402-403}} |
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The U.S. secretary of state [[John Foster Dulles]] suggested that the American response to Khrushchev's ultimatum should be to recognize and deal with the East Germans as "agents" of the Soviet Union, something that Dulles hoped might be an acceptable compromise.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 141"/> In a message to the U.S President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], Adenauer stated that any form of American recognition of East Germany, even as Soviet "agents" would mean that West Germany would enforce the Hallstein Doctrine by breaking off diplomatic relations with Washington.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 141"/> Eisenhower complained privately that thanks to Adenauer's threat to enforce the Hallstein Doctrine that this was "another instance in which our political posture requires us to assume military positions that are wholly illogical" and that average American would have trouble understanding why thermonuclear war was being risked because "we worry about the shape of the helmet of the official to whom we present credentials".<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 141"/> Eisenhower decided that rather than risk a rupture with Bonn, that the Americans would refuse to have any dealings with the East Germans, and come 27 May 1959 if a Soviet-East German peace treaty was signed, then an American platoon would be sent to fight its way across East Germany to West Berlin.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 141"/> If the platoon was repulsed, then an American armored division would be sent to fight its way to West Berlin in order to create a situation as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff put to convince the world that U.S. "would use whatever degree of force may be necessary" to enjoy its access rights to West Berlin without dealing with the East German regime.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 141"/> Dulles during a visit to Bonn in February 1959 told Adenauer that if the division was rebuffed in its attempt to access West Berlin, the U.S. would go to war with the Soviet Union, a war "in which we obviously would not forego the use of nuclear weapons".<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 141"/> Adenauer, who never much liked Berlin is said to have told Dulles in horror: "For God's sake, not for Berlin!".<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 141"/> Adenauer had already been informed by NATO planners in 1955 that the use of [[tactical nuclear weapon]]s alone in Germany should World War III break out would release enough radiation to kill about 1.7 million German civilians at once and hospitalize about 3.5 million Germans civilians with radiation-related injuries.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 141"/> This estimate of German civilian casualties were for tactical nuclear weapons alone, and excluded the dead and wounded expected from the use of conventional weapons. Adenauer was opposed to the American plan to fight their way across East Germany as the consequences of a Third World War from the German point of view were too horrific, but at the same time was opposed to any sort of negotiations with the Soviets, arguing if only the West were to hang tough long enough, Khrushchev would back down.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 399.</ref> |
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Adenauer tarnished his image when he announced he would run for the office of [[President of Germany|federal president]] in 1959, only to pull out when he discovered that under the [[Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany|Basic Law]], the president had far less power than he did in the Weimar Republic. Adenauer believed that he could re-reinterpret the powers of the presidency in such a way as to be an effective power-player instead holding a merely ceremonial post by attending cabinet meetings (the Basic Law was silent on whether the president could attend cabinet meetings or not).{{sfn|Schwarz Vol. 2|1997|pp=421-422}} President Heuss wrote to Adenauer in a letter that Adenauer had always worked to prevent him from attending cabinet meetings and was now very annoyed by Adenauer's idea of chairing cabinet meetings as president.{{sfn|Schwarz Vol. 2|1997|p=422}} Additionally, the departing and respected Theodor Heuss had established the precedent that the president be nonpartisan, which clashed with Adenauer's vision.<ref>Williams, p. 464</ref> After his reversal he supported the nomination of [[Heinrich Lübke]] as the CDU presidential candidate whom he believed weak enough not to interfere with his actions as Federal Chancellor. One of Adenauer's reasons for not pursuing the presidency was his fear that Ludwig Erhard, whom Adenauer thought little of, would become the new chancellor. |
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As the 27 May deadline approached, the crisis was defused though not resolved by the British Prime Minister [[Harold Macmillan]], who visited [[Moscow]] to meet with Khrushchev to discuss the Berlin crisis over the objections of Adenauer who believed that Macmillan would seek a compromise that would in some way imply recognition of the German Democratic Republic.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 141"/> Macmillan failed to get the resolution of the Berlin crisis he was seeking, but managed to win time by getting Khrushchev to extend the deadline by promising a four-power conference on a solution while not committing himself or the other Western powers to concessions.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis page 141"/> The four-power conference that was to discuss the Berlin crisis was the abortive Paris summit of May 1960 that was cancelled due to the [[1960 U-2 incident|U-2 incident]]. Adenauer-who was always inclined to believe the worst about the British-was livid about the Moscow summit, and believed quite wrongly as it turned out, that Macmillan had made a secret deal with Khrushchev at the expense of the Federal Republic.<ref name="Thorpe, D.R. page 428">Thorpe, D.R. ''Supermac'', London: Chatto & Windus, 2010 page 428</ref> At a subsequent Anglo-German summit between Adenauer and Macmillan to discuss the Berlin crisis was quite frosty with the two leaders being barely civil to one another.<ref name="Thorpe, D.R. page 428"/> At the end of the Moscow summit, an Anglo-Soviet communiqué was released, which spoke in very vague terms of the British and Soviet governments' desire to end the nuclear arms race and a solution to the "German question" that would be satisfactory to all parties.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 403">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 403.</ref> Adenauer saw the Anglo-Soviet communiqué as a sign that Macmillan had surrendered too much to the Soviets, and did nothing at the Bonn summit with Macmillan to hide his displeasure.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 403"/> Adenauer saw Macmillan as a spineless "appeaser" unable and unwilling to stand up to Khrushchev, and in a 1965 interview was to call Macmillan "stupid" for holding the 1959 summit with Khrushchev.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 396.</ref> The dislike between Macmillan and Adenauer was mutual. In his diary entries from 1959, Macmillan variously described Adenauer as "half crazy", "... a false and cantankerous old man", and "... vain, suspicious and grasping".<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 396–397.</ref> Macmillan argued that Adenauer by opposing all talks with the Soviets was taking a needlessly intransigent line on the Berlin crisis that was likely to plunge the world into a nuclear holocaust, and argued the best solution to the Berlin crisis was to follow Churchill's dictum that "jaw-jaw-jaw" was always better than "war-war-war".<ref>Thorpe, D.R. ''Supermac'', London: Chatto & Windus, 2010 pages 428–429.</ref> By contrast with his poor relations with Macmillan, Adenauer enjoyed excellent relations with General de Gaulle of France, whom Adenauer saw as a "rock", and the only foreign leader whom he could completely trust.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 402–403.</ref> One of Adenauer's aides Heinrich Krone wrote in his diary in early 1959 that: "The Chancellor is intent on the closest partnership with France".<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter page 403"/> |
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By early 1959, Adenauer came under renewed pressure from his Western allies, especially the Americans and the French to recognize the [[Oder-Neisse line]] with the Americans being especially insistent.{{sfn|Ahonen|1998|p=56}} Adenauer gave his "explicit and unconditional approval" to the idea of non-aggression pacts in late January 1959, which effectively meant recognising the Oder-Neisse line, since realistically speaking Germany could only regain the lost territories through force. For next several months, West German officials met with American, British and French diplomats to discuss in conditions of great secrecy the texts of the suggested non-aggression pacts.{{sfn|Ahonen|1998|p=56}} On 21 May 1959 the ''[[New York Times]]'' leaked the news of the proposed non-aggression pacts.{{sfn|Ahonen|1998|p=57}} The expellee lobby charged that the non-aggression pacts were only the first step towards accepting the Oder-Neisse line and the loss of the Sudetenland, and called Adenauer's commitment to the cause of the expellee lobby "a mere illusion".{{sfn|Ahonen|1998|p=57}} |
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Adenauer briefly considered running for the office of [[President of Germany|Federal President]] in 1959. Adenauer's biographer Hans-Peter Schwarz commented that though Adenauer was normally very cautious and careful when making decisions, but at times, Adenauer would act recklessly and impulsively with no thought for the consequences.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 421</ref> Adenauer had tarnished his image when he announced he would run for the office of federal president in 1959, only to pull out when he discovered that under the [[Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany|Basic Law]], the president had far less power than he did in the Weimar Republic. Adenauer believed that he could re-reinterpret the powers of the presidency in such a way as to be an effective power-player instead holding a merely ceremonial post by attending cabinet meetings (the Basic Law was silent on whether the president could attend cabinet meetings or not).<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 421–422</ref> In a letter that showed signs of much anger, President Heuss wrote to Adenauer that he had always worked to prevent him from attending cabinet meetings, and argued that having established that precedent, was now very annoyed by Adenauer's idea if he was elected president, he would chair cabinet meetings.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 422</ref> Additionally, the departing and respected Theodor Heuss had established the precedent that the president be nonpartisan, which clashed with Adenauer's vision.<ref>Williams, p. 464</ref> After his reversal he supported the nomination of [[Heinrich Lübke]] as the CDU presidential candidate whom he believed weak enough not to interfere with his actions as Federal Chancellor. For a couple of weeks in 1959, Adenauer considered leaving the chancellorship and becoming Federal President. He initially believed the office could be fulfilled in a more politically active way than president Heuss did. He reconsidered, among other reasons, because he was afraid that Ludwig Erhard, whom Adenauer thought little of, would become the new chancellor. |
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In June 1959, Adenauer promised that his government would never cease demanding ''Heimatrecht'' for the expellees, declared the [[Flight and expulsion of Germans (1944–50)|expulsion of the Germans]] a "great crime", and announced that if diplomatic relations were ever established with Poland and Czechoslovakia he would demand Polish and Czechoslovakian reparations.<ref name="Tetens, T.H. page 133">Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 page 133</ref> Adenauer's promises were intended to undo the damage done to his reputation amongst the expellee lobby by the proposed non-aggression pacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia. In early July 1959, coming under strong Western pressure, Adenauer decided to revive the idea of the non-aggression pacts. At that point, the expellee lobby swung into action and organized protests all over the Federal Republic while bombarding the offices of Adenauer and other members of the cabinet with thousands of letters, telegrams and telephone calls promising never to vote CDU again if the non-aggression pacts were signed.{{sfn|Ahonen|1998|p=59}} Faced with this pressure, Adenauer promptly capitulated to the expellee lobby.{{sfn|Ahonen|1998|p=59}} |
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By early 1959, Adenauer came under renewed pressure from his Western allies, especially the Americans and the French to recognize the [[Oder-Neisse line]] with the Americans being especially insistent.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 56.</ref> The Americans argued that Adenauer's revanchist statements about the Oder-Neisse line were a godsend to Communist propaganda in Poland, and that the best way of countering the Communist claim that the Federal Republic was out to stage a new ''[[Drang nach Osten]]'', thereby requiring the Red Army to protect the Poles was for Adenauer to publicly accept the Oder-Neisse line.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 56.</ref> In response to the Franco-American pressure, the Foreign Minister [[Heinrich von Brentano]] suggested as a way of gaining "breathing space" was for the Federal Republic to sign non-aggression pacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia, which would imply recognition of the Oder-Neisse line without formally saying so.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 56.</ref> Since it was extremely unlikely that the Poles would ever willingly return the [[Recovered Territories]] to Germany, realistically war was the only way that the Germans could ever hope to challenge the Oder-Neisse line, so by signing a non-aggression pact with Poland would effectively mean accepting the Oder-Neisse line.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 56.</ref> In response to Brenatno's proposal, Adenauer gave his "explicit and unconditional approval" to the idea of non-aggression pacts in late January 1959, and for next several months, West German officials met with American, British and French diplomats to discuss in conditions of great secrecy the texts of the suggested non-aggression pacts.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 56.</ref> Crucially, Adenauer did not inform either the Ernst Lemmer, the Minister of All-German Affairs or the [[Theodor Oberländer]] Minister of Refugees as the former was close to the expelle lobby while the latter was one of the leaders of the expelle lobby.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 56.</ref> In March 1959, Adenauer had a rare public rift with his friend General de Gaulle of France, when de Gaulle publicly urged Adenauer to recognize the [[Oder-Neisse line]], a statement which promoted a press release from Chancellor's office which firmly declared the Chancellor believed that "the German borders are still those of December 30, 1937".<ref>Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 page 135</ref> At the same time, the London ''Times'' ran an article documenting the most of the leaders of the powerful expellee lobby had been active National Socialists, and some had been war criminals such as the SS officer Hermann Krumey, who after the war led one of the Sudeten expelle groups.<ref name="Tetens, T.H. pages 134-135">Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 pages 134–135</ref> The article charged that by refusing to recognize the Oder-Neisse line and promoting the idea of ''Heimatrecht'' that Adenauer had been "keeping alive the sentiments and hatreds" expressed by the expellee lobby.<ref name="Tetens, T.H. pages 134-135"/> By late April 1959, the texts of the proposed non-aggression pacts were largely finished, and all that remained was to present them to the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 57.</ref> But before that could happen, the ''[[New York Times]]'' on 21 May 1959 leaked the news of the proposed non-aggression pacts.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from Central European History, Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 57.</ref> The expellee lobby reacted with open dismay, charging that the non-aggression pacts were only the first step towards accepting the Oder-Neisse line and the loss of the Sudetenland, and called Adenauer's commitment to the cause of the expellee lobby "a mere illusion".<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 57.</ref> Adenauer had never laid claim to the Sudetenland, but the Sudeten German expellee groups had been quite open in expressing their views that the Munich Agreement was still in effect in their opinion, and as such the Germans had the right to invade Czechoslovakia to take back the Sudetenland, which had been "illegally" occupied by Czechoslovakia since 1945.<ref>Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 page 132</ref> Adenauer insisted that he was still opposed to the Oder-Neisse line, and that the proposed non-aggression pacts did not change that fact, but this argument fooled almost no-one. The expellee lobby knew well that without the option of war that the Oder-Neisse line would remain unchanged (Adenauer's argument that the Poles could somehow be persuaded to peacefully return the land lost by the Oder-Neisse line did not impress many), which is why they were so outraged by the idea of a non-aggression pact with Poland.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from ''Central European History'', Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 57.</ref> |
