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{{talkquote|Fearing discontent amongst the local population, Moti Ram closed the Jama Masjid to prevent crowds of disaffected Muslims from gathering there. Although the motive may have been political rather than religious, the closure of the mosque upset the local Muslim Kashmiris.<ref>{{citation |last=Schofield |first=Victoria |authorlink=Victoria Schofield |title=Kashmir in the crossfire |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RDFuAAAAMAAJ |year=1996 |publisher=I.B. Tauris |isbn=978-1-86064-036-0 |ref={{sfnref|Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire|1996}}|p=34}}</ref>}} |
{{talkquote|Fearing discontent amongst the local population, Moti Ram closed the Jama Masjid to prevent crowds of disaffected Muslims from gathering there. Although the motive may have been political rather than religious, the closure of the mosque upset the local Muslim Kashmiris.<ref>{{citation |last=Schofield |first=Victoria |authorlink=Victoria Schofield |title=Kashmir in the crossfire |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RDFuAAAAMAAJ |year=1996 |publisher=I.B. Tauris |isbn=978-1-86064-036-0 |ref={{sfnref|Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire|1996}}|p=34}}</ref>}} |
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So I was right in saying that it was a ''political'' measure, rather than a religious one. I will edit the article according to this information. -- [[User:Kautilya3|Kautilya3]] ([[User talk:Kautilya3|talk]]) 13:37, 3 January 2017 (UTC) |
So I was right in saying that it was a ''political'' measure, rather than a religious one. I will edit the article according to this information. -- [[User:Kautilya3|Kautilya3]] ([[User talk:Kautilya3|talk]]) 13:37, 3 January 2017 (UTC) |
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::I suggest that you, and others here, not engage in research, treating all sources as equal---and with those suiting your long-held prejudices more equal---and making a mess of the page semantically and stylistically. Instead, let the experts who write text books, tertiary texts, or survey articles on Kashmir historiography, draw those conclusions. Please also don't edit the article according to whatever "information" you have divined unless you want to turn this article into a disputed page. There is no dispute about the horrors of Sikh rule in Kashmir. How many sources published by academic presses do you want me to cite? |
::I suggest that you, and others here, not engage in research, treating all sources as equal---and with those suiting your long-held prejudices more equal---and making a mess of the page semantically and stylistically. Instead, let the experts who write text books, tertiary texts, or survey articles on Kashmir historiography, draw those conclusions. Please also don't edit the article according to whatever "information" you have divined unless you want to turn this article into a disputed page. There is no dispute about the horrors of Sikh rule in Kashmir. How many sources published by academic presses do you want me to cite? [[User:Fowler&fowler|<font color="#B8860B">Fowler&fowler</font>]][[User talk:Fowler&fowler|<font color="#708090">«Talk»</font>]] 15:58, 3 January 2017 (UTC) |
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Refugees - unreliable source
There are roughly 1.5 million refugees from Indian-Administered Kashmir in Pakistan-Administered Kashmir and other parts of Pakistan.[1]
References
- ^ Rahman, Khalid. "Kashmiri Refugees: Facts, Issues and the Future Ahead". www.ips.org.pk. Retrieved 2016-07-31.
@Fenrir77: The content you have added (reproduced above) is sourced to a self-published source. The author is the Director of the Institute of Policy Studies (Pakistan) and the editor of the journal (apparently an in-house journal of the Institute) [1]. I am replacing it by reliably sourced content. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:28, 31 July 2016 (UTC)
- I have now done a little bit of calculation since all kinds of numbers are being thrown around. According to Snedden's data, there were 1.2m Muslims in the Jammu province in the 1941 census. There was pretty much no migration from the Kashmir province. So, it is clearly impossible for 1.5m Muslims to have migrated to AJK from the Indian-held Kashmir!
- If I subtract Mirpur and half of Poonch populations, then the rest of the Jammu province had only about 700,000 Muslims (about 50% of the population). India's Jammu province is still 33.5% Muslim. So, the maximum number that could have migrated is 17% of the-then population, which is about 250,000. Even the 500,000 number that was accepted by Christopher Snedden is an overestimate.
