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{{short description|Sum or aggregate of all that is real or existent}} |
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'''Reality''' is the sum or aggregate of all that is real or [[ |
'''Reality''' is the sum or aggregate of all that is real or existent within the [[universe]], as opposed to that which is only [[Object of the mind|imaginary]], nonexistent or nonactual. The term is also used to refer to the ontological status of things, indicating their [[existence]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/reality|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160926223327/https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/reality|url-status=dead|archive-date=September 26, 2016|title=reality {{!}} Definition of reality in English by Oxford Dictionaries|website=Oxford Dictionaries {{!}} English|access-date=2017-10-28}}</ref> In [[physics|physical]] terms, reality is the totality of a system, known and unknown.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Saridakis E.|date=2016|title=Information, reality, and modern physics|journal=International Studies in the Philosophy of Science|volume=30|issue=4|pages=327–341|doi=10.1080/02698595.2017.1331980|s2cid=126411165}}</ref> |
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Philosophical questions about the nature of reality or existence or being are considered under the [[rubric]] of [[ontology]], which is a major branch of [[metaphysics]] in the Western philosophical tradition. Ontological questions also feature in diverse branches of [[philosophy]], including the [[philosophy of science]], [[philosophy of religion|of religion]], [[philosophy of mathematics|of mathematics]], and [[philosophical logic]]. These include questions about whether only physical objects are real (i.e., [[physicalism]]), whether reality is fundamentally immaterial (e.g. [[idealism]]), whether hypothetical unobservable entities posited by scientific theories exist, whether a [[deity|god or gods]] exist, whether numbers and other [[abstract objects]] exist, and whether [[possible world]]s exist. [[Epistemology]] is concerned with what can be [[knowledge|known]] or inferred as [[Probability|likely]] and how, whereby in the modern world emphasis is put on [[reason]], [[empirical evidence]] and [[science]] as sources and methods to determine or investigate reality. |
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== Related concepts == |
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{{See also|Truth|Fact}} |
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== World views == |
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=== World views and theories === |
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{{Further|World view}} |
{{Further|World view}} |
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Reality can be defined in a way that links it to worldviews or parts of them (conceptual frameworks): Reality is the totality of all things, structures (actual and conceptual), events (past and present) and phenomena, whether observable or not. It is what a world view (whether it be based on individual or shared human experience) ultimately attempts to describe or map. |
Reality can be defined in a way that links it to worldviews or parts of them (conceptual frameworks): Reality is the totality of all things, structures (actual and conceptual), events (past and present) and phenomena, whether observable or not. It is what a world view (whether it be based on individual or shared human experience) ultimately attempts to describe or map. |
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{{Excerpt|Worldview|hat=no|files=0}} |
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Certain ideas from physics, philosophy, sociology, [[literary criticism]], and other fields shape various theories of reality. One such belief is that there simply and literally ''is'' no reality beyond the perceptions or beliefs we each have about reality. Such attitudes are summarized in the popular statement, "Perception is reality" or "Life is how you perceive reality" or "reality is what you can get away with" ([[Robert Anton Wilson]]), and they indicate [[anti-realism]] – that is, the view that there is no objective reality, whether acknowledged explicitly or not. |
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Certain ideas from physics, philosophy, sociology, [[literary criticism]], and other fields shape various theories of reality. One such theory is that there simply and literally ''is'' no reality beyond the perceptions or beliefs we each have about reality.{{citation needed|date=February 2023}} Such attitudes are summarized in popular statements, such as "Perception is reality" or "Life is how you perceive reality" or "reality is what you can get away with" ([[Robert Anton Wilson]]), and they indicate [[anti-realism]] – that is, the view that there is no objective reality, whether acknowledged explicitly or not. |
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Many of the concepts of science and philosophy are often defined [[culture|culturally]] and [[sociology|socially]]. This idea was elaborated by [[Thomas Kuhn]] in his book ''[[The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]'' (1962). ''[[The Social Construction of Reality]]'', a book about the [[sociology of knowledge]] written by [[Peter L. Berger]] and [[Thomas Luckmann]], was published in 1966. It explained how knowledge is acquired and used for the comprehension of reality. Out of all the realities, the reality of everyday life is the most important one since our consciousness requires us to be completely aware and attentive to the experience of everyday life. |
Many of the concepts of science and philosophy are often defined [[culture|culturally]] and [[sociology|socially]]. This idea was elaborated by [[Thomas Kuhn]] in his book ''[[The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]'' (1962). ''[[The Social Construction of Reality]]'', a book about the [[sociology of knowledge]] written by [[Peter L. Berger]] and [[Thomas Luckmann]], was published in 1966. It explained how knowledge is acquired and used for the comprehension of reality. Out of all the realities, the reality of everyday life is the most important one since our consciousness requires us to be completely aware and attentive to the experience of everyday life. |
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== Related concepts == |
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{{See also|Truth|Fact}} |
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===A priori and a posteriori=== |
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{{Excerpt|A priori and a posteriori|paragraphs=1|files=0}} |
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===Potentiality and actuality=== |
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{{Excerpt|Potentiality and actuality|paragraphs=1,2}} |
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===Belief=== |
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{{Excerpt|Belief}} |
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====Belief studies==== |
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{{Excerpt|Belief|Belief studies}} |
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== Western philosophy == |
== Western philosophy == |
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Philosophy addresses two different aspects of the topic of reality: the nature of reality itself, and the relationship between the [[mind]] (as well as [[language]] and culture) and reality. |
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On the one hand, [[ontology]] is the study of being, and the central topic of the field is couched, variously, in terms of being, existence, "what is", and reality. The task in ontology is to describe the most general [[category of being|categories of reality]] and how they are interrelated. If a philosopher wanted to proffer a positive definition of the concept "reality", it would be done under this heading. As explained above, some philosophers draw a distinction between reality and existence. In fact, many analytic philosophers today tend to avoid the term "real" and "reality" in discussing ontological issues. But for those who would treat "is real" the same way they treat "exists", one of the leading questions of analytic philosophy has been whether existence (or reality) is a property of objects. It has been widely held by analytic philosophers that it is ''not'' a property at all, though this view has lost some ground in recent decades. |
On the one hand, [[ontology]] is the study of being, and the central topic of the field is couched, variously, in terms of being, existence, "what is", and reality. The task in ontology is to describe the most general [[category of being|categories of reality]] and how they are interrelated. If a philosopher wanted to proffer a positive definition of the concept "reality", it would be done under this heading. As explained above, some philosophers draw a distinction between reality and existence. In fact, many analytic philosophers today tend to avoid the term "real" and "reality" in discussing ontological issues. But for those who would treat "is real" the same way they treat "exists", one of the leading questions of [[analytic philosophy]] has been whether existence (or reality) is a property of objects. It has been widely held by analytic philosophers that it is ''not'' a property at all, though this view has lost some ground in recent decades. |
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On the other hand, particularly in discussions of [[Objectivity (philosophy)|objectivity]] that have feet in both [[metaphysics]] and [[epistemology]], philosophical discussions of "reality" often concern the ways in which reality is, or is not, in some way ''dependent upon'' (or, to use fashionable [[jargon]], "constructed" out of) mental and cultural factors such as perceptions, beliefs, and other mental states, as well as cultural artifacts, such as |
On the other hand, particularly in discussions of [[Objectivity (philosophy)|objectivity]] that have feet in both [[metaphysics]] and [[epistemology]], philosophical discussions of "reality" often concern the ways in which reality is, or is not, in some way ''dependent upon'' (or, to use fashionable [[jargon]], "constructed" out of) mental and cultural factors such as perceptions, beliefs, and other mental states, as well as cultural artifacts, such as religions and [[political movement]]s, on up to the vague notion of a common cultural [[world view]], or {{lang|de|[[Weltanschauung]]}}. |
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=== Realism === |
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The view that there is a reality independent of any beliefs, perceptions, etc., is called [[Philosophical realism|realism]]. More specifically, philosophers are given to speaking about "realism ''about''" this and that, such as realism about universals or realism about the external world. Generally, where one can identify any class of object, the existence or essential characteristics of which is said not to depend on perceptions, beliefs, language, or any other human artifact, one can speak of "realism ''about''" that object. |
The view that there is a reality independent of any beliefs, perceptions, etc., is called [[Philosophical realism|realism]]. More specifically, philosophers are given to speaking about "realism ''about''" this and that, such as realism about universals or realism about the external world. Generally, where one can identify any class of object, the existence or essential characteristics of which is said not to depend on perceptions, beliefs, language, or any other human artifact, one can speak of "realism ''about''" that object. |
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One can also speak of ''anti''-realism about the same objects. ''[[Anti-realism]]'' is the latest in a long series of terms for views opposed to realism. Perhaps the first was [[idealism (philosophy)|idealism]], so called because reality was said to be in the mind, or a product of our ''ideas''. [[Berkeleyan idealism]] is the view, propounded by the Irish [[empiricism|empiricist]] [[George Berkeley]], that the objects of perception are actually ideas in the mind. In this view, one might be tempted to say that reality is a "mental construct"; this is not quite accurate, however, since, in Berkeley's view, perceptual ideas are created and coordinated by God. By the 20th century, views similar to Berkeley's were called [[phenomenalism]]. Phenomenalism differs from Berkeleyan idealism primarily in that Berkeley believed that minds, or souls, are not merely ideas nor made up of ideas, whereas varieties of phenomenalism, such as that advocated by [[Bertrand Russell|Russell]], tended to go farther to say that the mind itself is merely a collection of perceptions, memories, etc., and that there is no mind or soul over and above such [[mental event]]s. Finally, anti-realism became a fashionable term for ''any'' view which held that the existence of some object depends upon the mind or cultural artifacts. The view that the so-called external world is really merely a social, or cultural, artifact, called [[social constructionism]], is one variety of anti-realism. [[Cultural relativism]] is the view that [[social issues]] such as morality are not absolute, but at least partially [[cultural artifact]]. |
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A [[correspondence theory]] of [[knowledge]] about what exists claims that "true" knowledge of reality represents accurate correspondence of statements about and images of reality with the actual reality that the statements or images are attempting to represent. For example, the [[scientific method]] can [[Empiricism|verify]] that a statement is true based on the observable evidence that a thing exists. Many humans can point to the [[Rocky Mountains]] and say that this [[mountain range]] exists, and continues to exist even if no one is observing it or making statements about it. |
A [[correspondence theory]] of [[knowledge]] about what exists claims that "true" knowledge of reality represents accurate correspondence of statements about and images of reality with the actual reality that the statements or images are attempting to represent. For example, the [[scientific method]] can [[Empiricism|verify]] that a statement is true based on the observable evidence that a thing exists. Many humans can point to the [[Rocky Mountains]] and say that this [[mountain range]] exists, and continues to exist even if no one is observing it or making statements about it. |
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===Anti-realism=== |
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One can also speak of ''anti''-realism about the same objects. ''[[Anti-realism]]'' is the latest in a long series of terms for views opposed to realism. Perhaps the first was [[idealism (philosophy)|idealism]], so called because reality was said to be in the mind, or a product of our ''ideas''. [[Berkeleyan idealism]] is the view, propounded by the Irish [[empiricism|empiricist]] [[George Berkeley]], that the objects of perception are actually ideas in the mind. In this view, one might be tempted to say that reality is a "mental construct"; this is not quite accurate, however, since, in Berkeley's view, perceptual ideas are created and coordinated by God. By the 20th century, views similar to Berkeley's were called [[phenomenalism]]. Phenomenalism differs from Berkeleyan idealism primarily in that Berkeley believed that minds, or souls, are not merely ideas nor made up of ideas, whereas varieties of phenomenalism, such as that advocated by [[Bertrand Russell|Russell]], tended to go farther to say that the mind itself is merely a collection of perceptions, memories, etc., and that there is no mind or soul over and above such [[mental event]]s. Finally, anti-realism became a fashionable term for ''any'' view which held that the existence of some object depends upon the mind or cultural artifacts. The view that the so-called external world is really merely a social, or cultural, artifact, called [[social constructionism]], is one variety of anti-realism. [[Cultural relativism]] is the view that [[social issues]] such as morality are not absolute, but at least partially [[cultural artifact]]. |
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=== Being === |
=== Being === |
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The nature of [[being]] is a perennial topic in metaphysics. For |
The nature of [[being]] is a perennial topic in metaphysics. For instance, [[Parmenides]] taught that reality was a single unchanging Being, whereas [[Heraclitus]] wrote that all things flow. The 20th-century philosopher [[Heidegger]] thought previous philosophers have lost sight of the question of Being (qua Being) in favour of the questions of beings (existing things), so he believed that a return to the Parmenidean approach was needed. An [[ontological catalogue]] is an attempt to list the fundamental constituents of reality. The question of whether or not [[existence]] is a [[wikt:predicate|predicate]] has been discussed since the Early Modern period, not least in relation to the [[ontological argument for the existence of God]]. Existence, ''that'' something is, has been contrasted with ''[[essence]]'', the question of ''what'' something is. |
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Since existence without essence seems blank, it associated with [[nothingness]] by philosophers such as Hegel. [[Nihilism]] represents an extremely negative view of being, the [[absolute (philosophy)|absolute]] a positive one. |
Since existence without essence seems blank, it associated with [[nothingness]] by philosophers such as Hegel. [[Nihilism]] represents an extremely negative view of being, the [[absolute (philosophy)|absolute]] a positive one. |
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==== Explanations for the existence of something rather than nothing ==== |
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{{Excerpt|Why there is anything at all|files=0}} |
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=== Perception === |
=== Perception === |