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In late 1959, a controversy broke out when it emerged that [[Theodor Oberländer]], the Minister of Refugees since 1953 and one of the most powerful leaders of the expellee lobby had committed war crimes against Jews and Poles during World War II.<ref>Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 pages 191–192</ref> Despite his past, on 10 December 1959, a statement was released to the press declaring that "Dr. Oberländer has the full confidence of the Adenauer cabinet".<ref name="Tetens, T.H. page 192">Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 page 192</ref> Other Christian Democrats made it clear to Adenauer that they would have liked to see Oberländer out of the cabinet, and finally in May 1960 Oberländer resigned.<ref>Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 pages 192–193</ref> |
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In June 1959, Adenauer attended a four-day rally organized by the expellee lobby in Cologne during which he promised that his government would never cease demanding ''Heimatrecht'' for the expellees, declared that the [[Flight and expulsion of Germans (1944–50)|expulsion of the Germans]] was a "great crime", and announced that if diplomatic relations were ever established with Poland and Czechoslovakia that he would demand that the Poles and the Czechoslovaks pay reparations.<ref name="Tetens, T.H. page 133">Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 page 133</ref> Adenauer's speech was well received in West Germany, but attracted much outrage in Poland, when it was widely publicized by the Communist government as an example of why Poland needed the Red Army to counter the Adenauer's alleged new ''Drang nach Osten''.<ref name="Tetens, T.H. page 133"/> The demand that the Poles and the Czechoslovaks pay reparations to Germany was considered very offensive in those nations as the Federal Republic had never paid any reparations to either Poland or Czechoslovakia for their war-time occupation by Germany. Adenauer's speech at the Cologne rally was intended to undo the damage done to his reputation amongst the expellee lobby by the news that he had been seeking non-aggression pacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia. In early July 1959, coming under strong Western pressure, Adenauer decided to revive the idea of the non-aggression pacts, authorizing Brentano to formally present the non-aggression pacts to the Polish and Czechoslovak governments after he had obtained the approval of the cabinet for the non-aggression pacts, which was expected to be a mere formality.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from Central European History, Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 58.</ref> At that point, the expellee lobby swung into action to scuttle the idea of the non-aggression pacts, and organized protests all over the Federal Republic while bombarding the offices of Adenauer and other members of the cabinet with thousands of letters, telegrams and telephone calls promising never to vote CDU again if the non-aggression pacts were signed.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from Central European History, Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 59.</ref> Faced with this pressure, Adenauer promptly capitulated to the expellee lobby, telling his cabinet on 22 July 1959 that there would be no vote on approving the non-aggression pacts while at same time telling Brentano to inform the American, French and British governments that the idea of the Federal Republic signing the non-aggression pacts was now dead.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from Central European History, Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 59.</ref> Adenauer explained to the cabinet he had killed his own plans for non-aggression pacts because of the "several hundreds of thousands of votes" held by the [[All-German Bloc/League of Expellees and Deprived of Rights]], which he believed that the CDU could win in the 1961 elections provided that the CDU stayed in the good graces of the expellee lobby.<ref>Ahonen, Pertti "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era" pages 31–63 from Central European History, Volume 31, Issue # 1, 1998 page 61.</ref> |
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In late 1959, a controversy broke out when it emerged that [[Theodor Oberländer]], the Minister of Refugees since 1953 and one of the most powerful leaders of the expellee lobby had committed war crimes against Jews and Poles during World War II.<ref>Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 pages 191–192</ref> Oberländer had been in command of the [[Nachtigall Battalion]] which between 2–4 July 1941 shot about 7, 000 people mostly Jews and Polish intellectuals in what is now the Ukrainian city of [[Lviv]].<ref name="Tetens, T.H. page 52">Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 page 52</ref> Oberländer admitted to having commanded the Nachtigall Battalion in July 1941, but insisted in an interview with ''[[Die Zeit]]'' on 9 October 1959 that "not a shot was fired" by his men, maintaining that no massacre had taken place.<ref name="Tetens, T.H. page 52"/> Despite his past, on 10 December 1959, a statement was released to the press declaring that "Dr. Oberländer has the full confidence of the Adenauer cabinet".<ref name="Tetens, T.H. page 192">Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 page 192</ref> ''[[Der Spiegel]]'' ran a cover-story on Oberländer and an editorial written by [[Rudolf Augstein]] commented that "This man should never have been appointed a minister".<ref name="Tetens, T.H. page 192"/> Even other Christian Democrats made it clear to Adenauer that they would have liked to see Oberländer out of the cabinet, and finally in May 1960 Oberländer resigned.<ref>Tetens, T.H. ''The New Germany and the Old Nazis'', New York: Random House, 1961 pages 192–193</ref> |
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===Fourth government=== |
===Fourth government=== |
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The mood had changed by election time in September 1961. Over the course of 1961, Adenauer had his concerns about both the status of Berlin and US leadership confirmed, as the Soviets and East Germans built the Berlin Wall. Adenauer had come into the year distrusting the new US President, [[John F. Kennedy]]. He doubted Kennedy's commitment to a free Berlin and a unified Germany and considered him undisciplined and naïve.<ref>{{cite book|last=Kempe|first=Frederick|title=Berlin 1961|year=2011|publisher=Penguin Group (USA)|isbn=0-399-15729-8|page=98}}</ref> |
The mood had changed by election time in September 1961. Over the course of 1961, Adenauer had his concerns about both the status of Berlin and US leadership confirmed, as the Soviets and East Germans built the Berlin Wall. Adenauer had come into the year distrusting the new US President, [[John F. Kennedy]]. He doubted Kennedy's commitment to a free Berlin and a unified Germany and considered him undisciplined and naïve.<ref>{{cite book|last=Kempe|first=Frederick|title=Berlin 1961|year=2011|publisher=Penguin Group (USA)|isbn=0-399-15729-8|page=98}}</ref> For his part, Kennedy thought that Adenauer was a relic of the past. Their strained relationship impeded effective Western action on Berlin during 1961.<ref>{{cite book|last=Kempe|first=Frederick|title=Berlin 1961|year=2011|publisher=Penguin Group (USA)|isbn=0-399-15729-8|page=101}}</ref> |
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The construction of the [[Berlin Wall]] in August 1961 and the sealing of borders by the East Germans made Adenauer's government look weak. Adenauer chose to remain on the campaign trail, and made a disastrous misjudgement in a speech on 14 August 1961 in [[Regensburg]] when he engaged in a personal attack on the SPD Mayor of West Berlin, [[Willy Brandt]] saying that Brandt's illegitimate birth had disqualified him from holding any sort of office.{{sfn|Granieri|2004|p=135}} After failing to keep their majority in the general election on 17 September, the CDU/CSU again needed to include the FDP in a coalition government. Adenauer was forced to make two concessions: to relinquish the chancellorship before the end of the new term, his fourth, and to replace his foreign minister.<ref>Williams, p. 494; Foreign Minister [[Heinrich von Brentano]] was considered too subservient to the Chancellor and [[Gerhard Schröder (CDU)|Gerhard Schröder]] became foreign minister [Williams, p. 495]</ref> In his last years in office, Adenauer used to take a nap after lunch and, when he was traveling abroad and had a public function to attend, he sometimes asked for a bed in a room close to where he was supposed to be speaking, so that he could rest briefly before he appeared.<ref name="John Gunther">[[John Gunther]]: ''Inside Europe Today'', Harper and Brothers, New York, 1961; Library of Congress catalog card number: 61-9706</ref> |
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During this time, Adenauer came into |
During this time, Adenauer came into conflict with the Economics Minister [[Ludwig Erhard]] over the depth of German integration to the West. Erhard was in favor of allowing Britain to join to create a trans-Atlantic free trade zone, while Adenauer was for strengthening ties amongst the original founding six nations of West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy.{{sfn|Granieri|2004|p=153}} In Adenauer's viewpoint, the Cold War meant that the NATO alliance with the United States and Britain was essential, but there could be no deeper integration into a trans-Atlantic community beyond the existing military ties as that would lead to a "mishmash" between different cultural systems that would be doomed to failure.{{sfn|Granieri|2004|pp=154-155}} Though Adenauer had tried to get Britain to join the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951–52, by the early 1960s Adenauer had come to share General de Gaulle's belief that Britain simply did not belong in the EEC.{{sfn|Granieri|2004|p=155}} |
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[[File:Sculpture of Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle outside the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.jpg|thumb|Berlin plaque commemorating restoration of relations between Germany and France, showing Adenauer and [[Charles de Gaulle]].]] |
[[File:Sculpture of Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle outside the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.jpg|thumb|Berlin plaque commemorating restoration of relations between Germany and France, showing Adenauer and [[Charles de Gaulle]].]] |
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In October 1962, [[Spiegel scandal|a scandal erupted]] when police arrested five ''[[Der Spiegel]]'' journalists, charging them with espionage for publishing a memo detailing weaknesses in the West German armed forces. Adenauer had not initiated the arrests, but initially defended the person responsible, Defense Minister [[Franz Josef Strauss]], and called the Spiegel memo "abyss of treason". After public outrage and heavy protests from the coalition partner FDP he dismissed Strauss, but the reputation of Adenauer and his party had already suffered.<ref>Eleanor L. Turk, ''The history of Germany'' (1999) p. 154</ref><ref>Ronald F. Bunn, ''German politics and the Spiegel affair: a case study of the Bonn system'' (1968) pp. 159–60</ref> |
In October 1962, [[Spiegel scandal|a scandal erupted]] when police arrested five ''[[Der Spiegel]]'' journalists, charging them with espionage for publishing a memo detailing weaknesses in the West German armed forces. Adenauer had not initiated the arrests, but initially defended the person responsible, Defense Minister [[Franz Josef Strauss]], and called the Spiegel memo "abyss of treason". After public outrage and heavy protests from the coalition partner FDP he dismissed Strauss, but the reputation of Adenauer and his party had already suffered.<ref>Eleanor L. Turk, ''The history of Germany'' (1999) p. 154</ref><ref>Ronald F. Bunn, ''German politics and the Spiegel affair: a case study of the Bonn system'' (1968) pp. 159–60</ref> |
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Adenauer managed to remain in office for almost another year, but the scandal increased the pressure already on him to fulfill his promise to resign before the end of the term. Adenauer was not on good terms in his last years of power with his economics minister [[Ludwig Erhard]] and tried to block him from the chancellorship. In January 1963, Adenauer privately supported General [[Charles de Gaulle]]'s veto of Britain's attempt to join the [[European Economic Community]], and was only prevented from saying so openly by the need to preserve unity in his cabinet as most of his ministers led by [[Ludwig Erhard]] supported Britain's application.<ref>Jenkins, Roy ''Portraits and Miniatures'', London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 page 83</ref> A [[Francophile]], Adenauer saw a Franco-German partnership as the key for European peace and prosperity and shared de Gaulle's view that Britain would be a disputative force in the EEC.<ref>Jenkins, Roy ''Portraits and Miniatures'', London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 page 97</ref> Adenauer failed in his efforts to block Erhard as his successor, and in October 1963 he turned the office over to Erhard. He |