- While we are at it, let me also note that the 17% Hindus of Mirpur and 9% Hindus of Poonch (about 100,000 in total) have vanished. Nobody talks about them. So much for reliable sources! -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:28, 31 July 2016 (UTC)
Lead section
@101.50.115.215: Can you explain how this content is irrelevant? --SMS Talk 09:41, 17 November 2016 (UTC)
Reason For Nominating for Neutrality
This article has been nominated for neutrality because it contains insufficient information on the Muslim Rule of Kashmir, while providing extensive information on the Hindu/Buddhist and Sikh rule. Insufficient information because it talks about the Muslim Rule until 1342, then skips to the Sikh rule in 1842. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2601:183:8102:40DF:42F:76BD:87BB:F26D (talk) 02:19, 27 November 2016 (UTC)
- Lack of this information about history does not qualify as an NPOV issue. You are welcome to add this information. --SMS Talk 10:42, 29 November 2016 (UTC)
NPOV issue in the Dogra Rule section
I am putting a POV tag on the Dogra Rule section because it is overweight on Muslim grievances. This article is on the entire Kashmir region and not on just Kashmiri Muslims. There is no doubt that the grievances were real, but they have to be described in a historically correct way. Are they different from the ryotwari system elsewhere in the subcontinent? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:37, 7 December 2016 (UTC)
- The sentence
Scholar Ayesha Jalal states that the Maharajahs nurtured ties with Kashmiri Pandits and their Dogra kinsfolk in Jammu to trample on the rights of their subjects
is also a misrepresentation of the source. It implies that they nurtured ties for the purpose of trampling on the rights. There is no such causation in the source. They seem to be separate phenomena. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:49, 7 December 2016 (UTC)
Huge revert
I notice that Fowler&fowler did a huge revert this morning, apparently to his own version from 16 July, with the edit summary removing POV-ridden Hindu Dogra Rule and restoring last stable version. Please take it to the talk page and gain consensus.
Lost in the process were a large number of improvements over these months such as the updated demographic statistics, archived sources, and also the Kashmiri Muslim grievances that I complained about in the section above.
Coming to the "POV-ridden Hindu Dogra rule", most of this content is mine and I am no Hindu apologist or Dogra apologist. The content is sourced to K. M. Panikkar's 1930 book, which continues to be cited in scholarly works till today, cross-checked with Bawa Satinder Singh's journal article. If Fowler finds "POV" in this content, I would like to hear what it is. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:06, 20 December 2016 (UTC)
- I have now also cross-checked it also against Mridu Rai and added it as a source.
- It also occurs to me that F&f argued with me vehemently in May that "Kashmir" means the entire Jammu and Kashmir. It is ironic, therefore, that he should object to the content about Dogras, who are an integral part of "Kashmir" in his sense. As a matter of fact, the entire article is terribly overweight on the Kashmir valley with very little said about Jammu, Ladakh and Gilgit, a problem that needs to be corrected in due course. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:12, 20 December 2016 (UTC)
Foreign rule
I am tentatively labelling the Mughal, Afghan and Sikh rule as "foreign rule". I was prompted by a comment of Wasiq 9320. But this is in fact how Kashmiris themselves think of this period. Some citations:
- Minahan, James B. (2012), Ethnic Groups of South Asia and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia: An Encyclopedia, ABC-CLIO, pp. 185–, ISBN 978-1-59884-660-7
- Dulat, A. S.; Sinha, Aditya (2015), Kashmir: The Vajpayee Years, HarperCollins India, pp. 130–, ISBN 978-93-5177-067-1
- Kalla, Krishan Lal (1985), The Literary Heritage of Kashmir, Mittal Publications, pp. 52–, GGKEY:7JAXGZQJRGN
Comments welcome. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:01, 20 December 2016 (UTC)
Hindu elite
@Towns Hill: Your recent edits to the Dogra rule section added material alleging that it promoted a "Hindu elite" to the detriment of the Muslim masses. The implication seems to be that, since Dogras were Hindus, they promoted Hindu elites and oppressed the Muslims. Yet, Chitralekha Zutshi says[1]
As we saw, Kashmiri Pandits had entered the administrative machinery of state during the Afghan period, and by the Dogra period they were firmly entrenched in the lower levels of the state bureaucracy. Although the Pandits were, like all Kashmiris, excluded from the upper echelons of the bureaucracy, they continued to exercise control in the countryside, away from the urban centers of power.