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The question of [[direct realism|direct or "naïve" realism]], as opposed to [[indirect realism|indirect or "representational" realism]], arises in the [[philosophy of perception]] and [[philosophy of mind|of mind]] out of the debate over the nature of [[Consciousness|conscious]] [[Qualia|experience]];<ref name=lehar>Lehar, Steve. (2000). [http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/webstuff/consc1/consc1.html The Function of Conscious Experience: An Analogical Paradigm of Perception and Behavior], ''Consciousness and Cognition''.</ref><ref name=ce>Lehar, Steve. (2000). [http://sharp.bu.edu/~slehar/epist/naive-philos.html Naïve Realism in Contemporary Philosophy] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120811172229/http://sharp.bu.edu/~slehar/epist/naive-philos.html |date=2012-08-11 }}, ''The Function of Conscious Experience''.</ref> the [[Epistemology|epistemological]] question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by [[neural]] processes in our |
The question of [[direct realism|direct or "naïve" realism]], as opposed to [[indirect realism|indirect or "representational" realism]], arises in the [[philosophy of perception]] and [[philosophy of mind|of mind]] out of the debate over the nature of [[Consciousness|conscious]] [[Qualia|experience]];<ref name=lehar>Lehar, Steve. (2000). [http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/webstuff/consc1/consc1.html The Function of Conscious Experience: An Analogical Paradigm of Perception and Behavior] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151021061139/http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/webstuff/consc1/consc1.html |date=2015-10-21 }}, ''Consciousness and Cognition''.</ref><ref name=ce>Lehar, Steve. (2000). [http://sharp.bu.edu/~slehar/epist/naive-philos.html Naïve Realism in Contemporary Philosophy] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120811172229/http://sharp.bu.edu/~slehar/epist/naive-philos.html |date=2012-08-11 }}, ''The Function of Conscious Experience''.</ref> the [[Epistemology|epistemological]] question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by [[neural]] processes in our brain. [[Naïve realism]] is known as ''direct'' realism when developed to counter ''indirect'' or representative realism, also known as [[epistemological dualism]],<ref>Lehar, Steve. [http://sharp.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html Representationalism] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120905185905/http://sharp.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html |date=2012-09-05 }}</ref> the philosophical position that our conscious experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation, a miniature [[Virtual reality|virtual-reality]] replica of the world. |
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[[Timothy Leary]] coined the influential term [[Reality tunnel|Reality Tunnel]], by which he means a kind of [[representative realism]]. The theory states that, with a subconscious set of mental filters formed from their beliefs and experiences, every individual interprets the same world differently, hence "Truth is in the eye of the beholder". His ideas influenced the work of his friend [[Robert Anton Wilson]]. |
[[Timothy Leary]] coined the influential term [[Reality tunnel|Reality Tunnel]], by which he means a kind of [[representative realism]]. The theory states that, with a subconscious set of mental filters formed from their beliefs and experiences, every individual interprets the same world differently, hence "Truth is in the eye of the beholder". His ideas influenced the work of his friend [[Robert Anton Wilson]]. |
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The traditional debate has focused on whether an abstract (immaterial, intelligible) realm of numbers has existed ''in addition to'' the physical (sensible, concrete) world. A recent development is the [[mathematical universe hypothesis]], the theory that ''only'' a mathematical world exists, with the finite, physical world being an illusion within it. |
The traditional debate has focused on whether an abstract (immaterial, intelligible) realm of numbers has existed ''in addition to'' the physical (sensible, concrete) world. A recent development is the [[mathematical universe hypothesis]], the theory that ''only'' a mathematical world exists, with the finite, physical world being an illusion within it. |
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An extreme form of realism about mathematics is the [[mathematical multiverse hypothesis]] advanced by [[Max Tegmark]]. Tegmark's sole postulate is: ''All structures that exist mathematically also exist physically''. That is, in the sense that "in those [worlds] complex enough to contain self-aware substructures [they] will subjectively perceive themselves as existing in a physically 'real' world".<ref name="Tegmark2008">{{cite journal|last=Tegmark |first=Max |date=February 2008 |title=The Mathematical Universe |journal=Foundations of Physics |volume=38 |issue=2 |pages=101–150 |doi=10.1007/s10701-007-9186-9 |arxiv=0704.0646|bibcode = 2008FoPh...38..101T }}</ref><ref>Tegmark (1998), p. 1.</ref> The hypothesis suggests that worlds corresponding to different sets of initial conditions, physical constants, or altogether different equations should be considered real. The theory can be considered a form of [[Platonism]] in that it posits the existence of mathematical entities, but can also be considered a [[philosophy of mathematics|mathematical monism]] in that it denies that anything exists except mathematical objects. |
An extreme form of realism about mathematics is the [[mathematical multiverse hypothesis]] advanced by [[Max Tegmark]]. Tegmark's sole postulate is: ''All structures that exist mathematically also exist physically''. That is, in the sense that "in those [worlds] complex enough to contain self-aware substructures [they] will subjectively perceive themselves as existing in a physically 'real' world".<ref name="Tegmark2008">{{cite journal|last=Tegmark |first=Max |date=February 2008 |title=The Mathematical Universe |journal=Foundations of Physics |volume=38 |issue=2 |pages=101–150 |doi=10.1007/s10701-007-9186-9 |arxiv=0704.0646|bibcode = 2008FoPh...38..101T |s2cid=9890455 }}</ref><ref>Tegmark (1998), p. 1.</ref> The hypothesis suggests that worlds corresponding to different sets of initial conditions, physical constants, or altogether different equations should be considered real. The theory can be considered a form of [[Platonism]] in that it posits the existence of mathematical entities, but can also be considered a [[philosophy of mathematics|mathematical monism]] in that it denies that anything exists except mathematical objects. |
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=== Properties === |
=== Properties === |
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{{Main|Problem of universals}} |
{{Main|Problem of universals}} |
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The problem of universals is an ancient problem in [[metaphysics]] about whether [[Universal (metaphysics)|universals]] exist. Universals are general or abstract qualities, characteristics, [[property (philosophy)|properties]], kinds or [[relation (philosophy)|relations]], such as being male/female, solid/liquid/gas or a certain colour,<ref>Loux (2001), |
The problem of universals is an ancient problem in [[metaphysics]] about whether [[Universal (metaphysics)|universals]] exist. Universals are general or abstract qualities, characteristics, [[property (philosophy)|properties]], kinds or [[relation (philosophy)|relations]], such as being male/female, solid/liquid/gas or a certain colour,<ref>Loux, Michael J. (2001). "The Problem of Universals" in ''Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings'', Michael J. Loux (ed.), N.Y.: Routledge, pp. 3–13, [4]</ref> that can be predicated of individuals or particulars or that individuals or particulars can be regarded as sharing or participating in. For example, Scott, Pat, and Chris have in common the universal quality of ''being human'' or ''humanity''. |
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The realist school claims that universals are real – they exist and are distinct from the particulars that instantiate them. There are various forms of realism. Two major forms are [[Platonic realism]] and [[Aristotelian realism]].<ref>Price (1953), among others, sometimes uses such Latin terms</ref> ''Platonic realism'' is the view that universals are real entities and they exist independent of particulars. ''Aristotelian realism'', on the other hand, is the view that universals are real entities, but their existence is dependent on the particulars that exemplify them. |
The realist school claims that universals are real – they exist and are distinct from the particulars that instantiate them. There are various forms of realism. Two major forms are [[Platonic realism]] and [[Aristotelian realism]].<ref>[[H. H. Price|Price, H. H.]] (1953). "Universals and Resemblance", Ch. 1 of ''Thinking and Experience'', Hutchinson's University Library, among others, sometimes uses such Latin terms</ref> ''Platonic realism'' is the view that universals are real entities and they exist independent of particulars. ''Aristotelian realism'', on the other hand, is the view that universals are real entities, but their existence is dependent on the particulars that exemplify them. |
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[[Nominalism]] and [[conceptualism]] are the main forms of anti-realism about universals. |
[[Nominalism]] and [[conceptualism]] are the main forms of anti-realism about universals. |
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A traditional [[Philosophical realism|realist]] position in [[ontology]] is that time and space have existence apart from the human mind. [[Idealism|Idealists]] deny or doubt the existence of objects independent of the mind. Some [[anti-realism|anti-realists]] whose ontological position is that objects outside the mind do exist, nevertheless doubt the independent existence of time and space. |
A traditional [[Philosophical realism|realist]] position in [[ontology]] is that time and space have existence apart from the human mind. [[Idealism|Idealists]] deny or doubt the existence of objects independent of the mind. Some [[anti-realism|anti-realists]] whose ontological position is that objects outside the mind do exist, nevertheless doubt the independent existence of time and space. |
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[[Immanuel Kant|Kant]], in the ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'', described time as an ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' notion that, together with other ''a priori'' notions such as [[space]], allows us to comprehend [[empirical evidence|sense experience]]. Kant denies that either space or time are [[Substance theory|substance]], entities in themselves, or learned by experience; he holds rather that both are elements of a systematic framework we use to structure our experience. Spatial [[measurement]]s are used to [[quantity|quantify]] how far apart [[Physical body|objects]] are, and temporal measurements are used to quantitatively compare the interval between (or duration of) [[Spacetime#Basic concepts|events]]. Although |
[[Immanuel Kant|Kant]], in the ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'', described time as an ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' notion that, together with other ''a priori'' notions such as [[space]], allows us to comprehend [[empirical evidence|sense experience]]. Kant denies that either space or time are [[Substance theory|substance]], entities in themselves, or learned by experience; he holds rather that both are elements of a systematic framework we use to structure our experience. Spatial [[measurement]]s are used to [[quantity|quantify]] how far apart [[Physical body|objects]] are, and temporal measurements are used to quantitatively compare the interval between (or duration of) [[Spacetime#Basic concepts|events]]. Although space and time are held to be ''transcendentally ideal'' in this sense, they are also ''empirically real'', i.e. not mere illusions. |
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space and time are held to be ''transcendentally ideal'' in this sense, they are also ''empirically real'', i.e. not mere illusions. |
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Idealist writers such as [[J. M. E. McTaggart]] in ''[[The Unreality of Time]]'' have argued that time is an illusion. |
Idealist writers such as [[J. M. E. McTaggart]] in ''[[The Unreality of Time]]'' have argued that time is an illusion. |
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As well as differing about the reality of time as a whole, metaphysical theories of |
As well as differing about the reality of time as a whole, metaphysical theories of time can differ in their ascriptions of reality to the [[past]], present and [[future]] separately. |
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* [[Presentism (philosophy of time)|Presentism]] holds that the past and future are unreal, and only an ever-changing present is real. |
* [[Presentism (philosophy of time)|Presentism]] holds that the past and future are unreal, and only an ever-changing present is real. |
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* The [[block universe]] theory, also known as Eternalism, holds that past, present and future are all real, but the passage of time is an illusion. It is often said to have a scientific basis in [[Theory of relativity|relativity]]. |
* The [[block universe]] theory, also known as Eternalism, holds that past, present and future are all real, but the passage of time is an illusion. It is often said to have a scientific basis in [[Theory of relativity|relativity]]. |
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Other philosophers do not believe its techniques can aim so high. Some scientists think a more mathematical approach than philosophy is needed for a TOE, for instance [[Stephen Hawking]] wrote in ''[[A Brief History of Time]]'' that even if we had a TOE, it would necessarily be a set of equations. He wrote, "What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?"<ref>as quoted in [Artigas, ''The Mind of the Universe'', p.123]</ref> |
Other philosophers do not believe its techniques can aim so high. Some scientists think a more mathematical approach than philosophy is needed for a TOE, for instance [[Stephen Hawking]] wrote in ''[[A Brief History of Time]]'' that even if we had a TOE, it would necessarily be a set of equations. He wrote, "What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?"<ref>as quoted in [Artigas, ''The Mind of the Universe'', p.123]</ref> |
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=== Phenomenology === |
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On a much broader and more subjective level,{{Specify|date=August 2011}} private experiences, curiosity, inquiry, and the selectivity involved in personal interpretation of events shapes reality as seen by one and only one |
On a much broader and more subjective level,{{Specify|date=August 2011}} private experiences, curiosity, inquiry, and the selectivity involved in personal interpretation of events shapes reality as seen by one and only one person<ref>"Present-time consciousness", |
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Francisco J. Varela, |
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''Journal of Consciousness Studies'' 6 (2-3):111-140 (1999)</ref> and hence is called [[Phenomenology (philosophy)| phenomenological]]. While this |
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form of reality might be common to others as well, it could at times also be so unique to oneself as to never be experienced or agreed upon by anyone else. Much of the kind of experience deemed [[Spirituality|spiritual]] occurs on this level of reality. |
form of reality might be common to others as well, it could at times also be so unique to oneself as to never be experienced or agreed upon by anyone else. Much of the kind of experience deemed [[Spirituality|spiritual]] occurs on this level of reality.<ref> |
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For the concept of "levels of reality", compare: |
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{{cite book |
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|editor-last1 = Ioannidis |
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|editor-first1 = Stavros |
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|editor-last2 = Vishne |
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|editor-first2 = Gal |
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|editor-last3 = Hemmo |
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|editor-first3 = Meir |
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|editor-last4 = Shenker |
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|editor-first4 = Orly |
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|editor-link4 = Orly Shenker |
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|date = 8 June 2022 |
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|title = Levels of Reality in Science and Philosophy: Re-examining the Multi-level Structure of Reality |
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|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=TD90EAAAQBAJ |
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|series = Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science |
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|publication-place = Cham, Zug |
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|publisher = Springer Nature |
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|isbn = 9783030994259 |
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|access-date = 31 May 2024 |
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}} |
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</ref> |
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Phenomenology is a [[philosophical method]] developed in the early years of the twentieth century by [[Edmund Husserl]] and a circle of followers at the universities of [[Göttingen]] and [[Munich]] in |