Adenauer managed to remain in office for almost another year, but the scandal increased the pressure already on him to fulfill his promise to resign before the end of the term. Adenauer was not on good terms in his last years of power with his economics minister [[Ludwig Erhard]] and tried to block him from the chancellorship. In January 1963, Adenauer privately supported General [[Charles de Gaulle]]'s veto of Britain's attempt to join the [[European Economic Community]], and was only prevented from saying so openly by the need to preserve unity in his cabinet as most of his ministers led by [[Ludwig Erhard]] supported Britain's application.<ref>Jenkins, Roy ''Portraits and Miniatures'', London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 page 83</ref> A [[Francophile]], Adenauer saw a Franco-German partnership as the key for European peace and prosperity and shared de Gaulle's view that Britain would be a disputative force in the EEC.<ref>Jenkins, Roy ''Portraits and Miniatures'', London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 page 97</ref> Adenauer failed in his efforts to block Erhard as his successor, and in October 1963 he turned the office over to Erhard. He remained chairman of the CDU until his resignation in December 1966.{{sfn|Granieri|2004|p=191}} |
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Adenauer ensured a truly free and democratic society |
Adenauer ensured a truly free and democratic society and laid the groundwork for Germany to reenter the community of nations and to evolve as a dependable member of the Western world. It can be argued that because of Adenauer's policies, a later reunification of both German states was possible; and unified Germany has remained a solid partner in the [[European Union]] and [[NATO]]. The British historian [[Frederick Taylor (historian)|Frederick Taylor]] argued that Federal Republic under Adenauer retained many of the characteristics of the authoritarian "deep state" that existed under the Weimar Republic, and that in many ways the Adenauer era was a transition period in values and viewpoints from the authoritarianism that characterized Germany in the first half of the 20th century to the more democratic values that characterized the western half Germany in the second half of the 20th century.<ref>Taylor, Frederick ''Exorcising Hitler'', London: Bloomsbury Press, 2011 page 371.</ref> |
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The [[German student movement]] of the late 1960s was essentially a left-wing protest against the conservatism that Adenauer—by then out of office—had personified. Radical student protesters and Marxist groups were further inflamed by strong [[Anti-Americanism]] fueled by the [[Vietnam War]] and opposition to the conservative [[Nixon administration]].<ref>''Time'', 3 July 1972, p. 37</ref> |
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In retrospect, mainly positive assessments of his chancellorship prevail, not only with the German public, which voted him the "greatest German of all time" in a 2003 television poll,<ref>http://unserebesten.zdf.de/</ref> but even with some of today's left-wing intellectuals, who praise his unconditional commitment to western-style democracy and European integration.<ref>Williams, p. 403</ref> |
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===Social policies=== |
===Social policies=== |
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Adenauer's years in the Chancellorship saw the realization of a number of important initiatives in the domestic field, such as in housing, pension rights, and unemployment provision. A major housebuilding programme was launched, while measures introduced to assist war victims<ref>https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=wcEpHsC-RvgC&pg=PA87&dq=west+germany+1950+social+housing&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ye9EVZCuDoXLaKnXgNAM&ved=0CEsQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q |
Adenauer's years in the Chancellorship saw the realization of a number of important initiatives in the domestic field, such as in housing, pension rights, and unemployment provision. A major housebuilding programme was launched, while measures introduced to assist war victims<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=wcEpHsC-RvgC&pg=PA87&dq=west+germany+1950+social+housing&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ye9EVZCuDoXLaKnXgNAM&ved=0CEsQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q&f=false|title=Shouldering the Burdens of Defeat: West Germany and the Reconstruction of Social Justice|page=87|publisher=The University of North Carolina Press|date=1999}}</ref> and expellees.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=8O4nBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT83&dq=west+germany+Lastenausgleichsgesetz+1952&hl=en&sa=X&ei=M_BEVf-yK8zvaKS_gfgH&ved=0CCkQ6AEwAjgK#v=onepage&q&f=false|title=Germans as Victims: Remembering the Past in Contemporary Germany|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|date=2006}}</ref> A savings scheme for homeownership was set up in 1952,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=AW1P-ejQUScC&pg=PA154&dq=west+germany+Savings+housebuilding+1952&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ofBEVYPJEZHmaNe7gYAI&ved=0CEkQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=west%20germany%20Savings%20housebuilding%201952&f=false|title=Bridging the Gap Between Social and Market Rented Housing in Six European countries|page=154|publisher=Delft University Press|date=2009}}</ref> while the Housebuilding Act of 1956 reinforced incentives for owner-occupation. Employer-funded child allowances for three of more children were established in 1954, and in 1957 the indexation of pension schemes was introduced, together with an old age assistance scheme for agricultural workers.<ref>The Federal Republic of Germany: The End of an era edited by Eva Kolinsky</ref> The 1952 Maternity Leave Law foresaw 12 weeks of paid leave for working mothers, who were also safeguarded from unfair dismissal,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=1Zbnxmd0dJsC&pg=PA121&dq=west+germany+1952+maternity+leave+law&hl=en&sa=X&ei=SO9EVdq8HtfzasrFgKgJ&ved=0CC4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=west%20germany%201952%20maternity%20leave%20law&f=false|title=The Politics of Parental Leave Policies: Children, Parenting, Gender and the labour market|page=121|publisher=The Policy Press|date=2009}}</ref> and improvements in unemployment benefits were carried out.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=vNrwmI5zuzEC&pg=PT63&lpg=PT63&dq=west+germany+reform+of+unemployment+benefits+1956&source=bl&ots=z9guL4j9Kk&sig=Mosv5UUbMEteQ4VTxJXu3rkxdu0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=BfNEVcKZKIjTaLOMgZAG&ved=0CD8Q6AEwBA#v=onepage&q&f=false|title=Politics of Segmentation: Party Competition and Social Protection in Europe|publisher=Routledge|date=2012}}</ref> The Soldiers’ Law of 1956 laid down that soldiers had the same rights as other citizens, “limited only by the demands of military service.”<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=02bfBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA195&dq=The+Soldiers%E2%80%99+Law+of+1956+limited+only+by+the+demands+of+military+service&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gvNtVbDnNcadsAGOjoBI&ved=0CDQQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=The%20Soldiers%E2%80%99%20Law%20of%201956%20limited%20only%20by%20the%20demands%20of%20military%20service&f=false|title=West Germany (RLE: German Politics): Politics and Society|page=195|date=1981}}</ref> Following a Federal Act of 1961, social assistance provided a safety net of minimum income “for those not adequately catered for by social insurance.”<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=L6WqvxTeFUoC&pg=PA184&dq=west+germany+Federal+Social+Assistance+Act+1961&hl=en&sa=X&ei=APJEVZwr0rFp8c2B0A8&ved=0CCUQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=west%20germany%20Federal%20Social%20Assistance%20Act%201961&f=false|title=Social Work and the European Community: The Social Policy and Practice Contexts|page=184|date=1996}}</ref> Controversially, however, a school lunch programme was abolished in 1950.<ref>http://www.ghi-dc.org/files/publications/bulletin/bu048/bu_48_059.pdf</ref> |
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==Death== |
==Death== |
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In 2003, Adenauer was voted the 'greatest German of all time' in a contest run on German [[Public broadcasting| public-service television broadcaster]] [[ZDF]] in which more than three million votes were cast. Adolf Hitler and other Nazis were excluded from the nominations.<ref name="BBC News 29 November 2003">{{cite web | title= Adenauer voted Germany's greatest |url= http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3248516.stm| last= Kroeger | first= Alix|date= 29 November 2003| website= [[BBC News Online]] | accessdate= 31 July 2015}}</ref> |
In 2003, Adenauer was voted the 'greatest German of all time' in a contest run on German [[Public broadcasting| public-service television broadcaster]] [[ZDF]] in which more than three million votes were cast. Adolf Hitler and other Nazis were excluded from the nominations.<ref name="BBC News 29 November 2003">{{cite web | title= Adenauer voted Germany's greatest |url= http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3248516.stm| last= Kroeger | first= Alix|date= 29 November 2003| website= [[BBC News Online]] | accessdate= 31 July 2015}}</ref> |
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When, in 1967, after his death at the age of 91, Germans were asked what they admired most about Adenauer, the majority responded that he had brought home the last German prisoners of war from the USSR, which had become known as the "Return of the 10,000". |
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==Adenauer cabinets== |
==Adenauer cabinets== |
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==References and bibliography== |
==References and bibliography== |
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* |
* {{cite journal|first=Pertti|last=Ahonen|title=Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era|pages=31–63|journal= Central European History|volume=31|issue=1|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/4546774|date=March 1998|doi=10.1017/S0008938900016034|ref=harv}} |
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*Cudlipp, E. ''Adenauer'' (1985) |
*Cudlipp, E. ''Adenauer'' (1985) |
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*Frei, Norbert |
* {{cite book |ref={{harvid|Frei|2002}} |author=Frei, Norbert|title=Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration|place=New York|publisher= Columbia University Press|year= 2002|isbn=0-231-11882-1}} |
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*Granieri, Ronald J. |
* {{cite book |ref={{harvid|Granieri|2004}} |author=Granieri, Ronald J.|title=The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949–1966|place=New York|publisher= Berghahn Books|year= 2004|isbn=978-1-57181-492-0}} |
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*Heidenheimer, Arnold J. ''Adenauer and the CDU: the Rise of the Leader and the Integration of the Party'' (1960) |
*Heidenheimer, Arnold J. ''Adenauer and the CDU: the Rise of the Leader and the Integration of the Party'' (1960) |
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*Herf, Jeffrey |
* {{cite book |ref={{harvid|Herf|1997}} |author=Herf, Jeffrey|title=Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys|place=Cambridge|publisher= Harvard University Press|year= 1997|isbn=0-674-21303-3}} |
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*Hiscocks, Richard. ''The Adenauer Era'' (1966) |
*Hiscocks, Richard. ''The Adenauer Era'' (1966) |
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* {{cite book |ref={{harvid|Large|1996}} |author=Large, David Clay|title=Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era|place=Chapel Hill|publisher= University of North Carolina Press|year= 1996|isbn=0-8078-4539-6}} |
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*Rovan, Joseph. ''Konrad Adenauer'' (1987) 182 pages [https://books.google.com/books?id=3dHtW4yojJIC&dq=intitle:Konrad+intitle:Adenauer&lr=&as_drrb_is=q&as_minm_is=0&as_miny_is=&as_maxm_is=0&as_maxy_is=&num=30&as_brr=3&as_pt=ALLTYPES excerpt and text search] |
*Rovan, Joseph. ''Konrad Adenauer'' (1987) 182 pages [https://books.google.com/books?id=3dHtW4yojJIC&dq=intitle:Konrad+intitle:Adenauer&lr=&as_drrb_is=q&as_minm_is=0&as_miny_is=&as_maxm_is=0&as_maxy_is=&num=30&as_brr=3&as_pt=ALLTYPES excerpt and text search] |
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*Schwarz, Hans-Peter |
* {{cite book |ref={{harvid|Schwarz Vol. 1|1995}} |author=Schwarz, Hans-Peter|title=Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction. Vol. 1: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952.|place=Oxford|publisher= Berghahn Books|year= 1995|isbn=1-57181-870-7}} |
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** {{cite book |ref={{harvid|Schwarz Vol. 2|1997}} |author=Schwarz, Hans-Peter|title=Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction. Vol. 2: The Statesman: 1952-1967|place=Providence|publisher= Berghahn Books|year= 1997|isbn=1-57181-960-6}} |
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**Schwarz, Hans-Peter. ''vol 2: Konrad Adenauer a German politician and statesman in a period of war, revolution and reconstruction'' (1995) 759 pp. [https://books.google.com/books?id=T4vQw1RNkQ8C&dq=intitle:Konrad+intitle:Adenauer+intitle:A+intitle:German+intitle:Politician+intitle:and+intitle:Statesman&lr=&as_drrb_is=q&as_minm_is=0&as_miny_is=&as_maxm_is=0&as_maxy_is=&num=30&as_brr=0&as_pt=ALLTYPES excerpt and text search vol 2]; also [http://www.questia.com/read/98804131 full text online] |
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*Williams, Charles. ''Konrad Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany'' (2001), 624pp |
*Williams, Charles. ''Konrad Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany'' (2001), 624pp |
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*"Konrad Adenauer" in ''Encyclopædia Britannica'' (Macropedia) © 1989 |
*"Konrad Adenauer" in ''Encyclopædia Britannica'' (Macropedia) © 1989 |
Revision as of 18:34, 24 August 2015
Konrad Adenauer | |
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Chancellor of West Germany | |
In office 15 September 1949 – 16 October 1963 | |
President | Theodor Heuss Heinrich Lübke |
Deputy | Franz Blücher Ludwig Erhard |
Preceded by | Office created |
Succeeded by | Ludwig Erhard |
Minister of Foreign Affairs | |
In office 15 March 1951 – 6 June 1956 | |
Preceded by | Office created |
Succeeded by | Heinrich von Brentano |
Leader of the Christian Democratic Union | |
In office 21 October 1950 – 23 March 1966 | |
Preceded by | Office created |
Succeeded by | Ludwig Erhard |
Mayor of Cologne | |
In office 4 May 1945 – 6 October 1945 | |
Preceded by | Willi Suth |
Succeeded by | Willi Suth |
In office 13 October 1917 – 13 March 1933 | |
Preceded by | Max Wallraf |
Succeeded by | Günter Riesen |
President of the State Council of Prussia | |
In office 1922 – 26 April 1933 | |
Preceded by | Office created |
Succeeded by | Robert Ley |
Personal details | |
Born | Konrad Hermann Joseph Adenauer 5 January 1876 Cologne, German Empire |
Died | 19 April 1967 Bad Honnef, West Germany | (aged 91)
Political party | Centre Party (1906–1933) Christian Democratic Union (1945–1967) |
Other political affiliations | CDU/CSU coalition (1945–1967) |
Spouse(s) | Emma Weyer (1904–†1916) Auguste Zinsser (1919–†1948) |
Children | 8 |
Alma mater | University of Freiburg University of Munich University of Bonn |
Signature | |
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Konrad Hermann Joseph Adenauer (German pronunciation: [ˈkɔnʁaːt ˈhɛʁman ˈjoːzɛf ˈaːdənaʊɐ]; 5 January 1876 – 19 April 1967) was a German statesman. As the first post-war Chancellor of Germany (West Germany) from 1949 to 1963, he led his country from the ruins of World War II to a productive and prosperous nation that forged close relations with France, Great Britain and the United States.[1] During his years in power Germany achieved democracy, stability, international respect and economic prosperity ("Wirtschaftswunder", German for "economic miracle").[2] He was the first leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), a Christian Democratic party that under his leadership became, and has since usually been, the most powerful party in the country.