In fact, another PhD thesis on the land revenue system[2] says that the Afghans tried to replace the Pandit officials but didn't succeed. This tells me two things: (1) the Pandits were working as officials even before the Afghan rule, (2) the employment of Pandits had nothing to do with religion. For all we know, the Pandits have been playing this role for eternity (for we can't imagine that Mughals specially brought Pandits do it nor that that Shahmiri dynasty did it.)
You are also forgetting the fact that the Pandits were Brahmins. And, the Brahmins had a hold on the state machinery all over the subcontinent. In the British-ruled Madras Presidency, there was a non-Brahmin movement demanding reservations for jobs for non-Brahmins in the 1920s. The Kashmiris launched a similar movement in the 1930s, only ten years behind. In other parts like Uttar Pradesh, there were no such reservations until a couple of decades ago.
Given the historical context and the socio-political factors, I don't see any Hindu-Muslim divide in this affair, and I intend to get rid of any text that suggests there was. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:23, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
Zutshi also says,
Furthermore, many Kashmiri Pandits in rural areas were simply cultivators, with no connection to the revenue administration. Additionally, there was an important Kashmiri Muslim element in the revenue administration, drawn mostly from Sayyids and Pirs.
So, Muslims were not excluded from the administration, and it is wrong to make it look as if they were. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:54, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
- A small clarification. 'Sayyids' and 'Pirzadas' (Pirzada being the 'kram' name) were not Kashmiris. They were exploitative outsiders and not part of the Valley's native Muslim peasantry who suffered during the Dogra rule. There was also Dogra state discrimination with anti-Muslim religious bias. There were also Kashmiri Pandits such as Prem Nath Bazaz who were sympathetic to the plight of their Kashmiri brethren among the Muslims. So its true that not all Kashmiri Pandits exploited Kashmiri Muslims. Lawrence also documents that there were many 'kind and gentle' Kashmiri Pandit officials, though as a body they were 'cruel'. But there was definitely a class divide which coincided with the religious divide in the Valley (it was somewhat different in Jammu). Kashmiri Pandits dominated the landowning and administrative classes and did exploit the Muslims (again, not all of them). Anti-Kashmiri Muslim peasantry co-operation also certainly existed between the Dogras and the Kashmiri Pandits, as the chakdari system demonstrates.[3][4] Towns_Hill 01:50, 2 January 2017 (UTC) Towns Hill
- I think you did not get my point. Whatever system was operating during the Dogra rule, was operating for a long time, as long as we can see in the past. So, you cannot put this under the Dogra rule section, implying that they instituted it. Do you have evidence that they instituted anything new (other than the fact they brought in Dogra overlords from outside the Valley)?
- Secondly, you are communalising history. State officials exploited the poor peasantry. It so happened that, in Kashmir, the majority (though not all) officials were Hindu and the majority (thought not all) peasantry were Muslim. And this was the case even when the Kashmiris were ruling themselves, i.e., before the Mughals occupied Kashmir. Akbar tried to break the power of the officials, by getting rid of the one-third that they were collecting from the peasants. (See the section below.) But the system came back eventually, again well before the Dogras came into the picture.
- All the scholars you are reading are not honest-to-goodness historians. They are looking at narrow parts of history and telling us what they find. They are also reproducing the observations of the local observers, who are also not historians. The PhD theses that I am citing from India are doing proper historical analyses, under historian supervisors, who are all guided by established historians of India like Irfan Habib, Ram Sharan Sharma etc. We can't discount the evidence they present.
- Pinging Kashmiri, Wasiq 9320, Vanamonde93, Ghatus, to get outside opinion before we start going in circles. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:45, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
References
References
- ^ Zutshi, Chitralekha (2004), Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, p. 52, ISBN 978-1-85065-700-2
- ^ Khanday, Abdul Rashid (2015), Some aspects of the administrative socio economic and cultural life of the people of Kashmir under the Sikhs 1819 to 1846, University of Kashmir/Shodhganga, Chapter 5, p. 162
- ^ Rai, Mridu (2004). Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. p. 158. ISBN 9781850656616.