Phenomenology is a [[philosophical method]] developed in the early years of the twentieth century by [[Edmund Husserl]] (1859-1938) and a circle of followers at the universities of [[Göttingen]] and [[Munich]] in Germany. Subsequently, phenomenological themes were taken up by philosophers in France, the United States, and elsewhere, often in contexts far removed from Husserl's work. |
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The word ''phenomenology'' comes from the [[Greek language|Greek]] ''phainómenon'', meaning "that which appears", and ''lógos'', meaning "study". In Husserl's conception, phenomenology is primarily concerned with making the structures of [[consciousness]], and the [[phenomena]] which appear in acts of consciousness, objects of systematic reflection and analysis. Such reflection was to take place from a highly modified "[[First-person narrative|first person]]" viewpoint, studying phenomena not as they appear to "my" consciousness, but to any consciousness whatsoever. Husserl believed that phenomenology could thus provide a firm basis for all human [[knowledge]], including scientific knowledge, and could establish philosophy as a "rigorous science".<ref>{{cite book | author = Joseph Kockelmans | year = 2001 | title = Edmund Husserl's phenomenology | edition = 2 | publisher = [[Purdue University]] Press | pages = 311–314 | isbn = 1-55753-050-5}}</ref> |
The word ''phenomenology'' comes from the [[Greek language|Greek]] ''phainómenon'', meaning "that which appears", and ''lógos'', meaning "study". In Husserl's conception, phenomenology is primarily concerned with making the structures of [[consciousness]], and the [[phenomena]] which appear in acts of consciousness, objects of systematic reflection and analysis. Such reflection was to take place from a highly modified "[[First-person narrative|first person]]" viewpoint, studying phenomena not as they appear to "my" consciousness, but to any consciousness whatsoever. Husserl believed that phenomenology could thus provide a firm basis for all human [[knowledge]], including [[scientific knowledge]], and could establish philosophy as a "rigorous science".<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Joseph Kockelmans]] | year = 2001 | title = Edmund Husserl's phenomenology | edition = 2 | publisher = [[Purdue University]] Press | pages = 311–314 | isbn = 1-55753-050-5}}</ref> |
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Husserl's conception of phenomenology has been criticised and developed |
Husserl's conception of phenomenology has been criticised and developed by his student and assistant [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889-1976), by [[existentialists]] like [[Maurice Merleau-Ponty]] (1908-1961) and [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] (1905-1980), and by other philosophers, such as [[Paul Ricoeur]] (1913-2005), [[Emmanuel Levinas]] (1906-1995), and [[Dietrich von Hildebrand]] (1889-1977).<ref>{{cite book | author = Steven Galt Crowell | year = 2001 | title = Husserl, Heidegger, and the space of meaning: paths toward transcendental phenomenology | publisher = [[Northwestern University]] Press | page = 160 | isbn = 0-8101-1805-X}} |
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=== Skeptical hypotheses === |
=== Skeptical hypotheses === |
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[[File:braininvat.jpg|thumb|right|280px|A [[brain in a vat]] that believes it is walking]] |
[[File:braininvat.jpg|thumb|right|280px|A [[brain in a vat]] that believes it is walking]] |
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Skeptical hypotheses in philosophy suggest that reality |
Skeptical hypotheses in philosophy suggest that reality could be very different from what we think it is; or at least that we cannot prove it is not. Examples include: |
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* The "[[Brain in a vat]]" hypothesis is cast in scientific terms. It supposes that one might be a disembodied brain kept alive in a vat, and fed false sensory signals. This hypothesis is related to the Matrix hypothesis below. |
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* The "[[Brain in a vat]]" hypothesis is cast in scientific terms. It supposes that one might be a disembodied brain kept alive in a vat, and fed false sensory signals, by a [[mad scientist]]. This is a premise of the film series, [[Matrix hypothesis]]. |
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* The "[[Dream argument]]" of Descartes and [[Zhuang Zhou|Zhuangzi]] supposes reality to be indistinguishable from a dream. |
* The "[[Dream argument]]" of Descartes and [[Zhuang Zhou|Zhuangzi]] supposes reality to be indistinguishable from a dream. |
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* |
* Descartes' [[Evil demon]] is a being "as clever and deceitful as he is powerful, who has directed his entire effort to misleading me." |
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* The [[five minute hypothesis]] (or [[omphalos hypothesis]] or [[Last Thursdayism]]) suggests that the world was created recently together with records and traces indicating a greater age. |
* The [[five minute hypothesis]] (or [[omphalos hypothesis]] or [[Last Thursdayism]]) suggests that the world was created recently together with records and traces indicating a greater age. |
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* Diminished reality refers to artificially diminished reality, not due to limitations of sensory systems but via artificial [[Filter (signal processing)|filters]]<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mori |first1=Shohei |last2=Ikeda |first2=Sei |last3=Saito |first3=Hideo |title=A survey of diminished reality: Techniques for visually concealing, eliminating, and seeing through real objects |journal=IPSJ Transactions on Computer Vision and Applications |date=28 June 2017 |volume=9 |issue=1 |pages=17 |doi=10.1186/s41074-017-0028-1 |s2cid=21053932 |issn=1882-6695|doi-access=free }}</ref> |
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* The Matrix hypothesis or [[Simulated reality hypothesis]] suggest that we might be inside a [[computer simulation]] or [[virtual reality]]. |
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* [[The Matrix (franchise)|The Matrix]] hypothesis or [[Simulated reality hypothesis]] suggest that we might be inside a [[computer simulation]] or [[virtual reality]]. Related hypotheses may also involve simulations with signals that allow the inhabitant species in virtual or simulated reality to perceive the external reality. |
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== |
== Non-western ancient philosophy and religion == |
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=== Jain philosophy === |
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{{Main|Tattva (Jainism)}} |
{{Main|Tattva (Jainism)}} |
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[[Jain philosophy]] postulates that seven '''tattva''' (truths or fundamental principles) constitute reality.{{sfn| |
[[Jain philosophy]] postulates that seven '''tattva''' (truths or fundamental principles) constitute reality.{{sfn|Jain|1992|p=6}} These seven ''tattva'' are:{{sfn|Jain|1992|p=7}} |
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#''[[Jiva|Jīva]]'' – The [[Soul (Jainism)|soul]] which is characterized by consciousness. |
# ''[[Jiva|Jīva]]'' – The [[Soul (Jainism)|soul]] which is characterized by consciousness. |
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#''[[Ajiva|Ajīva]]'' – The non-soul. |
# ''[[Ajiva|Ajīva]]'' – The non-soul. |
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#''[[Asrava]]'' – Influx of [[Karma in Jainism|karma]]. |
# ''[[Asrava]]'' – Influx of [[Karma in Jainism|karma]]. |
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#''[[Bandha (Jainism)|Bandha]]'' – The bondage of karma. |
# ''[[Bandha (Jainism)|Bandha]]'' – The bondage of karma. |
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#''[[Samvara]]'' – Obstruction of the inflow of karmic matter into the soul. |
# ''[[Samvara]]'' – Obstruction of the inflow of karmic matter into the soul. |
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#''[[Nirjara]]'' – Shedding of karmas. |
# ''[[Nirjara]]'' – Shedding of karmas. |
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#''[[Moksha (Jainism)|Moksha]]'' – Liberation or Salvation, i.e. the complete annihilation of all karmic matter (bound with any particular soul). |
# ''[[Moksha (Jainism)|Moksha]]'' – Liberation or Salvation, i.e. the complete annihilation of all karmic matter (bound with any particular soul). |
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== Physical sciences == |
== Physical sciences == |
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=== Scientific realism === |
=== Scientific realism === |
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[[Scientific realism]] is, at the most general level, the view that the world described by science (perhaps ideal science) is the real world, as it is, independent of what we might take it to be. Within [[philosophy of science]], it is often framed as an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?" The debate over what the success of science involves centers primarily on the status of entities that are [[unobservable|not directly observable]] discussed by [[scientific theory|scientific theories]]. Generally, those who are scientific realists state that one can make reliable claims about these entities (viz., that they have the same [[Ontology|ontological]] status) as directly observable entities, as opposed to [[instrumentalism]]. The most used and studied scientific theories today state more or less the truth. |
[[Scientific realism]] is, at the most general level, the view that the world (the [[universe]]) described by science (perhaps ideal science) is the real world, as it is, independent of what we might take it to be. Within [[philosophy of science]], it is often framed as an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?" The debate over what the success of science involves centers primarily on the status of entities that are [[unobservable|not directly observable]] discussed by [[scientific theory|scientific theories]]. Generally, those who are scientific realists state that one can make reliable claims about these entities (viz., that they have the same [[Ontology|ontological]] status) as directly observable entities, as opposed to [[instrumentalism]]. The most used and studied scientific theories today state more or less the truth. |
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=== Realism and locality in physics === |
=== Realism and locality in physics === |
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''Realism'' in the sense used by physicists does not equate to [[Philosophical realism|realism]] in [[metaphysics]].<ref>{{cite journal|title=Against |
''Realism'' in the sense used by physicists does not equate to [[Philosophical realism|realism]] in [[metaphysics]].<ref>{{cite journal|title=Against 'Realism'|first=Travis|last=Norsen|date=26 February 2007|journal=Foundations of Physics|volume=37|issue=3|pages=311–340|doi=10.1007/s10701-007-9104-1|arxiv=quant-ph/0607057|bibcode=2007FoPh...37..311N|s2cid=15072850}}</ref> |
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The latter is the claim that the world is mind-independent: that even if the results of a measurement do not pre-exist the act of measurement, that does not require that they are the creation of the observer. Furthermore, a mind-independent property does not have to be the value of some physical variable such as position or [[momentum]]. A property can be ''[[disposition]]al'' (or potential), i.e. it can be a tendency: in the way that glass objects tend to break, or are disposed to break, even if they do not ''actually'' break. Likewise, the mind-independent properties of quantum systems could consist of a tendency to respond to particular measurements with particular values with ascertainable probability.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.generativescience.org/|title=Generative Science|first=Ian|last=Thompson|website=www.generativescience.org}}</ref> Such an ontology would be metaphysically realistic, without being realistic in the physicist's sense of "local realism" (which would require that a single value be produced with certainty). |
The latter is the claim that the world is mind-independent: that even if the results of a measurement do not pre-exist the act of measurement, that does not require that they are the creation of the observer. Furthermore, a mind-independent property does not have to be the value of some physical variable such as position or [[momentum]]. A property can be ''[[disposition]]al'' (or potential), i.e. it can be a tendency: in the way that glass objects tend to break, or are disposed to break, even if they do not ''actually'' break. Likewise, the mind-independent properties of quantum systems could consist of a tendency to respond to particular measurements with particular values with ascertainable probability.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.generativescience.org/|title=Generative Science|first=Ian|last=Thompson|website=www.generativescience.org}}</ref> Such an ontology would be metaphysically realistic, without being realistic in the physicist's sense of "local realism" (which would require that a single value be produced with certainty). |
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[[Local realism]] is a significant feature of classical mechanics, of [[general relativity]], and of [[electrodynamics]]; but [[quantum mechanics]] has shown that [[quantum entanglement]] is possible. This was rejected by Einstein, who proposed the [[EPR paradox]], but it was subsequently quantified by [[Bell's inequalities]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://bendov.info/eng/crucial.htm|title=Local realism and the crucial experiment|website=bendov.info}}</ref> If Bell's inequalities are violated, either local realism ''or'' [[counterfactual definiteness]] must be incorrect; but some physicists dispute that experiments have demonstrated Bell's violations, on the grounds that the sub-class of [[Bells Theorem#Two classes of Bell inequalities|inhomogeneous Bell inequalities]] has not been tested or due to [[Bell test loopholes|experimental limitations in the tests]]. Different [[interpretation of quantum mechanics|interpretations of quantum mechanics]] violate different parts of local realism and/or [[counterfactual definiteness]]. |
[[Local realism]] is a significant feature of classical mechanics, of [[general relativity]], and of [[electrodynamics]]; but [[quantum mechanics]] has shown that [[quantum entanglement]] is possible. This was rejected by Einstein, who proposed the [[EPR paradox]], but it was subsequently quantified by [[Bell's inequalities]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://bendov.info/eng/crucial.htm|title=Local realism and the crucial experiment|website=bendov.info}}</ref> If Bell's inequalities are violated, either local realism ''or'' [[counterfactual definiteness]] must be incorrect; but some physicists dispute that experiments have demonstrated Bell's violations, on the grounds that the sub-class of [[Bells Theorem#Two classes of Bell inequalities|inhomogeneous Bell inequalities]] has not been tested or due to [[Bell test loopholes|experimental limitations in the tests]]. Different [[interpretation of quantum mechanics|interpretations of quantum mechanics]] violate different parts of local realism and/or [[counterfactual definiteness]]. |
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The transition from "possible" to "actual" is a major topic of [[quantum physics]], with related theories including [[quantum darwinism]]. |
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=== Role of the observer in quantum mechanics === |
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==== Role of "observation" in quantum mechanics ==== |
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{{See also|Quantum decoherence}} |
{{See also|Quantum decoherence}} |
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The quantum |
The [[quantum mind]]–body problem refers to the philosophical discussions of the [[mind–body problem]] in the context of [[quantum mechanics]]. Since quantum mechanics involves [[quantum superposition]]s, which [[Measurement in quantum mechanics|are not perceived by observers]], some [[interpretations of quantum mechanics]] place conscious observers in a special position. |
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The founders of quantum mechanics debated the role of the observer, and of them, [[Wolfgang Pauli]] and [[Werner Heisenberg]] believed that it was the observer that produced [[wave function collapse|collapse]]. This point of view, which was never fully endorsed by [[Niels Bohr]], was denounced as mystical and anti-scientific by [[Albert Einstein]]. Pauli accepted the term, and described quantum mechanics as ''lucid mysticism''.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Juan Miguel Marin|year=2009|title='Mysticism' in quantum mechanics: the forgotten controversy|journal=European Journal of Physics|volume=30|issue=4|pages=807–822|bibcode=2009EJPh...30..807M|doi=10.1088/0143-0807/30/4/014}} [http://www.iop.org/EJ/article/0143-0807/30/4/014/ejp9_4_014.pdf?request-id=9350419a-e5ea-42e2-b5f3-7878a09dfe42 link], summarized here [http://www.physorg.com/news163670588.html%7care/] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110606092933/http://www.physorg.com/news163670588.html%7Care/|date=2011-06-06}}</ref> |
The founders of quantum mechanics debated the role of the observer, and of them, [[Wolfgang Pauli]] and [[Werner Heisenberg]] believed that it was the observer that produced [[wave function collapse|collapse]]. This point of view, which was never fully endorsed by [[Niels Bohr]], was denounced as mystical and anti-scientific by [[Albert Einstein]]. Pauli accepted the term, and described quantum mechanics as ''lucid mysticism''.<ref>{{cite journal |author=Juan Miguel Marin |year=2009 |title='Mysticism' in quantum mechanics: the forgotten controversy |journal=European Journal of Physics |volume=30 |issue=4 |pages=807–822 |bibcode=2009EJPh...30..807M |doi=10.1088/0143-0807/30/4/014 |s2cid=122757714}} [http://www.iop.org/EJ/article/0143-0807/30/4/014/ejp9_4_014.pdf?request-id=9350419a-e5ea-42e2-b5f3-7878a09dfe42 link], summarized here [http://www.physorg.com/news163670588.html%7care/] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110606092933/http://www.physorg.com/news163670588.html%7Care/|date=2011-06-06}}</ref> |