Adenauer, dubbed "Der Alte" ("the old man"), the oldest democratically elected leader in world history,[3] belied his age by his intense work habits and his uncanny political instinct. He displayed a strong dedication to a broad vision of market-based liberal democracy and anti-communism. A shrewd politician, Adenauer was deeply committed to a Western-oriented foreign policy and restoring the position of West Germany on the world stage. He worked to restore the West German economy from the destruction of World War II to a central position in Europe, presiding over the German Economic Miracle. He founded the Bundeswehr in 1955 and came to terms with France, which made possible the economic unification of Western Europe. Adenauer opposed rival East Germany and made his nation a member of NATO and a firm ally of the United States.
A devout Roman Catholic, he was a leading Centre Party politician in the Weimar Republic, serving as Mayor of Cologne (1917–1933) and as president of the Prussian State Council (1922–1933).
The 1968–1969 academic year at the College of Europe was named in his honour.
The Cologne years
Early life and education
Konrad Adenauer was born as the third of five children of Johann Konrad Adenauer (1833–1906) and his wife Helene (née Scharfenberg; 1849–1919) in Cologne, Rhenish Prussia, on 5 January 1876.[4] His siblings were August (1872–1952), Johannes (1873–1937), Lilli (1879–1950) and Elisabeth, who died shortly after birth in c. 1880. One of the formative influences of Adenauer's youth was the Kulturkampf, an experience that as related to him by his parents left him with a lifelong dislike for "Prussianism", and led him like many other Catholic Rhinelanders of the 19th century to deeply resent the Rhineland's inclusion in Prussia.[5]
In 1894, he completed his Abitur and started to study law and politics at the universities of Freiburg, Munich and Bonn. He was a member of several Roman Catholic students' associations under the K.St.V. Arminia Bonn in Bonn. He graduated in 1900[4] and afterwards worked as a lawyer at the court in Cologne. Adenauer had ill health as a young man and was rejected for military service at age 20 because of his lungs.
He was greatly interested in the use of medicinal herbs, according to famous French herbalist Maurice Messugue, whom he met and befriended. Adenauer credited his strong health in older age to the use of an infusion of barley water taken at night, but also maize stigma, mallow, sage, and yellow roses, which he used for coughs he was prone to. These were his favourite medicinal plants according to Messugue, though he had extensive knowledge of a wide range of plants. He agreed with MM that plants had to be free of sprays and not grown too artificially. He told Messugue that he owed his good health to "the plants, to nature."
Adenauer found relaxation and great enjoyment in the Italian game of bocce and spent a great deal of his post political career playing this game. His favorite holiday place to do this was in Cadenabbia, Italy, in a rented villa overlooking Lake Como, which has since been acquired as a conference centre by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the political foundation established by Adenauer's political party Christian Democratic Union (CDU).
Leader in Cologne
As a devout Catholic, he joined the Centre Party in 1906 and was elected to Cologne's city council in the same year. In 1909, he became Vice-Mayor of Cologne, an industrial metropolis with a population of 635,000 in 1914. Avoiding the extreme political movements that attracted so many of his generation, Adenauer was committed to bourgeois common-sense, diligence, order, Christian morals and values, and was dedicated to rooting out disorder, inefficiency, irrationality and political immorality.[6] From 1917 to 1933, he served as Mayor of Cologne and became qua office a member of the Prussian House of Lords.
Adenauer headed Cologne during World War I, working closely with the army to maximize the city's role as a rear base of supply and transportation for the Western Front. He paid special attention to the civilian food supply, enabling the residents to avoid the worst of the severe shortages that beset most German cities during 1918–1919.[7] In the face of the collapse of the old regime and the threat of revolution and widespread disorder in late 1918, Adenauer maintained control in Cologne using his good working relationship with the Social Democrats. In a speech on 1 February 1919 Adenauer called for the dissolution of Prussia, and for the Prussian Rhineland to become a new autonomous Land (state) in the Reich.[8] Adenauer claimed this was the only way to prevent France from annexing the Rhineland.[8] Both the Reich and Prussian governments were totally against Adenauer's plans for breaking up Prussia.[9] When the terms of the Treaty of Versailles were presented to Germany in June 1919, Adenauer again suggested to Berlin his plan for an autonomous Rhineland state and again his plans were rejected by the Reich government.[10]
He was mayor during the postwar British occupation. He established a good working relationship with the British military authorities, using them to neutralize the workers' and soldiers' council that had become an alternative base of power for the city's left wing.[11] During the Weimar Republic, he was president of the Prussian State Council (Preußischer Staatsrat) from 1921 to 1933, which was the representation of the provinces of Prussia in its legislation. Since 1906, a major debate within the Zentrum concerned the question if the Zentrum should "leave the tower" (i.e. allow Protestants to join to become a multi-faith party) or "stay in the tower" (i.e. continue to be a Catholic only party). Adenauer was one of the leading advocates of "leaving the tower", which led to a dramatic clash between him and Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber at the 1922 Katholikentag, where the Cardinal publicly admonished Adenauer for wanting to take the Zentrum "out of the tower".[12]
In mid-October 1923, the Chancellor Gustav Stresemann announced that Berlin would cease all financial payments to the Rhineland and that the new Rentemark, which had replaced the now worthless Mark would not circulate in the Rhineland.[13] To save the Rhineland economy, Adenauer opened talks with the French High Commissioner Paul Tirard in late October 1923 for a Rhenish republic in a sort of economic union with France which would achieve Franco-German reconciliation, which Adenauer called a "grand design".[14] At the same time, Adenauer clung to the hope that the Rentemark might still circulate in the Rhineland. Adenauer's plans came to nought when Stresemann, who was resolutely opposed to Adenauer's "grand design", which he viewed as borderline treason, was able to negotiate an end to the crisis on his own.[14]
In 1926, the Zentrum suggested that Adenauer become Chancellor, an offer that he was interested in, but in the end he rejected when the German People's Party insisted that one of the conditions for entering into a coalition under Adenauer's leadership was that Gustav Stresemann stay on as Foreign Minister.[15] Adenauer who disliked Stresemann as "too Prussian" rejected that condition, which marked the end of his chance of becoming Chancellor in 1926.[16]
Years under the Nazi government
Election gains of Nazi Party candidates in municipal, state and national elections in 1930 and 1932 were significant. Adenauer, as mayor of Cologne and president of the Prussian State Council, still believed that improvements in the national economy would make his strategy work: ignore the Nazis and concentrate on the Communist threat. Adenauer thought the Nazis should be part of the Prussian and Reich governments based on election returns, even when he was already the target of intense personal attacks.[17] Political manoeuvrings around the aging President Hindenburg then brought the Nazis to power on 30 January 1933.
By early February Adenauer finally realized that all talk and all attempts at compromise with the Nazis were futile. Cologne's city council and the Prussian parliament had been dissolved; on 4 April 1933, he was officially dismissed as mayor and his bank accounts frozen. "He had no money, no home and no job."[18] After arranging for the safety of his family, he appealed to the abbot of the Benedictine monastery at Maria Laach for a stay of several months. According to Albert Speer in his book Spandau: The Secret Diaries, Hitler expressed admiration for Adenauer, noting his civic projects, the building of a road circling the city as a bypass, and a "green belt" of parks. However, both Hitler and Speer concluded that Adenauer's political views and principles made it impossible for him to play any role in Nazi Germany.
Adenauer was imprisoned for two days after the Night of the Long Knives on 30 June 1934, but already on 10 August 1934, manoeuvring for his pension, he wrote a 10-page letter to Hermann Göring (the Prussian interior minister) stating among other things that as Mayor he had even violated Prussian laws in order to allow NSDAP events in public buildings and Nazi flags to be flown from city flagpoles, and added that in 1932 he had declared publicly that the Nazis should join the Reich government in a leading role.[19][20] Indeed, at the end of 1932, Adenauer had demanded a joint government by his Zentrum party and the Nazis for Prussia.[21]
During the next two years, Adenauer changed residences often for fear of reprisals against him, while living on the benevolence of friends. With the help of lawyers in August 1937 he was successful in claiming a pension; he received a cash settlement for his house, which had been taken over by the city of Cologne; his unpaid mortgage, penalties and taxes were waived. With reasonable financial security he managed to live in seclusion for some years. After the failed assassination attempt on Hitler in 1944, he was imprisoned for a second time as an opponent of the regime. He fell ill and credited Eugen Zander, a former municipal worker in Cologne and communist, with saving his life. Zander, then a section Kapo of a labor camp near Bonn discovered Adenauer's name on a deportation list to the East and managed to get him admitted to a hospital. Adenauer was subsequently rearrested (and so was his wife), but in the absence of any evidence against him was released from prison at Brauweiler in November 1944.
After World War II and the founding of the CDU
Shortly after the war ended, the American occupation forces once again installed him as Mayor of Cologne, which had been heavily bombed. After the city was transferred into the British zone of occupation, however, the Director of its military government, General Gerald Templer, dismissed Adenauer for incompetence in December 1945.[22] The probable reason for this was that Adenauer considered the Germans the equals of the occupying Allies, a view the British did not appreciate, resulting in his sacking.[23] Adenauer's dismissal by the British contributed much to his subsequent political success and allowed him to pursue a policy of alliance with the West in the 1950s without facing charges of being a "sell-out".
After being dismissed, Adenauer devoted himself to building a new political party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which he hoped would embrace both Protestants and Roman Catholics in a single party, and thereby achieve his long-standing goal of bringing the Zentrum "out of the tower". According to Adenauer, a catholic-only party would lead to German politics being dominated by anti-democratic parties yet again.[24] In January 1946, Adenauer initiated a political meeting of the future CDU in the British zone in his role as doyen (the oldest man in attendance, Alterspräsident) and was informally confirmed as its leader. Adenauer had become a leader almost by default. During the Weimar Republic, Adenauer had often been considered a future Chancellor and after 1945, his claims for leadership were even stronger.[25] The other surviving Zentrum leaders were considered unsuitable for the tasks that lay ahead.[26]
Reflecting his background as a Catholic Rhinelander who had long chafed under Prussian rule, Adenauer believed that Prussianism was the root cause of National Socialism, and that only by driving out Prussianism could Germany become a democracy.[27] In a December 1946 letter, Adenauer wrote that the Prussian state in the early 19th century had become an "almost God-like entity" that valued state power over the rights of individuals.[27] Adenauer's dislike of Prussia even led him to oppose Berlin as a future capital.[28] Adenauer's Sonderweg view of German history, with National Socialism as a natural outgrowth out of Prussianism, sharply contrasted with the views of the Social Democratic leader Kurt Schumacher, who saw National Socialism as a natural outgrowth of capitalism.[29] These two radically differing views of recent German history led Adenauer and Schumacher in turn to recommend very different solutions for a better future. For Schumacher, to banish National Socialism meant replacing the capitalist system with a Marxist socialist system, whereas, for Adenauer, banishing National Socialism meant purging Prussianism.
Adenauer viewed the most important battle in the post-war world as between the forces of Christianity and Marxism, especially Communism."[30] In Germany during this period, the term Marxism described both the Communists and the Social Democrats as the latter were officially a Marxist party until the Bad Godesberg conference of 1959 when the SPD repudiated its commitment to achieving a Marxist society. The same anti-Marxist viewpoints led Adenauer to denounce the Social Democrats as the heirs to Prussianism and National Socialism.[31] Adenauer's ideology was at odds with many in the CDU, who wished to unite socialism and Christianity.[32] Adenauer worked diligently at building up contacts and support in the CDU over the following years, and he sought with varying success to impose his particular ideology on the party.
Adenauer's leading role in the CDU of the British zone won him a position at the Parliamentary Council of 1948, called into existence by the Western Allies to draft a constitution for the three western zones of Germany. He was the chairman of this constitutional convention and vaulted from this position to being chosen as the first head of government once the new "Basic Law" had been promulgated in May 1949.