However, it seems highly unlikely that the Kashmir durbar was such a helpless victim of Kashmiri Pandit officialdom. In creating chaks hanudi and mukarris assigned mostly to Hindus in the valley, the Dogras were quite clearly seeking to provide Kashmiri Pandits with a stake in supporting their rule.
- ^ Rai, Mridu (2004). Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. p. 156. ISBN 9781850656616.
...the chakdari system was also a device for the Dogras to brace their 'alliance', political and cultural, with the Kashmiri Pandits
Mughal rule, land revenue, and oppression
I see a lot of talk about how the Mughal rule was oppressive and all. An example:[1]
The Mughal period also saw a new development, namely increase in land and other revenues,[38: Land revenue was increased from one-third to one-half. Allami, Ain-i-Akbari, 374] drain of wealth, and withdrawal of state patronage to the development sector.[39: More than one half of the GDP was drained out of Kashmir, and except the construction of pleasure gardens; a a few mosques and a military cantonment, no interest was shown to the productive sector.] Without any regard for one-crop-a-year economy in Kashmir, the Mughals increased the land revenue from one-third to one-half,[40: Allami, Ain-i-Akbari, 374] and not less than half of the gross domestic product (GDP) was drained out of Kashmir to the capital of the Mughals as the state share.[41, Allami?]
Yet, Hangloo says[2]
In 1586 when the valley was included in the Mughal empire, the land revenue was theoretically demanded at one third of the produce but in practice it amounted to two thirds. Emperor Akbar fixed the land revenue demand at one half.[2] Under the Afghans (1553-1819) the state demand worked out to 60 to 65 percent of the produce.[3] The Sikh rulers (1819-1846) fixed the state's share of produce generally at one half but over and above this share the state levied a number of cesses.[4]
This illustrates the difficulty of assessing land revenue demands. The headline figure is not all there is to it. A lot depends on the revenue collection system. I expect the pre-Mughal revenue collection system used middlemen, who apparently took as much money as the state. Akbar, on the other hand, employed salaried employees to collect revenue. But salaried employees are prone to corruption. So the system seems to have returned to middlemen again.
There are two other facts from Wani's account that are worth noting:
- drain of wealth. Whatever money the Mughal court took would have been spent on the state machinery and the army etc. The Kashmiris, who had little participation in these, would have seen little of it. So, roughly half the money went out of the Kashmiri economy. This kind of drain would have continued under Afghans and Sikhs too. But Dogras, being locals, couldn't "drain" the wealth in that way. The money paid to Dogras stayed within the Kashmiri economy. So, one would expect that things must have gotten better under the Dogras.
- one-crop-a-year-economy. If Kashmiris could grow only one crop a year, they would be obviously be poorer than the rest of the country. This would explain the observations of the British observers, many of whom say that the Kashmiris were poorer than what they saw in the rest of India. This has very little to do with what the government did. Jammu and Kashmir, being a large, underpopulated state, would have had higher administrative costs than other places. In fact, it seems that the Dogra regime was often in the red. Despite all the self-congratulatory accolades that Lawrence gives himself, Zutshi says that he didn't make much difference in practice. His reforms were also counterproductive in some ways. We should be careful not to take Lawrence at face value. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 01:49, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
It is also interesting that Wani is writing in 2016 in an apparently international venue, yet he doesn't know the standard history that the Indian historians know. The reference "[2]" in Hangloo's article is
- Irfan Habib, Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1962
This should have been standard stuff that every historian is expected to know. So, almost nothing you read regarding Kashmir is historically based. Notice also this comment from Zutshi:
King Lalitaditya, who ruled Kashmir in the eighth century, is quoted in the Rajatarangini as having said, “Cultivators must be repressed and their style of living must be lower than that of the city people or the latter will suffer.”[22] Clearly, this system was not a product of the nineteenth century, although Kashmiri poetry from this century is rife with references to the evisceration of the countryside to provide for the inhabitants of urban areas.