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Heisenberg and Bohr always described quantum mechanics in [[logical positivism|logical positivist]] terms. Bohr also took an active interest in the philosophical implications of quantum theories such as his [[Complementarity (physics)|complementarity]], for example.<ref>{{cite journal |journal=Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science |author=John Honner |title= Niels Bohr and the Mysticism of Nature |volume=17-3 |pages=243–253 |year=2005}}</ref> He believed quantum theory offers a complete description of nature, albeit one that is simply ill-suited for everyday experiences – which are better described by classical mechanics and probability. Bohr never specified a demarcation line above which objects cease to be quantum and become classical. He believed that it was not a question of physics, but one of philosophy. |
Heisenberg and Bohr always described quantum mechanics in [[logical positivism|logical positivist]] terms. Bohr also took an active interest in the philosophical implications of quantum theories such as his [[Complementarity (physics)|complementarity]], for example.<ref>{{cite journal |journal=Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science |author=John Honner |title= Niels Bohr and the Mysticism of Nature |volume=17-3 |pages=243–253 |year=2005}}</ref> He believed quantum theory offers a complete description of nature, albeit one that is simply ill-suited for everyday experiences – which are better described by classical mechanics and probability. Bohr never specified a demarcation line above which objects cease to be quantum and become classical. He believed that it was not a question of physics, but one of philosophy. |
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[[Eugene Wigner]] reformulated the "[[Schrödinger's cat]]" [[thought experiment]] as "[[Wigner's friend]]" and proposed that the consciousness of an observer is the demarcation line which precipitates [[Wave function collapse|collapse of the wave function]], independent of any realist interpretation. Commonly known as "[[consciousness causes collapse]]", this [[ |
[[Eugene Wigner]] reformulated the "[[Schrödinger's cat]]" [[thought experiment]] as "[[Wigner's friend]]" and proposed that the consciousness of an observer is the demarcation line which precipitates [[Wave function collapse|collapse of the wave function]], independent of any realist interpretation. Commonly known as "[[consciousness causes collapse]]", this controversial [[interpretation of quantum mechanics]] states that [[observation]] by a [[conscious]] observer is what makes the wave function collapse. However, this is a minority view among quantum philosophers, considering it a misunderstanding.<ref>{{cite journal |author1=M. Schlosshauer |author2=J. Koer |author3=A. Zeilinger |title=A Snapshot of Foundational Attitudes Toward Quantum Mechanics |year=2013 |pages=222–230 |volume=44 |issue=3 |journal=Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics |arxiv=1301.1069 |doi=10.1016/j.shpsb.2013.04.004|bibcode=2013SHPMP..44..222S |s2cid=55537196 }}</ref> There are other possible solutions to the "[[Wigner's friend]]" thought experiment, which do not require consciousness to be different from other physical processes. Moreover, Wigner shifted to those interpretations in his later years.<ref name=Esfeld>Michael Esfeld, (1999), [http://www.unil.ch/webdav/site/philo/shared/DocsPerso/EsfeldMichael/1999/SHPMP99.pdf Essay Review: Wigner's View of Physical Reality], published in Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 30B, pp. 145–154, Elsevier Science Ltd.</ref> |
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=== Multiverse === |
=== Multiverse === |
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The [[multiverse]] is the [[hypothetical]] set of multiple possible [[universe]]s (including the historical universe we consistently experience) that together comprise everything that [[Existence|exists]]: the entirety of [[space]], |
The [[multiverse]] is the [[hypothetical]] set of multiple possible [[universe]]s (including the historical universe we consistently experience) that together comprise everything that [[Existence|exists]]: the entirety of [[space]], time, [[matter]], and energy as well as the [[physical law]]s and [[physical constant|constants]] that describe them. The term was coined in 1895 by the American philosopher and psychologist [[William James]].<ref>James, William, ''The Will to Believe'', 1895; and earlier in 1895, as cited in [[OED]]'s new 2003 entry for "multiverse": "1895 W. JAMES in Internat. Jrnl. Ethics 6 10 Visible nature is all plasticity and indifference, a multiverse, as one might call it, and not a universe."</ref> In the [[many-worlds interpretation]] (MWI), one of the mainstream [[interpretations of quantum mechanics]], there are an infinite number of universes and every possible quantum outcome occurs in at least one universe, albeit there is [[Many-worlds interpretation#Debate whether the other worlds are real|a debate as to how real the (other) worlds are]]. |
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The structure of the multiverse, the nature of each universe within it and the relationship between the various constituent universes, depend on the specific multiverse hypothesis considered. Multiverses have been hypothesized in [[cosmology]], [[physics]], [[astronomy]], religion, philosophy, [[transpersonal psychology]] and fiction, particularly in science fiction and fantasy. In these contexts, parallel universes are also called "alternative universes", "quantum universes", "interpenetrating dimensions", "parallel dimensions", "parallel worlds", "alternative realities", "alternative timelines", and "dimensional planes", among others. |
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{{Excerpt|Multiverse#Cyclic theories|hat=no}} |
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===Anthropic principle=== |
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{{Excerpt|Anthropic principle|only=paragraph|files=0}} |
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===Personal and collective reality=== |
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[[File:White Matter Connections Obtained with MRI Tractography.png|thumb|[[Nerve tract|White matter tracts]] within a human brain, as visualized by [[MRI]] [[tractography]]]] |
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Each individual has a different [[Point of view (philosophy)|view of reality]], with different memories and personal history, knowledge, personality traits and experience.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Savin-Baden |first1=Maggi |last2=Burden |first2=David |title=Digital Immortality and Virtual Humans |journal=Postdigital Science and Education |date=1 April 2019 |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=87–103 |doi=10.1007/s42438-018-0007-6 |s2cid=149797460 |language=en |issn=2524-4868|doi-access=free }}</ref> This system, mostly referring to the [[human brain]], affects [[cognition]] and behavior and into this complex new [[knowledge integration|knowledge]], memories,<ref>{{cite journal |last1=van Kesteren |first1=Marlieke T. R. |last2=Rignanese |first2=Paul |last3=Gianferrara |first3=Pierre G. |last4=Krabbendam |first4=Lydia |last5=Meeter |first5=Martijn |title=Congruency and reactivation aid memory integration through reinstatement of prior knowledge |journal=Scientific Reports |date=16 March 2020 |volume=10 |issue=1 |pages=4776 |doi=10.1038/s41598-020-61737-1 |pmid=32179822 |pmc=7075880 |bibcode=2020NatSR..10.4776V |language=en |issn=2045-2322}}</ref> information, [[thought]]s and experiences are continuously integrated.<ref>{{cite news |title=Understanding reality through algorithms |url=https://news.mit.edu/2022/understanding-reality-through-algorithms-fernanda-de-la-torre-0925 |access-date=6 November 2022 |work=MIT News {{!}} Massachusetts Institute of Technology |language=en}}</ref>{{additional citation needed|date=November 2022}} The [[connectome]] – [[Neuron#Connectivity|neural networks/wirings]] in brains – is thought to be a key factor in [[human variability]] in terms of cognition or the way we perceive the world (as a context) and related features or processes.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Popova |first1=Maria |title=The Connectome: A New Way To Think About What Makes You You |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-connectome-a-new-way-to-think-about-what-makes-you-you/255023/ |website=The Atlantic |access-date=6 November 2022 |date=28 March 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Seung |first1=Sebastian |title=Connectome: How the Brain's Wiring Makes Us Who We Are |year=2012 |publisher=HMH |isbn=978-0547508177 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GXwEuoYl3wQC |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Quest for the connectome: scientists investigate ways of mapping the brain |url=https://www.theguardian.com/science/2012/may/07/quest-connectome-mapping-brain |access-date=6 November 2022 |work=The Guardian |date=7 May 2012 |language=en}}</ref> [[Sensemaking]] is the process by which people give [[Semantics|meaning]] to their experiences and make sense of the world they live in. [[Personal identity]] is relating to questions like how a unique individual is persisting through time. |
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Sensemaking and determination of reality also occurs collectively, which is investigated in [[social epistemology]] and related approaches. From the [[collective intelligence]] perspective, the intelligence of the individual human (and potentially AI entities) is substantially limited and advanced intelligence emerges when multiple entities collaborate over time.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Peeters |first1=Marieke M. M. |last2=van Diggelen |first2=Jurriaan |last3=van den Bosch |first3=Karel |last4=Bronkhorst |first4=Adelbert |last5=Neerincx |first5=Mark A. |last6=Schraagen |first6=Jan Maarten |last7=Raaijmakers |first7=Stephan |title=Hybrid collective intelligence in a human–AI society |journal=AI & Society |date=1 March 2021 |volume=36 |issue=1 |pages=217–238 |doi=10.1007/s00146-020-01005-y |s2cid=220050285 |language=en |issn=1435-5655|url=https://ris.utwente.nl/ws/files/205948801/Peeters_2020_Hybrid_collective_intelligence_in_a.pdf }}</ref>{{additional citation needed|date=November 2022}} [[Collective memory]] is an important component of the social construction of reality<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Luckmann |first1=Thomas |title=On Social Interaction and the Communicative Construction of Personal Identity, Knowledge and Reality |journal=Organization Studies |date=February 2008 |volume=29 |issue=2 |pages=277–290 |doi=10.1177/0170840607087260 |s2cid=145106025 |language=en |issn=0170-8406}}</ref> and communication and communication-related systems, such as media systems, may also be major components {{see below|[[#Technology]]}}. |
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Philosophy of perception raises questions based on the evolutionary history of humans' perceptual apparatuses, particularly or especially individuals' [[human senses|physiological senses]], described as "[w]e don't see reality — we only see what was useful to see in the past", partly suggesting that "[o]ur species has been so successful not in spite of our inability to see reality but because of it".<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Draaisma |first1=Douwe |title=Perception: Our useful inability to see reality |journal=Nature |date=April 2017 |volume=544 |issue=7650 |pages=296 |language=en |doi=10.1038/544296a|bibcode=2017Natur.544..296D |s2cid=4400770 |doi-access=free }}</ref> |
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The structure of the multiverse, the nature of each universe within it and the relationship between the various constituent universes, depend on the specific multiverse hypothesis considered. Multiverses have been hypothesized in [[cosmology]], [[physics]], [[astronomy]], [[religion]], [[philosophy]], [[transpersonal psychology]] and [[fiction]], particularly in [[science fiction]] and [[fantasy]]. In these contexts, parallel universes are also called "alternative universes", "quantum universes", "interpenetrating dimensions", "parallel dimensions", "parallel worlds", "alternative realities", "alternative timelines", and "dimensional planes", among others. |
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=== Scientific theories of everything === |
=== Scientific theories of everything === |
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A [[theory of everything]] (TOE) is a putative [[theory]] of [[theoretical physics]] that fully explains and links together all known physical phenomena, and predicts the outcome of ''any'' experiment that could be carried out ''in principle''. The theory of everything is also called the '''final theory'''.<ref>Weinberg (1993)</ref> Many candidate theories of everything have been proposed by theoretical physicists during the twentieth century, but none have been confirmed experimentally. The primary problem in producing a TOE is that [[general relativity]] and [[quantum mechanics]] are hard to unify. This is one of the [[unsolved problems in physics]]. |
A [[theory of everything]] (TOE) is a putative [[theory]] of [[theoretical physics]] that fully explains and links together all known physical phenomena, and predicts the outcome of ''any'' experiment that could be carried out ''in principle''. The theory of everything is also called the '''final theory'''.<ref>Weinberg (1993)</ref> Many candidate theories of everything have been proposed by theoretical physicists during the twentieth century, but none have been confirmed experimentally. The primary problem in producing a TOE is that [[general relativity]] and [[quantum mechanics]] are hard to unify. This is one of the [[unsolved problems in physics]]. |
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Initially, the term "theory of everything" was used with an ironic connotation to refer to various overgeneralized theories. For example, a great-grandfather of [[Ijon Tichy]], a character from a cycle of [[Stanisław Lem]]'s |
Initially, the term "theory of everything" was used with an ironic connotation to refer to various overgeneralized theories. For example, a great-grandfather of [[Ijon Tichy]], a character from a cycle of [[Stanisław Lem]]'s science fiction stories of the 1960s, was known to work on the "General Theory of Everything". Physicist [[John Ellis (physicist, born 1946)|John Ellis]]<ref>{{cite journal |
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| first = John | last = Ellis |
| first = John | last = Ellis |
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| year = 2002 |
| year = 2002 |
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|bibcode = 2002Natur.415..957E |
|bibcode = 2002Natur.415..957E |
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| issue=6875 |
| issue=6875 |
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| pmid=11875539}}</ref> claims to have introduced the term into the technical literature in an article in ''[[Nature (magazine)|Nature]]'' in 1986.<ref>{{Cite journal |
| pmid=11875539| doi-access = free |
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}}</ref> claims to have introduced the term into the technical literature in an article in ''[[Nature (magazine)|Nature]]'' in 1986.<ref>{{Cite journal |
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| first = John | last = Ellis |
| first = John | last = Ellis |
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| year = 1986 |
| year = 1986 |
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| doi = 10.1038/323595a0 |
| doi = 10.1038/323595a0 |
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|bibcode = 1986Natur.323..595E |
|bibcode = 1986Natur.323..595E |
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| issue=6089| s2cid = 4344940 |
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| issue=6089}}</ref> Over time, the term stuck in popularizations of [[quantum physics]] to describe a theory that would unify or explain through a single model the theories of all [[fundamental interaction]]s and of all particles of nature: [[general relativity]] for gravitation, and the [[Standard Model|standard model]] of elementary particle physics – which includes quantum mechanics – for electromagnetism, the two nuclear interactions, and the known elementary particles. |
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}}</ref> Over time, the term stuck in popularizations of [[quantum physics]] to describe a theory that would unify or explain through a single model the theories of all [[fundamental interaction]]s and of all particles of nature: [[general relativity]] for gravitation, and the [[Standard Model|standard model]] of elementary particle physics – which includes quantum mechanics – for electromagnetism, the two nuclear interactions, and the known elementary particles. |
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Current candidates for a theory of everything include [[string theory]], [[M theory]], and [[loop quantum gravity]]. |
Current candidates for a theory of everything include [[string theory]], [[M theory]], and [[loop quantum gravity]]. |
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== Technology == |
== Technology == |
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=== Media === |
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{{See also|#Personal and collective reality|#Belief studies}} |