Chancellor of West Germany
First government
The first election to the Bundestag of West Germany was held on 15 August 1949, with the Christian Democrats emerging as the strongest party. There were two clashing visions of a future Germany held by Adenauer and his main rival, the Social Democrat Kurt Schumacher. Adenauer favored integrating the Federal Republic with other Western states, especially France and the United States in order to fight the Cold War, even if the price of this was the continued division of Germany. Schumacher by contrast, though an anti-Communist, wanted to see a united, socialist and neutral Germany. As such, Adenauer was in favor of joining NATO, something that Schumacher was adamantly opposed to.
The Free Democrat Theodor Heuss was elected the first President of the Republic, and Adenauer was elected Chancellor (head of government) on 15 September 1949 with the support of his own CDU, the Christian Social Union, the liberal Free Democratic Party, and the right-wing German Party. It was said that Adenauer was elected Chancellor by the new German parliament by "a majority of one vote - his own".[33] At age 73,[34] it was initially thought that he would only be a caretaker Chancellor. However, he would go on to hold this post for 14 years, a period spanning most of the preliminary phase of the Cold War. During this period, the post-war division of Germany was consolidated with the establishment of two separate German states, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).
In the controversial selection for a "provisional capital" of the Federal Republic of Germany, Adenauer championed Bonn over Frankfurt am Main. The British had agreed to detach Bonn from their zone of occupation and convert the area to an autonomous region wholly under German sovereignty; the Americans were not prepared to grant the same for Frankfurt.[35]
As chancellor, Adenauer tended to make most major decisions himself, treating his ministers as mere extensions of his authority. While this tendency decreased under his successors, it established the image of West Germany (and later reunified Germany) as a "chancellor democracy".
In a speech on 20 September 1949, Adenauer denounced the entire denazification process pursued by the Allied military governments between, announcing in the same speech that he was planning to bring in an amnesty law for the Nazi war criminals and he planned to apply to "the High Commissioners for a corresponding amnesty for punishments imposed by the Allied military courts".[36] Adenauer argued the continuation of denazification would "foster a growing and extreme nationalism" as the millions who supported the Nazi regime would find themselves excluded from German life forever.[37]
The Adenauer government refused to accept the Oder–Neisse line as Germany's eastern frontier.[38] This refusal was in large part motivated by his desire to win the votes of expellees and right-wing nationalists to the CDU, which is why he supported Heimatrecht, i.e. the right of expellees to return to their former homes.[39] It was also intended to be a deal-breaker if negotiations ever began to reunite Germany on terms that Adenauer considered unfavorable such as the neutralization of Germany as Adenauer knew well that the Soviets would never revise the Oder-Neisse line.[39] Privately, Adenauer considered Germany's eastern provinces to be lost forever.[40]
At the Petersberg Agreement in November 1949 he achieved some of the first concessions granted by the Allies, such as a decrease in the number of factories to be dismantled, but in particular his agreement to join the International Authority for the Ruhr led to heavy criticism. In the following debate in parliament Adenauer stated:
The Allies have told me that dismantling would be stopped only if I satisfy the Allied desire for security, does the Socialist Party want dismantling to go on to the bitter end?[41][42]
The opposition leader Kurt Schumacher responded by labeling Adenauer "Chancellor of the Allies", accusing Adenauer of putting good relations with the West for the sake of the Cold War ahead of German national interests.
After a year of negotiations, the Treaty of Paris was signed on 18 April 1951 establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. The treaty was unpopular in Germany where it was seen as a French attempt to take over German industry.[43] The treaty conditions were favorable to the French, but for Adenauer, the only thing that mattered was European integration.[44] Adenauer was keen to see Britain join the European Coal and Steel Community as he believed the more free-market British would counterbalance the influence of the more dirigiste French, and to achieve that purpose he visited London in November 1951 to meet with Prime Minister Winston Churchill.[45] Churchill said Britain would not join the European Coal and Steel Community because doing so would mean sacrificing relations with the U.S and Commonwealth.[46]
From the beginning of his Chancellorship, Adenauer had been pressing for German rearmament. After the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, the U.S. and Britain agreed that West Germany had to be rearmed to strengthen the defenses of Western Europe against a possible Soviet invasion. Further contributing to the crisis atmosphere of 1950 was the bellicose rhetoric of the East German leader Walter Ulbricht, who proclaimed the reunification of Germany under communist rule to be imminent.[47][48] To soothe French fears of German rearmament, the French Premier René Pleven suggested the so-called Pleven plan in October 1950 under which the Federal Republic would have its military forces function as part of the armed wing of the multinational European Defense Community (EDC).[49] Adenauer deeply disliked the "Pleven plan", but was forced to support it when it became clear that this plan was the only way the French would agree to German rearmament.[50]
In 1950, a major controversy broke out when it emerged that Adenauer's State Secretary Hans Globke had played a major role in drafting anti-semitic laws in Nazi Germany.[51] Adenauer kept Globke on as State Secretary as part of his strategy of integration.[52] Starting in August 1950, Adenauer began to pressure the Western Allies to free all of the war criminals in their custody, especially those from the Wehrmacht, whose continued imprisonment made West German rearmament impossible, Adenaeur claimed.[53] Adenauer had been opposed to the Nuremberg trial in 1945–46 and after becoming Chancellor he demanded the release of the so-called "Spandau Seven" as the seven war criminals convicted at Nuremberg and imprisoned at Spandau prison were known.[54][55]
By 1951 laws were passed by the Bundestag ending denazification. Denazification was viewed by the United States as counterproductive and ineffective, and its demise was not opposed.[56] Adenauer's intention was to switch government policy to reparations and compensation for the victims of NS rule (Wiedergutmachung).[57][58] Officials were allowed to retake jobs in civil service, with the exception of people assigned to Group I (Major Offenders) and II (Offenders) during the denazification review process.[58][59] Adenauer pressured his rehabilitated ex-Nazis by threatening that stepping out of line could trigger the reopening of individual de-Nazification prosecutions. The construction of a "competent Federal Government effectively from a standing start was one of the greatest of Adenauer's formidable achievements".[60]
In October 1950, Adenauer received the so-called "Himmerod Memorandum" drafted by four former Wehrmacht generals at the Himmerod Abbey that linked freedom for German war criminals as the price of German rearmament, along with public statements from the Allies that the Wehrmacht committed no war crimes in World War II.[61] The Allies were willing to do whatever necessary to get the much-needed German rearmament underway and in January 1951 General Dwight Eisenhower, commander of NATO forces, issued a statement which declared the great majority of the Wehrmacht had acted honorably.[62]
On 2 January 1951, Adenauer met with the American High Commissioner, John J. McCloy, to argue that executing the Landsberg prisoners would ruin forever any effort at having the Federal Republic play its role in the Cold War.[63] In response to Adenauer's demands and pressure from the German public, McCloy on 31 January 1951 reduced the death sentences of most of the 102 men at Landsberg, hanging only 7 of the prisoners while the rest of the condemned to death were spared.[64]
Contemporary critics accused Adenauer of cementing the division of Germany, sacrificing reunification and the recovery of territories lost in the westward shift of Poland and the Soviet Union with his determination to secure the Federal Republic to the West. Adenauer's German policy was based upon Politik der Stärke (Policy of Strength), and upon the so-called "magnet theory", in which a prosperous, democratic West Germany integrated with the West would act as a "magnet" that would eventually bring down the East German regime.[65]
In 1952, the Stalin Note, as it became known, "caught everybody in the West by surprise".[66] It offered to unify the two German entities into a single, neutral state with its own, non-aligned national army to effect superpower disengagement from Central Europe. Adenauer and his cabinet were unanimous in their rejection of the Stalin overture; they shared the Western Allies' suspicion about the genuineness of that offer and supported the Allies in their cautious replies. In this, they were supported by leader of the opposition Kurt Schumacher (a very rare occurrence), and recent (21st century) findings of historical research.[citation needed] Adenauer's flat rejection was, however, still out of step with public opinion; he then realized his mistake and he started to ask questions. Critics denounced him for having missed an opportunity for German reunification. The Soviets sent a second note, courteous in tone. Adenauer by then understood that "all opportunity for initiative had passed out of his hands,"[67] and the matter was put to rest by the Allies. Given the realities of the Cold War, German reunification and recovery of lost territories in the east were not realistic goals as both of Stalin's notes specified the retention of the existing "Potsdam"-decreed boundaries of Germany.
Adenauer recognized the obligation of the German government to compensate Israel, as the main representative of the Jewish people, for The Holocaust. Germany started negotiations with Israel for restitution of lost property and the payment of damages to victims of Nazi persecution. In the Luxemburger Abkommen, Germany agreed to pay compensation to Israel. Jewish claims were bundled in the Jewish Claims Conference, which represented the Jewish victims of Nazi Germany. Germany then initially paid about 3 billion Mark to Israel and about 450 million to the Claims Conference, although payments continued after that, as new claims were made.[68] In the face of severe opposition both from the public and from his own cabinet, Adenauer was only able to get the reparations agreement ratified by the Bundestag with the support of the SPD.[69] Israeli public opinion was divided over accepting the money, but ultimately the fledgling state under David Ben-Gurion agreed to take it, opposed by more radical groups like Irgun, who were against such treaties. Those treaties were cited as a main reason for the assassination attempt by the radical Jewish groups against Adenauer.[70]
On 27 March 1952, a package addressed to Chancellor Adenauer exploded in the Munich Police Headquarters, killing one Bavarian police officer. Investigations revealed the mastermind behind the assassination attempt was Menachem Begin, who would later become the Prime Minister of Israel.[71] Begin had been the former commander of Irgun and at that time headed Herut and was a member of the Knesset. His goal was to put pressure on the German government and prevent the signing of the Reparations Agreement between Israel and West Germany, which he vehemently opposed.[72][73] The West German government kept all proof under seal in order to prevent antisemitic responses from the German public.
Second government
When a rebellion in East Germany was harshly suppressed by the Red Army in June 1953, Adenauer took political advantage of the situation and was handily re-elected to a second term as Chancellor.[74] The CDU/CSU came up one seat short of an outright majority. Adenauer could have governed alone without the support of other parties, but retained the support of nearly all of the parties in the Bundestag that were to the right of the SPD. For all of his efforts as West Germany's leader, Adenauer was named Time magazine's Man of the Year in 1953. In 1954, he received the Karlspreis (English: Charlemagne Award), an Award by the German city of Aachen to people who contributed to the European idea, European cooperation and European peace.