We don't know the land revenue demand of Lalitaditya but I don't think it would have been particularly different from the modern times. This is how India always operated. And, for the first hundred years of their rule, the British happily collaborated with the system, draining India's wealth to Britain. They even did worse, by instituting trade protection, which impoverished the urban populations in addition to the rural populations. Look at famines during the British rule. So, sorry, if Lawrence comes tom-toming himself to be a big hero trying to save the Kashmiris, we have to take it in perspective. Lawrence was also politicising and communalising the Kashmiri grievance, which was probably not much different from the rest of India, except for the fact that they were living in a one-crop-a-year economy. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:45, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
References
References
- ^ Wani, Aijaz Ashraf (2016), "Ethnic identities and the dynamics of regional and sub-regional assertions in Jammu and Kashmir", in Yu-Wen Chen; Chih-yu Shih (eds.), Borderland Politics in Northern India, Routledge, pp. 37–69, ISBN 978-1-317-60517-1
- ^ Hangloo, Ratan Lal (June 1984), "The Magnitude of Land Revenue Demand in Kashmir-1846 to 1900 A.D.", Social Scientist, 12 (6): 52–59, JSTOR 3517003
Anti-Muslim policies of Sikhs
The current text says:
The Sikhs enacted a number of anti-Muslim laws,[45] which included handing out death sentences for cow slaughter,[43] closing down the Jamia Masjid in Srinagar,[45] and banning the azaan, the public Muslim call to prayer.[45]
This was apparently done by the governor Moti Ram, about whom we hear, he was the "best governor" and "kind-hearted and liked by the people". Despite the measures indicated above, In all other religious matters Muslims were given full freedom.
[1] It also appears from this source that the Jama Masjid was not closed, but congregational prayers on Fridays in the Jama Masjid of Srinagar
were banned.
Meenakshi Jain, a reasonably good but pro-Hindu historian, says this, regarding Ranjit Singh:[2]
Similarly, the Sikh ruler, Ranjit Singh, while identifying with the Khalsa tradition, issuing coins in the name the Gurumutta (the general council of Sikh leaders), banning cow slaughter in his domain and azam in the holy city in Amritsar (his only recorded act which could be considered "anti-Muslim," Bayly 2001:219-220), did not endeavour to curb the practice of Islam in his kingdom. Muslim learned men were invited to the court when Ranjit Singh first assumed royal title in 1801. Ranjit Singh also appointed Nizamuddin qazi and head of the Muslims of the Lahore region, thereby fulfilling an important requirement for Punjab to be regarded dar-ul-Islam, a land where Islam could be freely practised. In a public gesture or respect, Ranjit Singh visited the mausoleums of Data Ganj Bakhsh and Shah Abdul Maali and made offerings.[4] He contributed to the repair of mosques in his kingdom, besides granting land for the upkeep of several Muslim shrines (Gupta 1991:425-428).
So the evidence is mixed, which is not reflected in the article text. I don't know enough about the Jama Masjid closure, but I do know that the Jama Masjid is an intensely political place till this day. Banning or restricting it could have been a political measure, rather than a religious one, especially given all the other evidence we have of the religious tolerance of these rulers. Pinging Joshua Jonathan and Ms Sarah Welch for their input. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:59, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
- We also know that Guru Tegh Bahadur was executed for defending Kashmiri Brahmins. That needs to be covered too, to set the scene of the religious conflicts of the period. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:03, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
- And also the fact that Kashmiri Hindus were force fed beef in order to convert them to Islam permanently.[3] Once again, this means that cow slaughter has become a political symbol, rather than a religious one. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:10, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
@Kautilya3: First thing first. A quick wikitool scan suggests that at least one large para in Sikh-Kashmir section is exact copy of page 12 of this published about 3 years ago (don't know who copied whom, but 'lulu' publisher is non-RS, and if the wikipedia article is a copy of that source, we need surgery and rewrite).