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Media – such as [[news media]], [[social media]], websites including [[Wikipedia]],<ref>{{cite book |last1=McDowell |first1=Zachary J. |last2=Vetter |first2=Matthew A. |title=Wikipedia and the Representation of Reality |date=2022 |url=https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/50520 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |doi=10.4324/9781003094081 |hdl=20.500.12657/50520 |isbn=978-1003094081 |s2cid=238657838 |language=English}}</ref> and [[fiction]]<ref name="1999-02377-025">{{cite book |last1=Prentice |first1=D. |last2=Gerrig |first2=R. |chapter=Exploring the boundary between fiction and reality |date=1999 |editor1=S. Chaiken |editor2=Y. Trope |title=Dual-process theories in social psychology |pages=529–546 |publisher=The Guilford Press. |url=https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1999-02377-025 |language=en}}</ref> – shape individuals' and society's perception of reality (including as part of belief and attitude formation)<ref name="1999-02377-025"/> and are partly used intentionally as means to [[Learning|learn]] about reality. Various technologies have changed society's relationship with reality such as the advent of radio and TV technologies. |
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Research investigates interrelations and effects, for example aspects in the social construction of reality.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gamson |first1=William A. |last2=Croteau |first2=David |last3=Hoynes |first3=William |last4=Sasson |first4=Theodore |title=Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality |journal=Annual Review of Sociology |date=1992 |volume=18 |pages=373–393 |doi=10.1146/annurev.so.18.080192.002105 |jstor=2083459 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2083459 |issn=0360-0572}}</ref> A major component of this shaping and representation of perceived reality is [[Agenda-setting theory|agenda, selection and prioritization]] – not only (or primarily) the quality, tone and types of content – which influences, for instance, the public agenda.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=McCombs |first1=Maxwell E. |last2=Shaw |first2=Donald L. |title=The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media |journal=Public Opinion Quarterly |date=1972 |volume=36 |issue=2 |pages=176 |doi=10.1086/267990}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=McCombs |first1=Maxwell |last2=Reynolds |first2=Amy |title=Media Effects |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203877111-7/news-shapes-civic-agenda-maxwell-mccombs-amy-reynolds |chapter=How the news shapes our civic agenda and News Influence on Our Pictures of the World |year=2009 |pages=17–32 |publisher=Routledge |doi=10.4324/9780203877111-7 |isbn=978-0203877111 }}</ref> Disproportional news attention for low-probability incidents – such as high-consequence accidents – can distort audiences' [[risk perception]]s with harmful consequences.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=van der Meer |first1=Toni G L A |last2=Kroon |first2=Anne C |last3=Vliegenthart |first3=Rens |title=Do News Media Kill? How a Biased News Reality can Overshadow Real Societal Risks, The Case of Aviation and Road Traffic Accidents |journal=Social Forces |date=20 July 2022 |volume=101 |issue=1 |pages=506–530 |doi=10.1093/sf/soab114|doi-access=free }}</ref> Various biases such as [[false balance]], public attention dependence reactions like [[sensationalism]] and domination by "current events",<ref>{{cite news |title=How the news took over reality |url=https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/may/03/how-the-news-took-over-reality |access-date=6 November 2022 |work=The Guardian |date=3 May 2019 |language=en}}</ref> as well as various interest-driven uses of media such as marketing can also have major impacts on the perception of reality. [[Time-use research|Time-use studies]] found that e.g. in 2018 the average U.S. American "spent around eleven hours every day looking at screens".<ref>{{cite news |last1=Gorvett |first1=Zaria |title=How the news changes the way we think and behave |url=https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200512-how-the-news-changes-the-way-we-think-and-behave |access-date=6 November 2022 |work=BBC |language=en}}</ref> |
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==== Filter bubbles and echo chambers ==== |
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{{Excerpt|Filter bubble|only=paragraph|files=0}} |
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{{Excerpt|Filter bubble#Extensions of concept|hat=no|paragraphs=1}} |
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=== Virtual reality and cyberspace === |
=== Virtual reality and cyberspace === |
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[[Virtual reality]] (VR) is a [[Computer simulation|computer-simulated]] environment that can simulate physical presence in places in the real world, as well as in imaginary worlds. |
[[Virtual reality]] (VR) is a [[Computer simulation|computer-simulated]] environment that can simulate physical presence in places in the real world, as well as in imaginary worlds. |
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[[File:Virtuality |
[[File:Virtuality continuum 2-en.svg|thumb|right|400px|Reality-virtuality continuum]]The [[virtuality continuum]] is a continuous scale ranging between the completely virtual, a [[Virtual reality|virtuality]], and the completely real: reality. The reality–virtuality continuum therefore encompasses all possible variations and compositions of real and [[Virtuality|virtual]] objects. It has been described as a concept in [[new media]] and [[computer science]], but in fact it could be considered a matter of [[anthropology]]. The concept was first introduced by Paul Milgram.<ref>{{cite conference|first=Paul |last=Milgram |author2=H. Takemura |author3=A. Utsumi |author4=F. Kishino |title=Augmented Reality: A class of displays on the reality-virtuality continuum |book-title=Proceedings of Telemanipulator and Telepresence Technologies |pages=2351–34 |year=1994 |url=http://vered.rose.utoronto.ca/publication/1994/Milgram_Takemura_SPIE1994.pdf |access-date=2007-03-15 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061004044435/https://vered.rose.utoronto.ca/publication/1994/Milgram_Takemura_SPIE1994.pdf |archive-date=2006-10-04 }}</ref> |
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The area between the two extremes, where both the real and the virtual are mixed, is the so-called [[ |
The area between the two extremes, where both the real and the virtual are mixed, is the so-called [[mixed reality]]. This in turn is said to consist of both [[augmented reality]], where the virtual augments the real, and [[augmented virtuality]], where the real augments the virtual. |
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[[Cyberspace]], the world's computer systems considered as an interconnected whole, can be thought of as a virtual reality; for instance, it is portrayed as such in the [[cyberpunk]] fiction of [[William Gibson]] and others. [[Second |
[[Cyberspace]], the world's computer systems considered as an interconnected whole, can be thought of as a virtual reality; for instance, it is portrayed as such in the [[cyberpunk]] fiction of [[William Gibson]] and others. ''[[Second Life]]'' and [[MMORPG]]s such as ''[[World of Warcraft]]'' are examples of artificial environments or [[virtual world]]s (falling some way short of full virtual reality) in cyberspace. |
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=== "RL" in internet culture === |
=== "RL" in internet culture === |
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On the Internet, "[[real life]]" refers to life in the real world. It generally references [[Conditio humana|life]] or [[consensus reality]], in contrast to an environment seen as |
On the Internet, "[[real life]]" refers to life in the real world. It generally references [[Conditio humana|life]] or [[consensus reality]], in contrast to an environment seen as fiction or fantasy, such as [[virtual reality]], lifelike experience, [[dream]]s, novels, or movies. Online, the [[acronym]] "IRL" stands for "in real life", with the meaning "not on the Internet".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.acronymfinder.com/IRL.html|title=IRL – Definition by AcronymFinder|website=www.acronymfinder.com}}</ref> [[Sociologist]]s engaged in the study of the Internet have determined that someday, a distinction between online and real-life worlds may seem "quaint", noting that certain types of online activity, such as sexual intrigues, have already made a full transition to complete legitimacy and "reality".<ref name=Slater>{{cite book |chapter=Social Relationships and Identity On-line and Off-line |title=Handbook of New Media: Social Shaping and Consequences of ICTs |editor-first=Sonia |editor-last=Livingstone |editor-link=Sonia Livingstone |editor2-first=Leah |editor2-last=Lievrouw |author=Don Slater |pages=533–543 |year=2002 |publisher=Sage Publications Inc |isbn=0-7619-6510-6}}</ref> The [[abbreviation]] "RL" stands for "real life". For example, one can speak of "meeting in RL" someone whom one has met in a [[online chat|chat]] or on an [[Internet forum]]. It may also be used to express an inability to use the Internet for a time due to "RL problems". |
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== See also == |
== See also == |
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{{cols|colwidth=26em}} |
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* [[Alternate history]] |
* [[Alternate history]] |
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* [[Counterfactual history]] |
* [[Counterfactual history]] |
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* [[Derealization]] |
* [[Derealization]] |
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* [[Consciousness]] |
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* [[Extended modal realism]] |
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* [[Modal realism]] |
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* [[Hyperreality]] |
* [[Hyperreality]] |
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{{colend}} |
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== Notes == |
== Notes == |
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== References == |
== References == |
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{{refbegin}} |
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*{{cite book|last1=Berger|first1=Peter L.|last2=Luckmann|first2=Thomas|title=The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge|date=1966|publisher=Anchor Books|location=New York|pages=21–22|accessdate=}} |
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* {{cite book|last1=Berger|first1=Peter L.|last2=Luckmann|first2=Thomas|title=The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge|date=1966|publisher=Anchor Books|location=New York|pages=21–22}} |
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*{{cite book|first=S. A.|last=Jain|title=Reality|date=1992|publisher=Jwalamalini Trust|url=https://books.google.co.in/books?id=uRIaAAAAMAAJ|archive-url=https://archive.org/details/Reality_JMT|archive-date=2015|quote=Not in Copyright}} |
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* {{Cite book |last=Durrant |first=Michael |title=Aristotle's De Anima in Focus |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3RcOAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA206 |year=1993 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=978-0-415-05340-2 }} |
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* {{cite book|first=S. A.|last=Jain|title=Reality|date=1992|publisher=Jwalamalini Trust|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uRIaAAAAMAAJ|quote=Not in Copyright}} [https://archive.org/details/Reality_JMT Alt URL] |
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* {{cite encyclopedia |last=Macleod |first=Christopher |date=25 August 2016 |title=John Stuart Mill |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |edition=Summer 2020 |editor-first=Edward N. |editor-last=Zalta |via=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/mill/}} |
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* {{cite book |last=Sachs|first=Joe |title=Aristotle's Metaphysics, a New Translation |location=Santa Fe, New Mexico|year=1999|publisher=Green Lion Books|isbn=1-888009-03-9}} |
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* {{cite journal |last=Sachs|first=Joe|title=Aristotle: Motion and its Place in Nature |year=2005 |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-mot/|journal=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}} |
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* {{cite journal | last = Sommers | first = Tamler | editor-last = Jarman | editor-first = Casey | url = http://www.believermag.com/issues/200303/?read=interview_strawson | title = Galen Strawson (interview) | publisher = McSweeney's McMullens | location = San Francisco, CA | journal = Believer Magazine |date = March 2003 | access-date = 10 July 2013 | volume = 1 | issue = 1}} |
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{{refend}} |
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==Further reading== |
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* [[George Musser]], "Virtual Reality: How close can physics bring us to a truly fundamental understanding of the world?", ''[[Scientific American]]'', vol. 321, no. 3 (September 2019), pp. 30–35. |
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** "[[Physics]] is ... the bedrock of the broader search for [[truth]].... Yet [physicists] sometimes seem to be struck by a collective [[impostor syndrome]].... Truth can be elusive even in the best-established theories. [[Quantum mechanics]] is as well tested a theory as can be, yet its interpretation remains inscrutable. [p. 30.] The deeper physicists dive into reality, the more reality seems to evaporate." [p. 34.] |
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== External links == |
== External links == |
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{{Sister project links|Reality}} |
{{Sister project links|Reality}} |
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*{{cite SEP |url-id=realism |title= |
* {{cite SEP |url-id=realism |title=Realism |last=Miller |first=Alexander}} |
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* [http://www.ditext.com/broad/reality.html C.D. Broad on Reality] |
* [http://www.ditext.com/broad/reality.html C.D. Broad on Reality] |
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* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BWyTxCsIXE4 Video: Animated version of the above with Dr Quantum – Flatland] |
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* [http://phenomenologyonline.com/ Phenomenology Online: Materials discussing and exemplifying phenomenological research] |
* [http://phenomenologyonline.com/ Phenomenology Online: Materials discussing and exemplifying phenomenological research] |
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* [http://consc.net/papers/matrix.html The Matrix as Metaphysics by David Chalmers] |
* [http://consc.net/papers/matrix.html The Matrix as Metaphysics by David Chalmers] |
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{{metaphysics}} |
{{metaphysics}} |
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{{World view}} |
{{World view}} |
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{{Spirituality-related topics}} |
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{{Authority control}} |
{{Authority control}} |
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[[Category:Reality| ]] |
[[Category:Reality| ]] |
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[[Category:Reality by type|*]] |
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[[Category:Concepts in metaphysics]] |
[[Category:Concepts in metaphysics]] |
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[[Category:Concepts in epistemology]] |
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[[Category:Concepts in logic]] |
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[[Category:Concepts in metaphilosophy]] |
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[[Category:Concepts in the philosophy of language]] |
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[[Category:Concepts in the philosophy of science]] |
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[[Category:Ontology]] |
[[Category:Ontology]] |
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[[Category:Philosophy of mathematics]] |
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[[Category:Assumption]]<!-- do both parties of an argument agree on the same reality, i.e., take the same realist stance on some concepts and construe others as less useful constructs? --> |
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[[Category:Philosophy of religion]] |
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[[Category:Philosophy of technology]] |
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[[Category:Concepts in the philosophy of mind]] |
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[[Category:Concepts in social philosophy]] |
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[[Category:Realism]] |
Latest revision as of 05:04, 31 May 2024
Reality is the sum or aggregate of all that is real or existent within the universe, as opposed to that which is only imaginary, nonexistent or nonactual. The term is also used to refer to the ontological status of things, indicating their existence.[1] In physical terms, reality is the totality of a system, known and unknown.[2]
Philosophical questions about the nature of reality or existence or being are considered under the rubric of ontology, which is a major branch of metaphysics in the Western philosophical tradition. Ontological questions also feature in diverse branches of philosophy, including the philosophy of science, of religion, of mathematics, and philosophical logic. These include questions about whether only physical objects are real (i.e., physicalism), whether reality is fundamentally immaterial (e.g. idealism), whether hypothetical unobservable entities posited by scientific theories exist, whether a god or gods exist, whether numbers and other abstract objects exist, and whether possible worlds exist. Epistemology is concerned with what can be known or inferred as likely and how, whereby in the modern world emphasis is put on reason, empirical evidence and science as sources and methods to determine or investigate reality.