The German Restitution Laws (Bundesentschädigungsgesetz) were passed in 1953 that allowed some victims of Nazi prosecution to claim restitution.[75] Under the 1953 restitution law, those who had suffered for "racial, religious or political reasons" could collect compensation, which were defined in such a way as to sharply limit the number of people entitled to collect compensation.[76]
In the spring of 1954, opposition to the Pleven plan grew within the French National Assembly.[77] The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill told Adenauer that Britain would ensure that German rearmament would happen, regardless if the National Assembly ratified the EDC treaty or not.[78] In August 1954, the Pleven plan died when an alliance of conservatives and Communists in the National Assembly joined forces to reject the EDC treaty under the grounds that German rearmament in any form and shape was an unacceptable danger to France.[79]
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden used the failure of the EDC to advocate for independent German rearmament and German NATO membership.[79] Thanks in part to Adenauer's success in rebuilding Germany's image, the British proposal met with considerable approval.[79] In the ensuing London conference, Eden assisted Adenauer by promising the French that Britain would always maintain at least four divisions in the British Army of the Rhine as long as there was a Soviet threat, with the the strengthened British forces also aimed implicitly against any German revanchism.[80] Adenauer then promised that Germany would never seek to have nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as heavy warships, strategic bombers, long-range artillery, and guided missiles, though these promises were non-binding.[80] The French had been assuaged that German rearmament would be no threat to France. Additionally, Adenauer promised that the German military would be under the operational control of NATO general staff, though ultimate control would rest with the German government; and that above all he would never violate the strictly defensive NATO charter and invade East Germany to achieve German reunification.[81]
In May 1955, Germany joined NATO and in November a German military, the Bundeswehr, was founded.[79] Though Adenauer made use of a number of Wehrmacht generals and admirals in the Bundeswehr, he saw the Bundeswehr as a new force with no links to the past, and wanted it to be kept under civilian control at all times[82] To achieve these aims, Adenauer gave a great deal of power to the military reformer Wolf Graf von Baudissin.[83]
In November 1954, Adenauer's lobbying efforts on behalf of the "Spandau Seven" finally borne fruit with the release of Konstantin von Neurath.[84] Adenauer congratulated Neurath on his release.[85] President Heuss went even further, telling Neurath of his "martyrdom" at Nuremberg, and strongly implied that Neurath had been framed by the Allies.[86] The statements welcoming Neurath's release by Heuss and Adenauer sparked controversy all over the world.[86] At the same time, Adenauer's efforts to win freedom for Admiral Karl Dönitz ran into staunch opposition from the British Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, Ivone Kirkpatrick, who argued Dönitz would be an active danger to German democracy.[87] Adenauer then traded with Kirkpatrick no early release for Admiral Dönitz with an early release for Admiral Erich Raeder on medical grounds.[88]
Adenauer's achievements include the establishment of a stable democracy in West Germany and a lasting reconciliation with France, culminating in the Élysée Treaty. His political commitment to the Western powers achieved full sovereignty for West Germany, which was formally laid down in the General Treaty, although there remained Allied restrictions concerning the status of a potentially reunited Germany and the state of emergency in West Germany. Adenauer firmly integrated the country with the emerging Euro-Atlantic community (NATO and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation). Adenauer is closely linked to the implementation of an enhanced pension system, which ensured unparalleled prosperity for retired people. Along with his Minister for Economic Affairs and successor Ludwig Erhard, the West German model of a "social market economy" (a mixed economy with capitalism moderated by elements of social welfare and Catholic social teaching) allowed for the boom period known as the Wirtschaftswunder ("economic miracle") that produced broad prosperity. The Adenauer era witnessed a dramatic rise in the standard of living of average Germans, with real wages doubling between 1950 and 1963. This rising affluence was accompanied by a 20% fall in working hours during that same period, together with a fall in the unemployment rate from 8% in 1950 to 0.4% in 1965.[89] in addition, an advanced welfare state was established.[90]
In return for the release of the last German prisoners of war in 1955, the Federal Republic opened diplomatic relations with the USSR, but refused to recognize East Germany and broke off diplomatic relations with countries (e.g., Yugoslavia) that established relations with the East German régime.[91] Adenauer was also ready to consider the Oder-Neisse line as the German border in order to pursue a more flexible policy with Poland but he did not command sufficient domestic support for this, and opposition to the Oder-Neisse line continued, causing considerable disappointment with Adenauer's Western allies.[92]
In 1956, during the Suez Crisis, Adenauer completely supported the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt, arguing to his Cabinet that Nasser was a pro-Soviet force that needed to cut down to size.[93] Adenauer was appalled that the Americans had come out against the attack on Egypt alongside the Soviets, which led Adenauer to fear that the United States and Soviet Union would "carve up the world" with no thought for European interests.[94]
Right at the height of the Suez crisis, Adenauer visited Paris to meet the French Premier Guy Mollet in a show of moral support for France.[95] The day before Adenauer arrived in Paris, the Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin sent the so-called "Bulganin letters" to the leaders of Britain, France, and Israel threatening nuclear strikes if they did not end the war against Egypt.[95] The news of the "Bulganin letters" reached Adenauer mid-way on the train trip to Paris. The threat of a Soviet nuclear strike that could destroy Paris at any moment added considerably to the tension of the summit.[96] The Paris summit helped to strengthen the bond between Adenauer and the French, who saw themselves as fellow European powers living in a world dominated by Washington and Moscow.[97]
Adenauer was deeply shocked by the Soviet threat of nuclear strikes against Britain and France, and even more by the apparent quiescent American response to the Soviet threat of nuclear annihilation against two of NATO's key members.[98] As a result, Adenauer became more interested in the French idea of a European "Third Force" in the Cold War as an alternative security policy.[99] This helped to lead to the formation of the European Economic Community in 1957, which was intended to be the foundation stone of the European "Third Force".[100]
Adenauer reached an agreement for his "nuclear ambitions" with a NATO Military Committee in December 1956 that stipulated West German forces to be "equipped for nuclear warfare".[101] Concluding that the United States would eventually pull out of Western Europe, Adenauer pursued nuclear cooperation with other countries. The French government then proposed that France, West Germany and Italy jointly develop and produce nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and an agreement was signed in April 1958. With the ascendancy of Charles de Gaulle, the agreement for joint production and control was shelved indefinitely.[102] President John F. Kennedy, an ardent foe of nuclear proliferation, considered sales of such weapons moot since "in the event of war the United States would, from the outset, be prepared to defend the Federal Republic."[103] The physicists of the Max Planck Institute for Theoretical Physics at Göttingen and other renowned universities would have had the scientific capability for in-house development, but the will was absent,[104] nor was there public support. With Adenauer's fourth-term election in November 1961 and the end of his chancellorship in sight, his "nuclear ambitions" began to taper off.
Third government
1957 saw the reintegration of the Saarland into West Germany . The election of 1957 essentially dealt with national matters.[104] His re-election campaigns centered around the slogan "No Experiments".[34] Riding a wave of popularity from the return of the last POWs from Soviet labor camps, as well as an extensive pension reform, Adenauer led the CDU/CSU to the first—and as of 2015, only—outright majority in a free German election.[105] In 1957, the Federal Republic signed the Treaty of Rome and become a founding member of the European Economic Community. In September 1958, Adenauer first met President Charles de Gaulle of France, who was to become a close friend and ally in pursuing Franco-German rapprochement.[106]
In response to the Ulm trials in 1958, Adenauer set up the Central Office of the State Justice Administrations for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes.[107]
On 27 November 1958 another Berlin crisis broke out when Khrushchev submitted an ultimatum with a six-month expiry date to Washington, London and Paris, where he demanded that the Allies pull all their forces out of West Berlin and agree that West Berlin become a "free city", or else he would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. [108] Adenauer was opposed to any sort of negotiations with the Soviets, arguing if only the West were to hang tough long enough, Khrushchev would back down.[109]
As the 27 May deadline approached, the crisis was defused by the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who visited Moscow to meet with Khrushchev.[110] Macmillan failed to get the resolution of the Berlin crisis he was seeking, but managed to win time by getting Khrushchev to extend the deadline while not committing himself or the other Western powers to concessions.[110] Adenauer believed Macmillan to be a spineless "appeaser", who had made a secret deal with Khrushchev at the expense of the Federal Republic.[111][112] Macmillan argued that Adenauer's rigid line on the Berlin crisis was likely to plunge the world into a nuclear holocaust, and that diplomacy was a better solution.[113] By contrast with his poor relations with Macmillan, Adenauer enjoyed excellent relations with General de Gaulle of France, whom Adenauer saw as a "rock", and the only foreign leader whom he could completely trust.[114]
Adenauer tarnished his image when he announced he would run for the office of federal president in 1959, only to pull out when he discovered that under the Basic Law, the president had far less power than he did in the Weimar Republic. Adenauer believed that he could re-reinterpret the powers of the presidency in such a way as to be an effective power-player instead holding a merely ceremonial post by attending cabinet meetings (the Basic Law was silent on whether the president could attend cabinet meetings or not).[115] President Heuss wrote to Adenauer in a letter that Adenauer had always worked to prevent him from attending cabinet meetings and was now very annoyed by Adenauer's idea of chairing cabinet meetings as president.[116] Additionally, the departing and respected Theodor Heuss had established the precedent that the president be nonpartisan, which clashed with Adenauer's vision.[117] After his reversal he supported the nomination of Heinrich Lübke as the CDU presidential candidate whom he believed weak enough not to interfere with his actions as Federal Chancellor. One of Adenauer's reasons for not pursuing the presidency was his fear that Ludwig Erhard, whom Adenauer thought little of, would become the new chancellor.
By early 1959, Adenauer came under renewed pressure from his Western allies, especially the Americans and the French to recognize the Oder-Neisse line with the Americans being especially insistent.[118] Adenauer gave his "explicit and unconditional approval" to the idea of non-aggression pacts in late January 1959, which effectively meant recognising the Oder-Neisse line, since realistically speaking Germany could only regain the lost territories through force. For next several months, West German officials met with American, British and French diplomats to discuss in conditions of great secrecy the texts of the suggested non-aggression pacts.[118] On 21 May 1959 the New York Times leaked the news of the proposed non-aggression pacts.[119] The expellee lobby charged that the non-aggression pacts were only the first step towards accepting the Oder-Neisse line and the loss of the Sudetenland, and called Adenauer's commitment to the cause of the expellee lobby "a mere illusion".[119]
In June 1959, Adenauer promised that his government would never cease demanding Heimatrecht for the expellees, declared the expulsion of the Germans a "great crime", and announced that if diplomatic relations were ever established with Poland and Czechoslovakia he would demand Polish and Czechoslovakian reparations.[120] Adenauer's promises were intended to undo the damage done to his reputation amongst the expellee lobby by the proposed non-aggression pacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia. In early July 1959, coming under strong Western pressure, Adenauer decided to revive the idea of the non-aggression pacts. At that point, the expellee lobby swung into action and organized protests all over the Federal Republic while bombarding the offices of Adenauer and other members of the cabinet with thousands of letters, telegrams and telephone calls promising never to vote CDU again if the non-aggression pacts were signed.[121] Faced with this pressure, Adenauer promptly capitulated to the expellee lobby.[121]
In late 1959, a controversy broke out when it emerged that Theodor Oberländer, the Minister of Refugees since 1953 and one of the most powerful leaders of the expellee lobby had committed war crimes against Jews and Poles during World War II.[122] Despite his past, on 10 December 1959, a statement was released to the press declaring that "Dr. Oberländer has the full confidence of the Adenauer cabinet".[123] Other Christian Democrats made it clear to Adenauer that they would have liked to see Oberländer out of the cabinet, and finally in May 1960 Oberländer resigned.[124]
Fourth government
The mood had changed by election time in September 1961. Over the course of 1961, Adenauer had his concerns about both the status of Berlin and US leadership confirmed, as the Soviets and East Germans built the Berlin Wall. Adenauer had come into the year distrusting the new US President, John F. Kennedy. He doubted Kennedy's commitment to a free Berlin and a unified Germany and considered him undisciplined and naïve.[125] For his part, Kennedy thought that Adenauer was a relic of the past. Their strained relationship impeded effective Western action on Berlin during 1961.[126]
The construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the sealing of borders by the East Germans made Adenauer's government look weak. Adenauer chose to remain on the campaign trail, and made a disastrous misjudgement in a speech on 14 August 1961 in Regensburg when he engaged in a personal attack on the SPD Mayor of West Berlin, Willy Brandt saying that Brandt's illegitimate birth had disqualified him from holding any sort of office.[127] After failing to keep their majority in the general election on 17 September, the CDU/CSU again needed to include the FDP in a coalition government. Adenauer was forced to make two concessions: to relinquish the chancellorship before the end of the new term, his fourth, and to replace his foreign minister.[128] In his last years in office, Adenauer used to take a nap after lunch and, when he was traveling abroad and had a public function to attend, he sometimes asked for a bed in a room close to where he was supposed to be speaking, so that he could rest briefly before he appeared.[129]
During this time, Adenauer came into conflict with the Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard over the depth of German integration to the West. Erhard was in favor of allowing Britain to join to create a trans-Atlantic free trade zone, while Adenauer was for strengthening ties amongst the original founding six nations of West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy.[130] In Adenauer's viewpoint, the Cold War meant that the NATO alliance with the United States and Britain was essential, but there could be no deeper integration into a trans-Atlantic community beyond the existing military ties as that would lead to a "mishmash" between different cultural systems that would be doomed to failure.[131] Though Adenauer had tried to get Britain to join the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951–52, by the early 1960s Adenauer had come to share General de Gaulle's belief that Britain simply did not belong in the EEC.[132]
In October 1962, a scandal erupted when police arrested five Der Spiegel journalists, charging them with espionage for publishing a memo detailing weaknesses in the West German armed forces. Adenauer had not initiated the arrests, but initially defended the person responsible, Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss, and called the Spiegel memo "abyss of treason". After public outrage and heavy protests from the coalition partner FDP he dismissed Strauss, but the reputation of Adenauer and his party had already suffered.[133][134]
Adenauer managed to remain in office for almost another year, but the scandal increased the pressure already on him to fulfill his promise to resign before the end of the term. Adenauer was not on good terms in his last years of power with his economics minister Ludwig Erhard and tried to block him from the chancellorship. In January 1963, Adenauer privately supported General Charles de Gaulle's veto of Britain's attempt to join the European Economic Community, and was only prevented from saying so openly by the need to preserve unity in his cabinet as most of his ministers led by Ludwig Erhard supported Britain's application.[135] A Francophile, Adenauer saw a Franco-German partnership as the key for European peace and prosperity and shared de Gaulle's view that Britain would be a disputative force in the EEC.[136] Adenauer failed in his efforts to block Erhard as his successor, and in October 1963 he turned the office over to Erhard. He remained chairman of the CDU until his resignation in December 1966.[137]
Adenauer ensured a truly free and democratic society and laid the groundwork for Germany to reenter the community of nations and to evolve as a dependable member of the Western world. It can be argued that because of Adenauer's policies, a later reunification of both German states was possible; and unified Germany has remained a solid partner in the European Union and NATO. The British historian Frederick Taylor argued that Federal Republic under Adenauer retained many of the characteristics of the authoritarian "deep state" that existed under the Weimar Republic, and that in many ways the Adenauer era was a transition period in values and viewpoints from the authoritarianism that characterized Germany in the first half of the 20th century to the more democratic values that characterized the western half Germany in the second half of the 20th century.[138]
Social policies
Adenauer's years in the Chancellorship saw the realization of a number of important initiatives in the domestic field, such as in housing, pension rights, and unemployment provision. A major housebuilding programme was launched, while measures introduced to assist war victims[139] and expellees.[140] A savings scheme for homeownership was set up in 1952,[141] while the Housebuilding Act of 1956 reinforced incentives for owner-occupation. Employer-funded child allowances for three of more children were established in 1954, and in 1957 the indexation of pension schemes was introduced, together with an old age assistance scheme for agricultural workers.[142] The 1952 Maternity Leave Law foresaw 12 weeks of paid leave for working mothers, who were also safeguarded from unfair dismissal,[143] and improvements in unemployment benefits were carried out.[144] The Soldiers’ Law of 1956 laid down that soldiers had the same rights as other citizens, “limited only by the demands of military service.”[145] Following a Federal Act of 1961, social assistance provided a safety net of minimum income “for those not adequately catered for by social insurance.”[146] Controversially, however, a school lunch programme was abolished in 1950.[147]
Death
Adenauer died on 19 April 1967 in his family home at Rhöndorf. According to his daughter, his last words were "Da jitt et nix zo kriesche!" [148] (Cologne dialect for "There's nothin' to weep about!")