Evidence is mixed indeed. While working on the Ranjit Singh article with @Apuldram, it was loud and clear that sources were divided on Sikh-Muslim relations during his era. Some Sikhs and Muslims had a relationship of respect, tolerance and support, as well as had serious regional conflicts, each side presented as persecuting the other. Ranjit Singh's army and administration had Muslims, for example. There was a period of mutual retaliation, particularly in Kashmir and elsewhere, depending on who was in power. For balance and NPOV, all this needs to be carefully summarized, they do not suggest one side only as persecutor or only as persecuted. Further, there were differences in the quality and aspects of Sikh-Sufi, Sikh-Shia, Sikh-Sunni relations. Other sources to consider for that section: Bayly,[4] Ahmed,[5] Low,[6] and Murphy.[7]
- The text was contributed by Fowler&fowler in 2011. So it is obvious who copied from whom :-) Not that I would ever doubt the integrity of Fowler! -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:38, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
- @Apuldram: any other sources and suggestions to improve the balance and quality of Sikh-Kashmir section? Ms Sarah Welch (talk) 14:03, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
After some research, here are my conclusions. The banning of cow-slaughter and the banning azan were policies of the Sikh state, which were implemented throughout the empire, not specifically with regard to Kashmir. Rajmohan Gandhi says at one point that these were ways of the Sikh state distinguishing itself from a Mughal identity. But Meenakshi Jain shows that the banning of cow-slaughter was done by all "Hindu" (i.e., Indic) rulers in this period throughout the subcontinent, clearly a religious, but not necessarily communal, assertion. The Hindu-Sikh distinctions were not underlined at this time. So, Hindus and Sikhs jointly formed the "ruling class" of the Sikh empire. At the same time, there was no religious bigotry.[8] Ranjit Singh's rule seems more akin to Akbar's than Aurangzeb's.
The "closure" of the Jama Masjid was a specific policy of Dewan Moti Ram in Kashmir. Victoria Schofield explains:
Fearing discontent amongst the local population, Moti Ram closed the Jama Masjid to prevent crowds of disaffected Muslims from gathering there. Although the motive may have been political rather than religious, the closure of the mosque upset the local Muslim Kashmiris.[9]
So I was right in saying that it was a political measure, rather than a religious one. I will edit the article according to this information. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:37, 3 January 2017 (UTC)
- I suggest that you, and others here, not engage in research, treating all sources as equal---and with those suiting your long-held prejudices more equal---and making a mess of the page semantically and stylistically. Instead, let the experts who write text books, tertiary texts, or survey articles on Kashmir historiography, draw those conclusions. Please also don't edit the article according to whatever "information" you have divined unless you want to turn this article into a disputed page. There is no dispute about the horrors of Sikh rule in Kashmir. How many sources published by academic presses do you want me to cite? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 15:58, 3 January 2017 (UTC)
References
- ^ * Gupta, Hari Ram (1991), History of the Sikhs: The Sikh lion of Lahore, Maharaja Ranjit Singh, 1799-1839, Munshiram Manoharlal, p. 130
- ^ Jain, Meenakshi (2010), Parallel Pathways: Essays on Hindu-Muslim Relations 1707–1857, Konark Publishers, p. 96, ISBN 9788122007831
- ^ Krishna, Nanditha (2014), Sacred Animals of India, Penguin Books Limited, pp. 108–, ISBN 978-81-8475-182-6
- ^ Christopher Alan Bayly (1996). Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-66360-1.
- ^ Ishtiaq Ahmed (1998). State, Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia. Bloomsburg Academic. pp. 139–140. ISBN 978-1-85567-578-0.
- ^ D. A. Low (18 June 1991). Political Inheritance of Pakistan. Palgrave Macmillan UK. ISBN 978-1-349-11556-3.
- ^ Anne Murphy (2012). The Materiality of the Past: History and Representation in Sikh Tradition. Oxford University Press. pp. 78–112 (sorry many pages, but this review is worth a read). ISBN 978-0-19-991629-0.