World views
World views and theories
A common colloquial usage would have reality mean "perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes toward reality", as in "My reality is not your reality." This is often used just as a colloquialism indicating that the parties to a conversation agree, or should agree, not to quibble over deeply different conceptions of what is real. For example, in a religious discussion between friends, one might say (attempting humor), "You might disagree, but in my reality, everyone goes to heaven."
Reality can be defined in a way that links it to worldviews or parts of them (conceptual frameworks): Reality is the totality of all things, structures (actual and conceptual), events (past and present) and phenomena, whether observable or not. It is what a world view (whether it be based on individual or shared human experience) ultimately attempts to describe or map.
Certain ideas from physics, philosophy, sociology, literary criticism, and other fields shape various theories of reality. One such theory is that there simply and literally is no reality beyond the perceptions or beliefs we each have about reality.[citation needed] Such attitudes are summarized in popular statements, such as "Perception is reality" or "Life is how you perceive reality" or "reality is what you can get away with" (Robert Anton Wilson), and they indicate anti-realism – that is, the view that there is no objective reality, whether acknowledged explicitly or not.
Many of the concepts of science and philosophy are often defined culturally and socially. This idea was elaborated by Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). The Social Construction of Reality, a book about the sociology of knowledge written by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, was published in 1966. It explained how knowledge is acquired and used for the comprehension of reality. Out of all the realities, the reality of everyday life is the most important one since our consciousness requires us to be completely aware and attentive to the experience of everyday life.
Related concepts
A priori and a posteriori
Potentiality and actuality
In philosophy, potentiality and actuality[7] are a pair of closely connected principles which Aristotle used to analyze motion, causality, ethics, and physiology in his Physics, Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, and De Anima.[8]
The concept of potentiality, in this context, generally refers to any "possibility" that a thing can be said to have. Aristotle did not consider all possibilities the same, and emphasized the importance of those that become real of their own accord when conditions are right and nothing stops them.[9]
Actuality, in contrast to potentiality, is the motion, change or activity that represents an exercise or fulfillment of a possibility, when a possibility becomes real in the fullest sense.[10] Both these concepts therefore reflect Aristotle's belief that events in nature are not all natural in a true sense. As he saw it, many things happen accidentally, and therefore not according to the natural purposes of things.Belief
A belief is a subjective attitude that a proposition is true or a state of affairs is the case. A subjective attitude is a mental state of having some stance, take, or opinion about something.[11] In epistemology, philosophers use the term "belief" to refer to attitudes about the world which can be either true or false.[12] To believe something is to take it to be true; for instance, to believe that snow is white is comparable to accepting the truth of the proposition "snow is white". However, holding a belief does not require active introspection. For example, few individuals carefully consider whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow, simply assuming that it will. Moreover, beliefs need not be occurrent (e.g. a person actively thinking "snow is white"), but can instead be dispositional (e.g. a person who if asked about the color of snow would assert "snow is white").[12]
There are various ways that contemporary philosophers have tried to describe beliefs, including as representations of ways that the world could be (Jerry Fodor), as dispositions to act as if certain things are true (Roderick Chisholm), as interpretive schemes for making sense of someone's actions (Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson), or as mental states that fill a particular function (Hilary Putnam).[12] Some have also attempted to offer significant revisions to our notion of belief, including eliminativists about belief who argue that there is no phenomenon in the natural world which corresponds to our folk psychological concept of belief (Paul Churchland) and formal epistemologists who aim to replace our bivalent notion of belief ("either we have a belief or we don't have a belief") with the more permissive, probabilistic notion of credence ("there is an entire spectrum of degrees of belief, not a simple dichotomy between belief and non-belief").[12][13]
Beliefs are the subject of various important philosophical debates. Notable examples include: "What is the rational way to revise one's beliefs when presented with various sorts of evidence?", "Is the content of our beliefs entirely determined by our mental states, or do the relevant facts have any bearing on our beliefs (e.g. if I believe that I'm holding a glass of water, is the non-mental fact that water is H2O part of the content of that belief)?", "How fine-grained or coarse-grained are our beliefs?", and "Must it be possible for a belief to be expressible in language, or are there non-linguistic beliefs?"[12]Belief studies
![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fd/Socio-demographic_correlates_of_witchcraft_beliefs.png/220px-Socio-demographic_correlates_of_witchcraft_beliefs.png)
Western philosophy
Philosophy addresses two different aspects of the topic of reality: the nature of reality itself, and the relationship between the mind (as well as language and culture) and reality.
On the one hand, ontology is the study of being, and the central topic of the field is couched, variously, in terms of being, existence, "what is", and reality. The task in ontology is to describe the most general categories of reality and how they are interrelated. If a philosopher wanted to proffer a positive definition of the concept "reality", it would be done under this heading. As explained above, some philosophers draw a distinction between reality and existence. In fact, many analytic philosophers today tend to avoid the term "real" and "reality" in discussing ontological issues. But for those who would treat "is real" the same way they treat "exists", one of the leading questions of analytic philosophy has been whether existence (or reality) is a property of objects. It has been widely held by analytic philosophers that it is not a property at all, though this view has lost some ground in recent decades.
On the other hand, particularly in discussions of objectivity that have feet in both metaphysics and epistemology, philosophical discussions of "reality" often concern the ways in which reality is, or is not, in some way dependent upon (or, to use fashionable jargon, "constructed" out of) mental and cultural factors such as perceptions, beliefs, and other mental states, as well as cultural artifacts, such as religions and political movements, on up to the vague notion of a common cultural world view, or Weltanschauung.
Realism
The view that there is a reality independent of any beliefs, perceptions, etc., is called realism. More specifically, philosophers are given to speaking about "realism about" this and that, such as realism about universals or realism about the external world. Generally, where one can identify any class of object, the existence or essential characteristics of which is said not to depend on perceptions, beliefs, language, or any other human artifact, one can speak of "realism about" that object.
A correspondence theory of knowledge about what exists claims that "true" knowledge of reality represents accurate correspondence of statements about and images of reality with the actual reality that the statements or images are attempting to represent. For example, the scientific method can verify that a statement is true based on the observable evidence that a thing exists. Many humans can point to the Rocky Mountains and say that this mountain range exists, and continues to exist even if no one is observing it or making statements about it.
Anti-realism
One can also speak of anti-realism about the same objects. Anti-realism is the latest in a long series of terms for views opposed to realism. Perhaps the first was idealism, so called because reality was said to be in the mind, or a product of our ideas. Berkeleyan idealism is the view, propounded by the Irish empiricist George Berkeley, that the objects of perception are actually ideas in the mind. In this view, one might be tempted to say that reality is a "mental construct"; this is not quite accurate, however, since, in Berkeley's view, perceptual ideas are created and coordinated by God. By the 20th century, views similar to Berkeley's were called phenomenalism. Phenomenalism differs from Berkeleyan idealism primarily in that Berkeley believed that minds, or souls, are not merely ideas nor made up of ideas, whereas varieties of phenomenalism, such as that advocated by Russell, tended to go farther to say that the mind itself is merely a collection of perceptions, memories, etc., and that there is no mind or soul over and above such mental events. Finally, anti-realism became a fashionable term for any view which held that the existence of some object depends upon the mind or cultural artifacts. The view that the so-called external world is really merely a social, or cultural, artifact, called social constructionism, is one variety of anti-realism. Cultural relativism is the view that social issues such as morality are not absolute, but at least partially cultural artifact.
Being
The nature of being is a perennial topic in metaphysics. For instance, Parmenides taught that reality was a single unchanging Being, whereas Heraclitus wrote that all things flow. The 20th-century philosopher Heidegger thought previous philosophers have lost sight of the question of Being (qua Being) in favour of the questions of beings (existing things), so he believed that a return to the Parmenidean approach was needed. An ontological catalogue is an attempt to list the fundamental constituents of reality. The question of whether or not existence is a predicate has been discussed since the Early Modern period, not least in relation to the ontological argument for the existence of God. Existence, that something is, has been contrasted with essence, the question of what something is. Since existence without essence seems blank, it associated with nothingness by philosophers such as Hegel. Nihilism represents an extremely negative view of being, the absolute a positive one.
Explanations for the existence of something rather than nothing
Perception
The question of direct or "naïve" realism, as opposed to indirect or "representational" realism, arises in the philosophy of perception and of mind out of the debate over the nature of conscious experience;[27][28] the epistemological question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by neural processes in our brain. Naïve realism is known as direct realism when developed to counter indirect or representative realism, also known as epistemological dualism,[29] the philosophical position that our conscious experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation, a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world.
Timothy Leary coined the influential term Reality Tunnel, by which he means a kind of representative realism. The theory states that, with a subconscious set of mental filters formed from their beliefs and experiences, every individual interprets the same world differently, hence "Truth is in the eye of the beholder". His ideas influenced the work of his friend Robert Anton Wilson.
Abstract objects and mathematics
The status of abstract entities, particularly numbers, is a topic of discussion in mathematics.
In the philosophy of mathematics, the best known form of realism about numbers is Platonic realism, which grants them abstract, immaterial existence. Other forms of realism identify mathematics with the concrete physical universe.
Anti-realist stances include formalism and fictionalism.
Some approaches are selectively realistic about some mathematical objects but not others. Finitism rejects infinite quantities. Ultra-finitism accepts finite quantities up to a certain amount. Constructivism and intuitionism are realistic about objects that can be explicitly constructed, but reject the use of the principle of the excluded middle to prove existence by reductio ad absurdum.
The traditional debate has focused on whether an abstract (immaterial, intelligible) realm of numbers has existed in addition to the physical (sensible, concrete) world. A recent development is the mathematical universe hypothesis, the theory that only a mathematical world exists, with the finite, physical world being an illusion within it.
An extreme form of realism about mathematics is the mathematical multiverse hypothesis advanced by Max Tegmark. Tegmark's sole postulate is: All structures that exist mathematically also exist physically. That is, in the sense that "in those [worlds] complex enough to contain self-aware substructures [they] will subjectively perceive themselves as existing in a physically 'real' world".[30][31] The hypothesis suggests that worlds corresponding to different sets of initial conditions, physical constants, or altogether different equations should be considered real. The theory can be considered a form of Platonism in that it posits the existence of mathematical entities, but can also be considered a mathematical monism in that it denies that anything exists except mathematical objects.