Konrad Adenauer's state funeral in Cologne Cathedral was attended by a large number of world leaders, among them United States President Lyndon B. Johnson. After the Requiem Mass and service, his remains were taken upstream to Rhöndorf on the Rhine aboard Kondor, with two more Jaguar class fast attack craft of the German Navy, Seeadler and Sperber as escorts, "past the thousands who stood in silence on both banks of the river".[149] He is interred at the Waldfriedhof ("Forest Cemetery") at Rhöndorf.
Honours
- Order of the Red Eagle, 4th class (Prussia, 1918)
- Grand Decoration of Honour of the Order for Services to the Republic of Austria (first Austrian republic, 1927)
- Knight of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta (1951)
- Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Italian Republic (1953)
- Order of the Southern Cross (Brazil, July 1953)
- Order of the Sun (Peru), 1953.[150]
- Grand Cross, Special Class of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany (January 1954)
- Charlemagne Prize (Aachen, May 1954) – as a "powerful promoter of a united Europe"
- Order of the Condor of the Andes (Bolivia, 1955)[150]
- Order of the Golden Spur (Papal Order of Chivalry, December 1955)
- Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George (UK), 1956.[150][151]
- Grand Decoration of Honour in Gold with Sash for Services to the Republic of Austria (1956)[152]
- Bavarian Order of Merit (May 1958)
- Honorary knight in the Teutonic Order (1958)
- Order of the Netherlands Lion (1960)
- Grand Croix of the Légion d'honneur (France, 1962)[153]
- Order of the Rising Sun, Grand Cordon (Japan, 1960)[150] – "because of its long-standing commitment to an understanding of the Japanese–German friendship, and for the peace and prosperity in the world"
- Order of the Rising Sun with Paulownia Flowers, Grand Cordon (Japan, 1963)[150]
- Supreme Order of Christ (September 1963)[154]
- Grand Cross of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre (1964)
- Order of Isabella the Catholic, Grand Cross (Spain), 1967.[150]
- Order of the Liberator General San Martin (Argentina)
Time magazine named Adenauer as Man of the Year in 1953.
Legacy
Adenauer was the main motive for one of the most recent and famous gold commemorative coins: the Belgian 3 pioneers of the European unification commemorative coin, minted in 2002. The obverse side shows a portrait with the names Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak and Konrad Adenauer.
In 2003, Adenauer was voted the 'greatest German of all time' in a contest run on German public-service television broadcaster ZDF in which more than three million votes were cast. Adolf Hitler and other Nazis were excluded from the nominations.[155]
When, in 1967, after his death at the age of 91, Germans were asked what they admired most about Adenauer, the majority responded that he had brought home the last German prisoners of war from the USSR, which had become known as the "Return of the 10,000".
Adenauer cabinets
First ministry
- Konrad Adenauer (CDU) – Chancellor
- Franz Blücher (FDP) – Vice Chancellor and Minister of Marshall Plan Affairs
- Gustav Heinemann (CDU) – Minister of the Interior
- Fritz Schäffer (CSU) – Minister of Finance
- Thomas Dehler (FDP) – Minister of Justice
- Ludwig Erhard (CDU) – Minister of Economics
- Anton Storch (CDU) – Minister of Labour and Social Affairs
- Wilhelm Niklas (CSU) – Minister of Food, Agriculture, and Forestry
- Hans-Christoph Seebohm (DP) – Minister of Transport
- Eberhard Wildermuth (FDP) – Minister of Construction
- Hans Schuberth (CSU) – Minister of Posts and Communications
- Hans Lukaschek (CDU) – Minister of Displaced Persons, Refugees, and War Victims
- Jakob Kaiser (CDU) – Minister of All-German Affairs
- Heinrich Hellwege (DP) – Minister of Bundesrat Affairs
Changes
- 13 October 1950 – Robert Lehr (CDU) succeeds Heinemann as Minister of the Interior.
- 15 March 1951 – Konrad Adenauer becomes Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as Chancellor when the Allies allow this post to be revived.
- 19 July 1952 – Fritz Neumayer (FDP) succeeds Wildermuth (died 9 March) as Minister of Construction.
Second ministry
- Konrad Adenauer (CDU) – Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Franz Blücher (FDP) – Vice Chancellor and Minister of Economic Cooperation
- Gerhard Schröder (CDU) – Minister of the Interior
- Fritz Schäffer (CSU) – Minister of Finance
- Fritz Neumayr (FDP) – Minister of Justice
- Ludwig Erhard (CDU) – Minister of Economics
- Anton Storch (CDU) – Minister of Labour and Social Affairs
- Heinrich Lübke (CDU) – Minister of Food, Agriculture, and Forestry
- Hans-Christoph Seebohm (DP) – Minister of Transport
- Viktor-Emanuel Preusker (FDP) – Minister of Construction
- Franz-Josef Wuermeling (CDU) – Minister of Family Affairs
- Franz Josef Strauss (CSU) – Minister of Special Tasks
- Robert Tillmanns (CDU) – Minister of Special Tasks
- Waldemar Kraft (GB/BHE) – Minister of Special Tasks
- Hermann Schäfer (FDP) – Minister of Special Tasks
- Siegfried Balke – Minister of Posts and Communications
- Theodor Oberländer (GB/BHE) – Minister of Displaced Persons, Refugees, and War Victims
- Jakob Kaiser (CDU) – Minister of All-German Affairs
- Heinrich Hellwege (DP) – Minister of Bundesrat Affairs
Changes
- 7 June 1955 – Theodor Blank (CDU) becomes Minister of Defense when that post is revived.
- 8 June 1955 – Heinrich von Brentano (CDU) succeeds Adenauer as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Hans-Joachim von Merkatz (DP) succeeds Hellwege as Minister of Bundesrat Affairs.
- 19 October 1955 – Franz Josef Strauss (CSU) becomes Minister of Atomic Affairs
- 12 November 1955 – Tillmanns leaves the cabinet.
- 16 October 1956 – Franz Josef Strauss (CSU) succeeds Blank as Minister of Defense. Hans-Joachim von Merkatz succeeds Neumayr as Minister of Justice. Kraft and Schäfer leave the Cabinet. Siegfried Balke (CSU) succeeds Strauss as Minister of Atomic Affairs.
- 15 November 1956 – Ernst Lemmer (CDU) succeeds Balke as Minister of Posts and Communications.
Third ministry
- Konrad Adenauer (CDU) – Chancellor
- Ludwig Erhard (CDU) – Vice Chancellor and Minister of Economics
- Heinrich von Brentano (CDU) – Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Franz Josef Strauss (CSU) – Minister of Defense
- Gerhard Schröder (CDU) – Minister of the Interior
- Franz Etzel (CDU) – Minister of Finance
- Fritz Schäffer (CSU) – Minister of Justice
- Theodor Blank (CDU) – Minister of Labour and Social Affairs
- Heinrich Lübke (CDU) – Minister of Food, Agriculture, and Forestry
- Hans-Christoph Seebohm (DP) – Minister of Transport
- Paul Lücke (CDU) – Minister of Construction
- Franz-Josef Wuermeling (CDU) – Minister of Family and Youth Affairs
- Richard Stücklen (CSU) – Minister of Posts and Communications
- Theodor Oberländer (CDU) – Minister of Displaced Persons, Refugees, and War Victims
- Ernst Lemmer (CDU) – Minister of All-German Affairs
- Hans-Joachim von Merkatz (DP) – Minister of Bundesrat and State Affairs
- Siegfried Balke (CSU) – Minister of Nuclear Energy and Water
- Hermann Lindrath (CDU) – Minister of Federal Economic Possessions
Changes
- 13 September 1959 – Werner Schwarz (CDU) succeeds Lübke as Minister of Food, Agriculture, and Forestry.
- 5 April 1960 – Oberländer resigns as Minister of Displaced Persons, Refugees, and War Victims.
- 4 May 1960 – Hans Wilhelmi (CDU) succeeds Lindrath (died 27 February) as Minister of Federal Economic Possessions.
- 27 October 1960 – Hans-Joachim von Merkatz (CDU) becomes Minister of Displaced Persons, Refugees, and War Victims.
Fourth ministry
- Konrad Adenauer (CDU) – Chancellor
- Ludwig Erhard (CDU) – Vice Chancellor and Minister of Economics
- Gerhard Schröder (CDU) – Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Franz Josef Strauss (CSU) – Minister of Defense
- Hermann Höcherl (CSU) – Minister of the Interior
- Heinz Starke (FDP) – Minister of Finance
- Wolfgang Stammberger (FDP) – Minister of Justice
- Theodor Blank (CDU) – Minister of Labour and Social Affairs
- Werner Schwarz (CDU) – Minister of Food, Agriculture, and Forestry
- Hans-Christoph Seebohm (CDU) – Minister of Transport
- Paul Lücke (CDU) – Minister of Construction
- Franz-Josef Wuermeling (CDU) – Minister of Family and Youth Affairs
- Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt (CDU) – Minister of Health
- Walter Scheel (FDP) – Minister of Economic Cooperation
- Heinrich Krone (CDU) – Minister of Special Tasks
- Richard Stücklen (CSU) – Minister of Posts and Communications
- Wolfgang Mischnick (FDP) – Minister of Displaced Persons, Refugees, and War Victims
- Ernst Lemmer (CDU) – Minister of All-German Affairs
- Hans-Joachim von Merkatz (CDU) – Minister of Bundesrat and State Affairs
- Siegfried Balke (CSU) – Minister of Nuclear Energy and Water
- Hans Lenz (FDP) – Minister of Federal Treasure
Changes
- 19 November 1962 Ewald Bucher (FDP) succeeds Stammberger as Minister of Justice. Werner Dollinger (CSU) succeeds Lenz as Minister of Federal Treasure.
- 14 December 1962 – Rolf Dahlgrün (FDP) succeeds Starke as Minister of Finance. Bruno Heck (CDU) succeeds Wuermeling as Minister of Family and Youth Affairs. Hans Lenz (FDP) enters the ministry as Minister of Scientific Research. Rainer Barzel (CDU) succeeds Lemmer as Minister of All-German Affairs. Alois Niederalt (CSU) succeeds Merkatz as Minister of Bundesrat and State Affairs. The Ministry of Nuclear Energy and Water is abolished, and Balke leaves the cabinet.
- 9 January 1963 – Kai-Uwe von Hassel (CDU) succeeds Strauss as Minister of Defense.
See also
Notes
- ^ "Konrad Adenauer (1876–1967)".
- ^ Richard Hiscocks, The Adenauer era (1975) p. 290
- ^ Roy Jenkins (2011). Portraits and Miniatures. A&C Black. p. 56.
- ^ a b David W. Del Testa, ed. (2001). "Adenauer, Konrad". Government Leaders, Military Rulers, and Political Activists. Westport, CT: Oryx Press. p. 4. – via Questia (subscription required)
- ^ Jenkins, Roy Portraits and Miniatures, London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 p. 81
- ^ Schwarz Vol.1 1995, p. 94.
- ^ Schwarz Vol.1 1995, pp. 97–99.
- ^ a b Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536–545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 page 539.
- ^ Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536–545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 pages 539–540.
- ^ Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536–545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 pages 540–541.
- ^ Schwarz Vol.1 1995, pp. 128–131.
- ^ Mitchell, Maria The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 20.
- ^ Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536–545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 pages 541–542.
- ^ a b Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536–545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 page 542.