- ^ Gandhi, Rajmohan (2013), Pujab: A History from Aurangzeb to Mountbatten, Aleph Book Company, Chapter 4, ISBN 9382277587
- ^ Schofield, Victoria (1996), Kashmir in the crossfire, I.B. Tauris, p. 34, ISBN 978-1-86064-036-0
Foreign rule section
ps: why is that section called "Foreign rule"? why not "Sikh rule" or something more appropriate, descriptively neutral. Ms Sarah Welch (talk) 14:18, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
- See the section above titled "Foreign rule". More generally, I thought there was overuse and abuse of religion in this article. And, it is getting worse. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:38, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
References
- @Kautilya3: Indeed. The Muslim rule section, one above the Foreign rule section, looks short and odd. Needs more summary from WP:RS. It has a quote, the source claimed for that quote is Muhammad Asimov and Clifford Bosworth. The source starts the same way, but is stating something different:
Shah Mir arrived in Kashmir in 1313 along with his family, during the reign of Suhadeva (1301–1320), whose service he entered. In subsequent years, through his tact and ability, Shah Mir rose to prominence and became one of the most important personalities of his time. Later after the death in 1338 of Udayanadeva, the brother of Suhedeva he was able to assume the kingship himself and thus laid the foundation of permanent Muslim rule in Kashmir. – Muhammad Asimov and Clifford Bosworth[1]
- I don't see the "due to his race" etc part. The part starting with "Rinchan..." looks odd. We should be quoting exact. Do you see the support for "race" etc part anywhere? Ms Sarah Welch (talk) 15:34, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
- Looks like it was vandalised. I have fixed it now. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:53, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
- I don't see the "due to his race" etc part. The part starting with "Rinchan..." looks odd. We should be quoting exact. Do you see the support for "race" etc part anywhere? Ms Sarah Welch (talk) 15:34, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
References
- ^ Muhammad S Asimov; Clifford E Bosworth (1992). History of Civilizations of Central Asia (Volume 4). Motilal Banarsidass. p. 307. ISBN 978-81-208-1595-7.
Paraphrasing
Will someone explain to me how, and by what rules of precis writing, the sentence:
Not only are Jammu, Ladakh, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan separate from the Kashmir Valley geographically, they are also non-Kashmiri areas, with the Kashmir Valley being the genuine ''Kashmir'
constitutes a paraphrase of the longer quote from Christopher Snedden's book, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris (OUP, 2015, pages 18 and 19) to which the sentence is cited:
In 1947, Kashmir was a geographically identifiable region that was called the Vale of Kashmir or the Kashmir Valley...In 1947, the other regions of J&K were not as well known as Kashmir. Jammu and other non-Kashmiri areas of J&K, except possibly Ladakh, had never enjoyed the geo-political unity, regional existence or continuous rule that Kashmiris had experienced for long periods...Kashmir's acclaim is why J&K was popularly called 'Kashmir'
Will they explain why this particular excerpt from Snedden has been chosen and how does highlighting it reconcile with other significant content about usage involving the word "Kashmir" in the introduction of the book, for example, in the first paragraph of the introduction, on page 7:
What is Kashmir? Who are Kashmiris? Terminology is important, especially if its use is clear. The term 'Kashmir' refers to the former princely 'State of Jammu and Kashmir', to use its official title. Under British rule of the Indian subcontinent that ended in 1947, the people called this entity 'Kashmir'.
Finally, will they explain, what significant NPOV content does this sentence add that is not already included in the sentence occurring earlier in the lead: "Until the mid-19th century, the term "Kashmir" denoted only the valley between the Great Himalayas and the Pir Panjal mountain range."Until such time as I receive a cogent answer, I shall be removing this sentence from the lead. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:01, 3 January 2017 (UTC)
- The previous sentence is simply not sufficiently clear enough and only seems to be limited in scope to the mid 19th century. It does not really make clear that 'Kashmir' is uniquely the Valley in all ways-geographically, culturally and ethnically- even today (and will be forever). Towns Hill
- I asked for rules of paraphrasing, not your personal emotional fantasies. Please take this seriously, otherwise I will take this page to dispute resolution. You and other editors who are adding nonsensical, undigested, content are doing a major disservice to Wikipedia. Again, tell me how you managed "genuine." It doesn't occur anywhere in the first 100 pages of the cited text. This page has been stable for some ten years. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:37, 3 January 2017 (UTC)