Properties
The problem of universals is an ancient problem in metaphysics about whether universals exist. Universals are general or abstract qualities, characteristics, properties, kinds or relations, such as being male/female, solid/liquid/gas or a certain colour,[32] that can be predicated of individuals or particulars or that individuals or particulars can be regarded as sharing or participating in. For example, Scott, Pat, and Chris have in common the universal quality of being human or humanity.
The realist school claims that universals are real – they exist and are distinct from the particulars that instantiate them. There are various forms of realism. Two major forms are Platonic realism and Aristotelian realism.[33] Platonic realism is the view that universals are real entities and they exist independent of particulars. Aristotelian realism, on the other hand, is the view that universals are real entities, but their existence is dependent on the particulars that exemplify them.
Nominalism and conceptualism are the main forms of anti-realism about universals.
Time and space
A traditional realist position in ontology is that time and space have existence apart from the human mind. Idealists deny or doubt the existence of objects independent of the mind. Some anti-realists whose ontological position is that objects outside the mind do exist, nevertheless doubt the independent existence of time and space.
Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, described time as an a priori notion that, together with other a priori notions such as space, allows us to comprehend sense experience. Kant denies that either space or time are substance, entities in themselves, or learned by experience; he holds rather that both are elements of a systematic framework we use to structure our experience. Spatial measurements are used to quantify how far apart objects are, and temporal measurements are used to quantitatively compare the interval between (or duration of) events. Although space and time are held to be transcendentally ideal in this sense, they are also empirically real, i.e. not mere illusions.
Idealist writers such as J. M. E. McTaggart in The Unreality of Time have argued that time is an illusion.
As well as differing about the reality of time as a whole, metaphysical theories of time can differ in their ascriptions of reality to the past, present and future separately.
- Presentism holds that the past and future are unreal, and only an ever-changing present is real.
- The block universe theory, also known as Eternalism, holds that past, present and future are all real, but the passage of time is an illusion. It is often said to have a scientific basis in relativity.
- The growing block universe theory holds that past and present are real, but the future is not.
Time, and the related concepts of process and evolution are central to the system-building metaphysics of A. N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.
Possible worlds
The term "possible world" goes back to Leibniz's theory of possible worlds, used to analyse necessity, possibility, and similar modal notions. Modal realism is the view, notably propounded by David Kellogg Lewis, that all possible worlds are as real as the actual world. In short: the actual world is regarded as merely one among an infinite set of logically possible worlds, some "nearer" to the actual world and some more remote. Other theorists may use the Possible World framework to express and explore problems without committing to it ontologically. Possible world theory is related to alethic logic: a proposition is necessary if it is true in all possible worlds, and possible if it is true in at least one. The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is a similar idea in science.
Theories of everything (TOE) and philosophy
The philosophical implications of a physical TOE are frequently debated. For example, if philosophical physicalism is true, a physical TOE will coincide with a philosophical theory of everything.
The "system building" style of metaphysics attempts to answer all the important questions in a coherent way, providing a complete picture of the world. Plato and Aristotle could be said to be early examples of comprehensive systems. In the early modern period (17th and 18th centuries), the system-building scope of philosophy is often linked to the rationalist method of philosophy, that is the technique of deducing the nature of the world by pure a priori reason. Examples from the early modern period include the Leibniz's Monadology, Descartes's Dualism, Spinoza's Monism. Hegel's Absolute idealism and Whitehead's Process philosophy were later systems.
Other philosophers do not believe its techniques can aim so high. Some scientists think a more mathematical approach than philosophy is needed for a TOE, for instance Stephen Hawking wrote in A Brief History of Time that even if we had a TOE, it would necessarily be a set of equations. He wrote, "What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?"[34]
Phenomenology
On a much broader and more subjective level,[specify] private experiences, curiosity, inquiry, and the selectivity involved in personal interpretation of events shapes reality as seen by one and only one person[35] and hence is called phenomenological. While this form of reality might be common to others as well, it could at times also be so unique to oneself as to never be experienced or agreed upon by anyone else. Much of the kind of experience deemed spiritual occurs on this level of reality.[36]
Phenomenology is a philosophical method developed in the early years of the twentieth century by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and a circle of followers at the universities of Göttingen and Munich in Germany. Subsequently, phenomenological themes were taken up by philosophers in France, the United States, and elsewhere, often in contexts far removed from Husserl's work.
The word phenomenology comes from the Greek phainómenon, meaning "that which appears", and lógos, meaning "study". In Husserl's conception, phenomenology is primarily concerned with making the structures of consciousness, and the phenomena which appear in acts of consciousness, objects of systematic reflection and analysis. Such reflection was to take place from a highly modified "first person" viewpoint, studying phenomena not as they appear to "my" consciousness, but to any consciousness whatsoever. Husserl believed that phenomenology could thus provide a firm basis for all human knowledge, including scientific knowledge, and could establish philosophy as a "rigorous science".[37]
Husserl's conception of phenomenology has been criticised and developed by his student and assistant Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), by existentialists like Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), and by other philosophers, such as Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005), Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), and Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977).[38]
Skeptical hypotheses
![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4c/Braininvat.jpg/280px-Braininvat.jpg)
Skeptical hypotheses in philosophy suggest that reality could be very different from what we think it is; or at least that we cannot prove it is not. Examples include:
- The "Brain in a vat" hypothesis is cast in scientific terms. It supposes that one might be a disembodied brain kept alive in a vat, and fed false sensory signals. This hypothesis is related to the Matrix hypothesis below.
- The "Dream argument" of Descartes and Zhuangzi supposes reality to be indistinguishable from a dream.
- Descartes' Evil demon is a being "as clever and deceitful as he is powerful, who has directed his entire effort to misleading me."
- The five minute hypothesis (or omphalos hypothesis or Last Thursdayism) suggests that the world was created recently together with records and traces indicating a greater age.
- Diminished reality refers to artificially diminished reality, not due to limitations of sensory systems but via artificial filters[39]
- The Matrix hypothesis or Simulated reality hypothesis suggest that we might be inside a computer simulation or virtual reality. Related hypotheses may also involve simulations with signals that allow the inhabitant species in virtual or simulated reality to perceive the external reality.
Non-western ancient philosophy and religion
Jain philosophy
Jain philosophy postulates that seven tattva (truths or fundamental principles) constitute reality.[40] These seven tattva are:[41]
- Jīva – The soul which is characterized by consciousness.
- Ajīva – The non-soul.
- Asrava – Influx of karma.
- Bandha – The bondage of karma.
- Samvara – Obstruction of the inflow of karmic matter into the soul.
- Nirjara – Shedding of karmas.
- Moksha – Liberation or Salvation, i.e. the complete annihilation of all karmic matter (bound with any particular soul).
Physical sciences
Scientific realism
Scientific realism is, at the most general level, the view that the world (the universe) described by science (perhaps ideal science) is the real world, as it is, independent of what we might take it to be. Within philosophy of science, it is often framed as an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?" The debate over what the success of science involves centers primarily on the status of entities that are not directly observable discussed by scientific theories. Generally, those who are scientific realists state that one can make reliable claims about these entities (viz., that they have the same ontological status) as directly observable entities, as opposed to instrumentalism. The most used and studied scientific theories today state more or less the truth.
Realism and locality in physics
Realism in the sense used by physicists does not equate to realism in metaphysics.[42] The latter is the claim that the world is mind-independent: that even if the results of a measurement do not pre-exist the act of measurement, that does not require that they are the creation of the observer. Furthermore, a mind-independent property does not have to be the value of some physical variable such as position or momentum. A property can be dispositional (or potential), i.e. it can be a tendency: in the way that glass objects tend to break, or are disposed to break, even if they do not actually break. Likewise, the mind-independent properties of quantum systems could consist of a tendency to respond to particular measurements with particular values with ascertainable probability.[43] Such an ontology would be metaphysically realistic, without being realistic in the physicist's sense of "local realism" (which would require that a single value be produced with certainty).
A closely related term is counterfactual definiteness (CFD), used to refer to the claim that one can meaningfully speak of the definiteness of results of measurements that have not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the existence of objects, and properties of objects, even when they have not been measured).
Local realism is a significant feature of classical mechanics, of general relativity, and of electrodynamics; but quantum mechanics has shown that quantum entanglement is possible. This was rejected by Einstein, who proposed the EPR paradox, but it was subsequently quantified by Bell's inequalities.[44] If Bell's inequalities are violated, either local realism or counterfactual definiteness must be incorrect; but some physicists dispute that experiments have demonstrated Bell's violations, on the grounds that the sub-class of inhomogeneous Bell inequalities has not been tested or due to experimental limitations in the tests. Different interpretations of quantum mechanics violate different parts of local realism and/or counterfactual definiteness.
The transition from "possible" to "actual" is a major topic of quantum physics, with related theories including quantum darwinism.
Role of "observation" in quantum mechanics
The quantum mind–body problem refers to the philosophical discussions of the mind–body problem in the context of quantum mechanics. Since quantum mechanics involves quantum superpositions, which are not perceived by observers, some interpretations of quantum mechanics place conscious observers in a special position.
The founders of quantum mechanics debated the role of the observer, and of them, Wolfgang Pauli and Werner Heisenberg believed that it was the observer that produced collapse. This point of view, which was never fully endorsed by Niels Bohr, was denounced as mystical and anti-scientific by Albert Einstein. Pauli accepted the term, and described quantum mechanics as lucid mysticism.[45]
Heisenberg and Bohr always described quantum mechanics in logical positivist terms. Bohr also took an active interest in the philosophical implications of quantum theories such as his complementarity, for example.[46] He believed quantum theory offers a complete description of nature, albeit one that is simply ill-suited for everyday experiences – which are better described by classical mechanics and probability. Bohr never specified a demarcation line above which objects cease to be quantum and become classical. He believed that it was not a question of physics, but one of philosophy.
Eugene Wigner reformulated the "Schrödinger's cat" thought experiment as "Wigner's friend" and proposed that the consciousness of an observer is the demarcation line which precipitates collapse of the wave function, independent of any realist interpretation. Commonly known as "consciousness causes collapse", this controversial interpretation of quantum mechanics states that observation by a conscious observer is what makes the wave function collapse. However, this is a minority view among quantum philosophers, considering it a misunderstanding.[47] There are other possible solutions to the "Wigner's friend" thought experiment, which do not require consciousness to be different from other physical processes. Moreover, Wigner shifted to those interpretations in his later years.[48]
Multiverse
The multiverse is the hypothetical set of multiple possible universes (including the historical universe we consistently experience) that together comprise everything that exists: the entirety of space, time, matter, and energy as well as the physical laws and constants that describe them. The term was coined in 1895 by the American philosopher and psychologist William James.[49] In the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), one of the mainstream interpretations of quantum mechanics, there are an infinite number of universes and every possible quantum outcome occurs in at least one universe, albeit there is a debate as to how real the (other) worlds are.
The structure of the multiverse, the nature of each universe within it and the relationship between the various constituent universes, depend on the specific multiverse hypothesis considered. Multiverses have been hypothesized in cosmology, physics, astronomy, religion, philosophy, transpersonal psychology and fiction, particularly in science fiction and fantasy. In these contexts, parallel universes are also called "alternative universes", "quantum universes", "interpenetrating dimensions", "parallel dimensions", "parallel worlds", "alternative realities", "alternative timelines", and "dimensional planes", among others.
Anthropic principle
Personal and collective reality
![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/f2/White_Matter_Connections_Obtained_with_MRI_Tractography.png/220px-White_Matter_Connections_Obtained_with_MRI_Tractography.png)
Each individual has a different view of reality, with different memories and personal history, knowledge, personality traits and experience.[54] This system, mostly referring to the human brain, affects cognition and behavior and into this complex new knowledge, memories,[55] information, thoughts and experiences are continuously integrated.[56][additional citation(s) needed] The connectome – neural networks/wirings in brains – is thought to be a key factor in human variability in terms of cognition or the way we perceive the world (as a context) and related features or processes.[57][58][59] Sensemaking is the process by which people give meaning to their experiences and make sense of the world they live in. Personal identity is relating to questions like how a unique individual is persisting through time.
Sensemaking and determination of reality also occurs collectively, which is investigated in social epistemology and related approaches. From the collective intelligence perspective, the intelligence of the individual human (and potentially AI entities) is substantially limited and advanced intelligence emerges when multiple entities collaborate over time.[60][additional citation(s) needed] Collective memory is an important component of the social construction of reality[61] and communication and communication-related systems, such as media systems, may also be major components ( ).
Philosophy of perception raises questions based on the evolutionary history of humans' perceptual apparatuses, particularly or especially individuals' physiological senses, described as "[w]e don't see reality — we only see what was useful to see in the past", partly suggesting that "[o]ur species has been so successful not in spite of our inability to see reality but because of it".[62]
Scientific theories of everything
A theory of everything (TOE) is a putative theory of theoretical physics that fully explains and links together all known physical phenomena, and predicts the outcome of any experiment that could be carried out in principle. The theory of everything is also called the final theory.[63] Many candidate theories of everything have been proposed by theoretical physicists during the twentieth century, but none have been confirmed experimentally. The primary problem in producing a TOE is that general relativity and quantum mechanics are hard to unify. This is one of the unsolved problems in physics.
Initially, the term "theory of everything" was used with an ironic connotation to refer to various overgeneralized theories. For example, a great-grandfather of Ijon Tichy, a character from a cycle of Stanisław Lem's science fiction stories of the 1960s, was known to work on the "General Theory of Everything". Physicist John Ellis[64] claims to have introduced the term into the technical literature in an article in Nature in 1986.[65] Over time, the term stuck in popularizations of quantum physics to describe a theory that would unify or explain through a single model the theories of all fundamental interactions and of all particles of nature: general relativity for gravitation, and the standard model of elementary particle physics – which includes quantum mechanics – for electromagnetism, the two nuclear interactions, and the known elementary particles.