- ^ Jenkins, Roy Portraits and Miniatures, London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 page 88
- ^ Jenkins, Roy Portraits and Miniatures, London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 pages 81 & 88
- ^ Williams, p. 201.
- ^ Williams, p. 212.
- ^ Cited by Peter Koch: Adenauer. Reinbek 1985
- ^ Letter to the Prussian Interior Minister of 10 August 1934 (after his firing), available online in: http://www.konrad-adenauer.de/index.php?msg=10045. Additional letter of 18 September 1962 that confirms the content of the 1934 letter, both reproduced in: Delmer, Sefton; Die Deutschen und ich; Hamburg 1963, S.751 (1962 Faksimilie), 752-60 (1934)
- ^ Augstein, Rudolf (29 September 1986). "Ein Hohenzoller oder meinetwegen auch Hitler". Der Spiegel (in German).
- ^ Schwarz Vol.1 1995, pp. 322–323.
- ^ Schwarz Vol.1 1995, pp. 321–323.
- ^ Schwarz Vol.1 1995, pp. 335–337.
- ^ Schwarz Vol.1 1995, pp. 345–346.
- ^ Schwarz Vol.1 1995, pp. 344–346.
- ^ a b Mitchell, Maria The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 96.
- ^ Mitchell, Maria The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 97.
- ^ Herf 1997, pp. 218–219.
- ^ Mitchell, Maria The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 132.
- ^ Mitchell, Maria The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 133.
- ^ Williams, p. 307
- ^ Kellen, Konrad (January 1966). "Adenauer at 90". Foreign Affairs. 44 (2): 257. Retrieved 6 July 2014.
- ^ a b Frum, David (2000). How We Got Here: The 1970s. New York, New York: Basic Books. p. 8. ISBN 0-465-04195-7.
- ^ Williams, p. 340
- ^ Frei 2002, p. 3.
- ^ Herf 1997, p. 217.
- ^ Duffy, Christopher Red Storm on the Reich, Routledge: London, 1991 page 302
- ^ a b Schwarz Vol.1 1995, p. 638.
- ^ Ahonen 1998, p. 48.
- ^ A Good European Time 5 December 1949
- ^ Schwarz Vol.1 1995, p. 450.
- ^ Schwarz Vol.1 1995, p. 608.
- ^ Schwarz Vol.1 1995, p. 612.
- ^ Schwarz Vol.1 1995, pp. 612–613.
- ^ Schwarz Vol.1 1995, p. 613.
- ^ Gaddis, John Lewis We Now Know, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 124.
- ^ Large 1996, p. 66.
- ^ Gaddis, John Lewis We Now Know, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 125.
- ^ Schwarz Vol.1 1995, pp. 592–594.
- ^ Tetens, T.H. The New Germany and the Old Nazis, New York: Random House, 1961 pages 37–40.
- ^ Herf 1997, pp. 289–290.
- ^ Goda, Norman Tales from Spandau, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 101 & 149.
- ^ Goda, Norman Tales from Spandau, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 page 149.
- ^ Goda, Norman Tales from Spandau, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 100–102.
- ^ The Nazi-ferreting questionnaire cited 136 mandatory reasons for exclusion from employment and created red-tape nightmares for both the hapless and the guilty; see The New York Times, 22 February 2003, p. A7.
- ^ Steinweis, Alan E., Rogers, Daniel E. The Impact of Nazism: New Perspectives on the Third Reich and Its Legacy. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2003, p. 235
- ^ a b Art, David, The politics of the Nazi past in Germany and Austria, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 53–55
- ^ Gesetz zur Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse der unter Artikel 131 des Grundgesetzes fallenden Personen – 11 May 1951 (Bundesgesetzblatt I 22/1951, p. 307 ff.)
- ^ Williams, p. 391
- ^ Large 1996, pp. 97–98.
- ^ Bickford, Andrew Fallen Elites: The Military Other in Post–Unification Germany, Stanford: 2011 pages 116–117
- ^ Frei 2002, p. 157.
- ^ Frei 2002, pp. 164–165.
- ^ Large 1996, p. 70.
- ^ Williams, p. 376
- ^ Williams, p. 378
- ^ Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung – Wiedergutmachung
- ^ Moeller, Robert War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001 pages 26-27.
- ^ Harding, Luke (15 June 2006). "Menachem Begin 'plotted to kill German chancellor'". Guardian. London.
- ^ Interview with H. Sietz, investigator (German)
- ^ Background history of assassination attempt (German)
- ^ Harding, Luke (15 June 2006). "Menachem Begin 'plotted to kill German chancellor'". London: The Guardian.
- ^ Williams, p. 406
- ^ Bundesgesetz zur Entschädigung für Opfer der nationalsozialistischen Verfolgung
- ^ Ludtke, Alf "'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany" pages 542–572 from The Journal Of Modern History, Volume 65, 1993 pages 564.
- ^ Large 1996, p. 209.
- ^ Large 1996, p. 211.
- ^ a b c d Gaddis, John Lewis We Now Know, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 134.
- ^ a b Large 1996, p. 217.
- ^ Large 1996, p. 220.
- ^ Fritz Erler, ‘Politik und nicht Prestige,’ in Erler and Jaeger, Sicherheit und Rustung, 1962, p.82-3, cited in Julian Lider, Origins and Development of West German Military Thought, Vol. I, 1949–1966, Gower Publishing Company Ltd, Aldershot/Brookfield VT, 1986, p.125
- ^ Large 1996, pp. 177–178.
- ^ Goda, Norman Tales from Spandau, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 129–131.
- ^ Goda, Norman Tales from Spandau, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 130–131.
- ^ a b Goda, Norman Tales from Spandau, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 page 131.
- ^ Goda, Norman Tales from Spandau, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 149–151.
- ^ Goda, Norman Tales from Spandau, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 pages 152–155.
- ^ Contemporary World History by William J. Duiker
- ^ The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany, edited by Wolfgang Mommsen
- ^ Williams, p. 450; this principle became known as the Hallstein Doctrine
- ^ Ahonen 1998, pp. 44–46.
- ^ Schwarz Vol. 2 1997, pp. 241–242.
- ^ Schwarz Vol. 2 1997, p. 242.
- ^ a b Schwarz Vol. 2 1997, p. 243.
- ^ Schwarz Vol. 2 1997, p. 244.
- ^ Schwarz Vol. 2 1997, p. 245.
- ^ Dietl, Ralph "Suez 1956: An European Intervention?" pp. 259–273 from Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 43, Issue # 2, April 2008 p. 273
- ^ Dietl, Ralph "Suez 1956: An European Intervention?" pp. 259–273 from Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 43, Issue # 2, April 2008, pp. 273–274.
- ^ Dietl, Ralph "Suez 1956: An European Intervention?" pp. 259–273 from Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 43, Issue # 2, April 2008, p. 274.
- ^ Williams, p. 442
- ^ Williams, p. 458
- ^ Williams, p. 490
- ^ a b Williams, p. 444
- ^ Williams, p. 445
- ^ Schwarz Vol. 2 1997, pp. 365–366.
- ^ Taylor, Frederick Exorcising Hitler, London: Bloomsbury Press, 2011 page 373.
- ^ Gaddis, John Lewis We Now Know, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 140.
- ^ Schwarz Vol. 2 1997, p. 399.
- ^ a b Gaddis, John Lewis We Now Know, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 page 141.
- ^ Thorpe, D.R. Supermac, London: Chatto & Windus, 2010 page 428
- ^ Schwarz Vol. 2 1997, p. 396.
- ^ Thorpe, D.R. Supermac, London: Chatto & Windus, 2010 pages 428–429.
- ^ Schwarz Vol. 2 1997, pp. 402–403.
- ^ Schwarz Vol. 2 1997, pp. 421–422.
- ^ Schwarz Vol. 2 1997, p. 422.
- ^ Williams, p. 464
- ^ a b Ahonen 1998, p. 56.
- ^ a b Ahonen 1998, p. 57.
- ^ Tetens, T.H. The New Germany and the Old Nazis, New York: Random House, 1961 page 133
- ^ a b Ahonen 1998, p. 59.
- ^ Tetens, T.H. The New Germany and the Old Nazis, New York: Random House, 1961 pages 191–192
- ^ Tetens, T.H. The New Germany and the Old Nazis, New York: Random House, 1961 page 192
- ^ Tetens, T.H. The New Germany and the Old Nazis, New York: Random House, 1961 pages 192–193
- ^ Kempe, Frederick (2011). Berlin 1961. Penguin Group (USA). p. 98. ISBN 0-399-15729-8.
- ^ Kempe, Frederick (2011). Berlin 1961. Penguin Group (USA). p. 101. ISBN 0-399-15729-8.
- ^ Granieri 2004, p. 135.
- ^ Williams, p. 494; Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano was considered too subservient to the Chancellor and Gerhard Schröder became foreign minister [Williams, p. 495]
- ^ John Gunther: Inside Europe Today, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1961; Library of Congress catalog card number: 61-9706
- ^ Granieri 2004, p. 153.
- ^ Granieri 2004, pp. 154–155.
- ^ Granieri 2004, p. 155.
- ^ Eleanor L. Turk, The history of Germany (1999) p. 154
- ^ Ronald F. Bunn, German politics and the Spiegel affair: a case study of the Bonn system (1968) pp. 159–60
- ^ Jenkins, Roy Portraits and Miniatures, London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 page 83
- ^ Jenkins, Roy Portraits and Miniatures, London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 page 97
- ^ Granieri 2004, p. 191.
- ^ Taylor, Frederick Exorcising Hitler, London: Bloomsbury Press, 2011 page 371.
- ^ "Shouldering the Burdens of Defeat: West Germany and the Reconstruction of Social Justice". The University of North Carolina Press. 1999. p. 87.
- ^ "Germans as Victims: Remembering the Past in Contemporary Germany". Palgrave Macmillan. 2006.
- ^ "Bridging the Gap Between Social and Market Rented Housing in Six European countries". Delft University Press. 2009. p. 154.
- ^ The Federal Republic of Germany: The End of an era edited by Eva Kolinsky
- ^ "The Politics of Parental Leave Policies: Children, Parenting, Gender and the labour market". The Policy Press. 2009. p. 121.
- ^ "Politics of Segmentation: Party Competition and Social Protection in Europe". Routledge. 2012.
- ^ "West Germany (RLE: German Politics): Politics and Society". 1981. p. 195.
- ^ "Social Work and the European Community: The Social Policy and Practice Contexts". 1996. p. 184.
- ^ http://www.ghi-dc.org/files/publications/bulletin/bu048/bu_48_059.pdf
- ^ Colognian pronunciation: [dɔˑ ˈjɪdət nɪks tsə ˈkʁiːɕə]
- ^ Williams, p. 537.
- ^ a b c d e f Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Biographie, Orden und Ehrenzeichen.
- ^ "Dr. Adenauer Grand Cross". Catholic Herald. 11 January 1957. Retrieved 2 October 2012.
- ^ "Reply to a parliamentary question" (pdf) (in German). p. 26. Retrieved 2 October 2012.
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- ^ Konrad Adenauer, Orden und Ehrenzeichen, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
- ^ Kroeger, Alix (29 November 2003). "Adenauer voted Germany's greatest". BBC News Online. Retrieved 31 July 2015.
References and bibliography
- Ahonen, Pertti (March 1998). "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era". Central European History. 31 (1): 31–63. doi:10.1017/S0008938900016034.
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(help) - Cudlipp, E. Adenauer (1985)
- Frei, Norbert (2002). Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-11882-1.
- Granieri, Ronald J. (2004). The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949–1966. New York: Berghahn Books. ISBN 978-1-57181-492-0.
- Heidenheimer, Arnold J. Adenauer and the CDU: the Rise of the Leader and the Integration of the Party (1960)
- Herf, Jeffrey (1997). Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-21303-3.
- Hiscocks, Richard. The Adenauer Era (1966)
- Large, David Clay (1996). Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 0-8078-4539-6.
- Rovan, Joseph. Konrad Adenauer (1987) 182 pages excerpt and text search
- Schwarz, Hans-Peter (1995). Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction. Vol. 1: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952. Oxford: Berghahn Books. ISBN 1-57181-870-7.
- Schwarz, Hans-Peter (1997). Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction. Vol. 2: The Statesman: 1952-1967. Providence: Berghahn Books. ISBN 1-57181-960-6.
- Williams, Charles. Konrad Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany (2001), 624pp
- "Konrad Adenauer" in Encyclopædia Britannica (Macropedia) © 1989
- Tammann, Gustav A. and Engelbert Hommel. (1999). Die Orden und Ehrenzeichen Konrad Adenauers,
Primary sources
- Adenauer, Konrad. Memoirs, (4 vols. English edition 1966–70)
External links
- The short film A DEFEATED PEOPLE (1946) is available for free viewing and download at the Internet Archive.
- The short film Interview with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1957) is available for free viewing and download at the Internet Archive.