Current candidates for a theory of everything include string theory, M theory, and loop quantum gravity.
Technology
Media
Media – such as news media, social media, websites including Wikipedia,[66] and fiction[67] – shape individuals' and society's perception of reality (including as part of belief and attitude formation)[67] and are partly used intentionally as means to learn about reality. Various technologies have changed society's relationship with reality such as the advent of radio and TV technologies.
Research investigates interrelations and effects, for example aspects in the social construction of reality.[68] A major component of this shaping and representation of perceived reality is agenda, selection and prioritization – not only (or primarily) the quality, tone and types of content – which influences, for instance, the public agenda.[69][70] Disproportional news attention for low-probability incidents – such as high-consequence accidents – can distort audiences' risk perceptions with harmful consequences.[71] Various biases such as false balance, public attention dependence reactions like sensationalism and domination by "current events",[72] as well as various interest-driven uses of media such as marketing can also have major impacts on the perception of reality. Time-use studies found that e.g. in 2018 the average U.S. American "spent around eleven hours every day looking at screens".[73]
Filter bubbles and echo chambers
Virtual reality and cyberspace
Virtual reality (VR) is a computer-simulated environment that can simulate physical presence in places in the real world, as well as in imaginary worlds.
![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c7/Virtuality_continuum_2-en.svg/400px-Virtuality_continuum_2-en.svg.png)
The virtuality continuum is a continuous scale ranging between the completely virtual, a virtuality, and the completely real: reality. The reality–virtuality continuum therefore encompasses all possible variations and compositions of real and virtual objects. It has been described as a concept in new media and computer science, but in fact it could be considered a matter of anthropology. The concept was first introduced by Paul Milgram.[84]
The area between the two extremes, where both the real and the virtual are mixed, is the so-called mixed reality. This in turn is said to consist of both augmented reality, where the virtual augments the real, and augmented virtuality, where the real augments the virtual. Cyberspace, the world's computer systems considered as an interconnected whole, can be thought of as a virtual reality; for instance, it is portrayed as such in the cyberpunk fiction of William Gibson and others. Second Life and MMORPGs such as World of Warcraft are examples of artificial environments or virtual worlds (falling some way short of full virtual reality) in cyberspace.
"RL" in internet culture
On the Internet, "real life" refers to life in the real world. It generally references life or consensus reality, in contrast to an environment seen as fiction or fantasy, such as virtual reality, lifelike experience, dreams, novels, or movies. Online, the acronym "IRL" stands for "in real life", with the meaning "not on the Internet".[85] Sociologists engaged in the study of the Internet have determined that someday, a distinction between online and real-life worlds may seem "quaint", noting that certain types of online activity, such as sexual intrigues, have already made a full transition to complete legitimacy and "reality".[86] The abbreviation "RL" stands for "real life". For example, one can speak of "meeting in RL" someone whom one has met in a chat or on an Internet forum. It may also be used to express an inability to use the Internet for a time due to "RL problems".
See also
Notes
- ^ "reality | Definition of reality in English by Oxford Dictionaries". Oxford Dictionaries | English. Archived from the original on September 26, 2016. Retrieved 2017-10-28.
- ^ Saridakis E. (2016). "Information, reality, and modern physics". International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 30 (4): 327–341. doi:10.1080/02698595.2017.1331980. S2CID 126411165.
- ^ Funk, Ken (2001-03-21). "What is a Worldview?". Retrieved 2019-12-10.
- ^ Palmer, Gary B. (1996). Toward A Theory of Cultural Linguistics. University of Texas Press. p. 114. ISBN 978-0-292-76569-6.
- ^ Some associationist philosophers have contended that mathematics comes from experience and is not a form of any a priori knowledge (Macleod 2016)
- ^ Galen Strawson has stated that an a priori argument is one in which "you can see that it is true just lying on your couch. You don't have to get up off your couch and go outside and examine the way things are in the physical world. You don't have to do any science." (Sommers 2003)
- ^ dynamis–energeia, translated into Latin as potentia–actualitas (earlier also possibilitas–efficacia). Giorgio Agamben, Opus Dei: An Archaeology of Duty (2013), p. 46.
- ^ Sachs (2005)
- ^ Sachs (1999, p. lvii).
- ^ Durrant (1993, p. 206)
- ^ Primmer, Justin (2018), "Belief", in Primmer, Justin (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab, archived from the original on 15 November 2019, retrieved 2008-09-19
- ^ a b c d e "Belief". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 15 November 2019. Retrieved 22 June 2020.
- ^ "Formal Representations of Belief". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 11 July 2020. Retrieved 22 June 2020.
- ^ a b Gershman, Boris (23 November 2022). "Witchcraft beliefs around the world: An exploratory analysis". PLOS ONE. 17 (11): e0276872. Bibcode:2022PLoSO..1776872G. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0276872. PMC 9683553. PMID 36417350.
- ^ "Witchcraft beliefs are widespread, highly variable around the world". Public Library of Science via phys.org. Retrieved 17 December 2022.
- ^ Ecker, Ullrich K. H.; Lewandowsky, Stephan; Cook, John; Schmid, Philipp; Fazio, Lisa K.; Brashier, Nadia; Kendeou, Panayiota; Vraga, Emily K.; Amazeen, Michelle A. (January 2022). "The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction". Nature Reviews Psychology. 1 (1): 13–29. doi:10.1038/s44159-021-00006-y. hdl:1983/889ddb0f-0d44-44f4-a54f-57c260ae4917. ISSN 2731-0574. S2CID 245916820.
- ^ Clifford, Catherine. "Americans don't think other Americans care about climate change as much as they do". CNBC. Retrieved 15 September 2022.
- ^ Sparkman, Gregg; Geiger, Nathan; Weber, Elke U. (23 August 2022). "Americans experience a false social reality by underestimating popular climate policy support by nearly half". Nature Communications. 13 (1): 4779. Bibcode:2022NatCo..13.4779S. doi:10.1038/s41467-022-32412-y. ISSN 2041-1723. PMC 9399177. PMID 35999211.
- ^ Nayak, Sandeep M.; Griffiths, Roland R. (28 March 2022). "A Single Belief-Changing Psychedelic Experience Is Associated With Increased Attribution of Consciousness to Living and Non-living Entities". Frontiers in Psychology. 13: 852248. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.852248. ISSN 1664-1078. PMC 8995647. PMID 35418909.
- ^ Timmermann, Christopher; Kettner, Hannes; Letheby, Chris; Roseman, Leor; Rosas, Fernando E.; Carhart-Harris, Robin L. (23 November 2021). "Psychedelics alter metaphysical beliefs". Scientific Reports. 11 (1): 22166. Bibcode:2021NatSR..1122166T. doi:10.1038/s41598-021-01209-2. ISSN 2045-2322. PMC 8611059. PMID 34815421.
- ^ "Principles of Nature and Grace", 1714, Article 7.
- ^ "Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is", Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 6.44
- ^ "Why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing? That is the question." What is Metaphysics? (1929), p. 110, Heidegger.
- ^ Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, Yale University Press, New Haven and London (1959), pp. 7–8.
- ^ "The Fundamental Question". www.hedweb.com. Retrieved 26 April 2017.
- ^ Geier, Manfred (2017). Wittgenstein und Heidegger: Die letzten Philosophen (in German). Rowohlt Verlag. p. 166. ISBN 978-3644045118.
- ^ Lehar, Steve. (2000). The Function of Conscious Experience: An Analogical Paradigm of Perception and Behavior Archived 2015-10-21 at the Wayback Machine, Consciousness and Cognition.
- ^ Lehar, Steve. (2000). Naïve Realism in Contemporary Philosophy Archived 2012-08-11 at the Wayback Machine, The Function of Conscious Experience.
- ^ Lehar, Steve. Representationalism Archived 2012-09-05 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Tegmark, Max (February 2008). "The Mathematical Universe". Foundations of Physics. 38 (2): 101–150. arXiv:0704.0646. Bibcode:2008FoPh...38..101T. doi:10.1007/s10701-007-9186-9. S2CID 9890455.
- ^ Tegmark (1998), p. 1.
- ^ Loux, Michael J. (2001). "The Problem of Universals" in Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings, Michael J. Loux (ed.), N.Y.: Routledge, pp. 3–13, [4]
- ^ Price, H. H. (1953). "Universals and Resemblance", Ch. 1 of Thinking and Experience, Hutchinson's University Library, among others, sometimes uses such Latin terms
- ^ as quoted in [Artigas, The Mind of the Universe, p.123]
- ^ "Present-time consciousness", Francisco J. Varela, Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):111-140 (1999)
- ^ For the concept of "levels of reality", compare: Ioannidis, Stavros; Vishne, Gal; Hemmo, Meir; Shenker, Orly, eds. (8 June 2022). Levels of Reality in Science and Philosophy: Re-examining the Multi-level Structure of Reality. Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science. Cham, Zug: Springer Nature. ISBN 9783030994259. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
- ^ Joseph Kockelmans (2001). Edmund Husserl's phenomenology (2 ed.). Purdue University Press. pp. 311–314. ISBN 1-55753-050-5.
- ^ Steven Galt Crowell (2001). Husserl, Heidegger, and the space of meaning: paths toward transcendental phenomenology. Northwestern University Press. p. 160. ISBN 0-8101-1805-X.
- ^ Mori, Shohei; Ikeda, Sei; Saito, Hideo (28 June 2017). "A survey of diminished reality: Techniques for visually concealing, eliminating, and seeing through real objects". IPSJ Transactions on Computer Vision and Applications. 9 (1): 17. doi:10.1186/s41074-017-0028-1. ISSN 1882-6695. S2CID 21053932.
- ^ Jain 1992, p. 6.
- ^ Jain 1992, p. 7.
- ^ Norsen, Travis (26 February 2007). "Against 'Realism'". Foundations of Physics. 37 (3): 311–340. arXiv:quant-ph/0607057. Bibcode:2007FoPh...37..311N. doi:10.1007/s10701-007-9104-1. S2CID 15072850.
- ^ Thompson, Ian. "Generative Science". www.generativescience.org.
- ^ "Local realism and the crucial experiment". bendov.info.
- ^ Juan Miguel Marin (2009). "'Mysticism' in quantum mechanics: the forgotten controversy". European Journal of Physics. 30 (4): 807–822. Bibcode:2009EJPh...30..807M. doi:10.1088/0143-0807/30/4/014. S2CID 122757714. link, summarized here [1] Archived 2011-06-06 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ John Honner (2005). "Niels Bohr and the Mysticism of Nature". Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science. 17–3: 243–253.
- ^ M. Schlosshauer; J. Koer; A. Zeilinger (2013). "A Snapshot of Foundational Attitudes Toward Quantum Mechanics". Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. 44 (3): 222–230. arXiv:1301.1069. Bibcode:2013SHPMP..44..222S. doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2013.04.004. S2CID 55537196.
- ^ Michael Esfeld, (1999), Essay Review: Wigner's View of Physical Reality, published in Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 30B, pp. 145–154, Elsevier Science Ltd.
- ^ James, William, The Will to Believe, 1895; and earlier in 1895, as cited in OED's new 2003 entry for "multiverse": "1895 W. JAMES in Internat. Jrnl. Ethics 6 10 Visible nature is all plasticity and indifference, a multiverse, as one might call it, and not a universe."
- ^ Bostrom, Nick (2008). "Where are they? Why I hope the search for extraterrestrial life finds nothing" (PDF). Technology Review. 2008: 72–77. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2022-10-09.
- ^ Bostrom, Nick (9 February 2020). "Was the Universe made for us?". anthropic-principle.com.
The data we collect about the Universe is filtered not only by our instruments' limitations, but also by the precondition that somebody be there to 'have' the data yielded by the instruments (and to build the instruments in the first place).
- ^ Weinberg, Steven (2011-02-10). "The Universes We Still Don't Know". The New York Review of Books. Vol. 58, no. 2. ISSN 0028-7504. Retrieved 2024-06-10.
- ^ James Schombert. "Anthropic principle". Department of Physics at University of Oregon. Archived from the original on 2012-04-28. Retrieved 2012-04-26.
- ^ Savin-Baden, Maggi; Burden, David (1 April 2019). "Digital Immortality and Virtual Humans". Postdigital Science and Education. 1 (1): 87–103. doi:10.1007/s42438-018-0007-6. ISSN 2524-4868. S2CID 149797460.
- ^ van Kesteren, Marlieke T. R.; Rignanese, Paul; Gianferrara, Pierre G.; Krabbendam, Lydia; Meeter, Martijn (16 March 2020). "Congruency and reactivation aid memory integration through reinstatement of prior knowledge". Scientific Reports. 10 (1): 4776. Bibcode:2020NatSR..10.4776V. doi:10.1038/s41598-020-61737-1. ISSN 2045-2322. PMC 7075880. PMID 32179822.
- ^ "Understanding reality through algorithms". MIT News | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Retrieved 6 November 2022.
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Not in Copyright
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Further reading
- George Musser, "Virtual Reality: How close can physics bring us to a truly fundamental understanding of the world?", Scientific American, vol. 321, no. 3 (September 2019), pp. 30–35.
- "Physics is ... the bedrock of the broader search for truth.... Yet [physicists] sometimes seem to be struck by a collective impostor syndrome.... Truth can be elusive even in the best-established theories. Quantum mechanics is as well tested a theory as can be, yet its interpretation remains inscrutable. [p. 30.] The deeper physicists dive into reality, the more reality seems to evaporate." [p. 34.]